Suppose you are a propositional realist, and suppose you think propositions are the primary bearers of the truth-values, the premises and conclusions of logically valid arguments, and hence the terms of logical relations such as entailment, consistency, and inconsistency. Suppose you also hold the standard account of logical validity as truth-preservation in virtue of form. Then it seems that you have a compelling reason for holding that propositions are structured—in particular, that they have logical structure.

This paper focuses on the claim that propositions have structure. I argue that logical structure is too indeterminate to be propositional structure. Indeed, attributing logical structure to propositions leads to a Benacerraf-style problem: there are too many equally good candidates for being the logical structure of any given proposition and no principled way to choose from among them. So propositional structure cannot be logical structure.

This might not seem like a serious worry since, nowadays, advocates of structured propositions are more inclined to attribute LF-structure to propositions. That is, they are likely to hold that a proposition expressed by a sentence $s$ has the sort of structure encoded by the level of representation of $s$ that provides all and only the syntactic information relevant to $s$’s semantic interpretation. If LF-structure encodes all of the relevant logical properties, then LF-structure can do the work of logical form in accounting for the role of propositions as logical objects.

After discussing the similarities and differences between logical form and LF, I argue that attributing LF-structure to propositions faces similar indeterminacy problems.