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Geografia d'Europa: textos de suport |
The Schengen Agreement provides for the abolition of internal border controls among the signatory states and increased control of the common external borders. However, as first reports from various borders appear to show, the signatory states have their own views on the practical implications of these measures. Thus, Germany has stepped up surveillance at its internal border with France, Austria is intending to grant the German police a territorially unrestricted right of "hot pursuit", while cross-border activities of the Italian police are to be confined to a zone of only 10 kilometres inside the Austrian border.
As for Switzerland, a non-Schengen and non-EU state, it
is being treated by its Schengen-neighbours France and Germany almost as
if it had already joined the Schengen Group.Already it appears that the
loudly publicised "abolition of internal border controls" is "compensated"
for by massively increased surveillance of entire border regions.
Austria
On 15 March, a border control operation at the Austro-Hungarian frontier crossing-point, Nickelsdorf, caused a traffic jam with travellers waiting for up to nine hours to cross. Regional security authorities had announced the operation as a "test-run" according to the requirements of the Schengen Agreement's provisions on the control of external borders. The operation drew angry reactions from the public both in Austria and Hungary and the Hungarian Office of Tourism expressed concern about deteriorating relations between the two neighbouring countries. This led the Austrian Interior Minister, Franz Löschnak, to hurriedly and firmly deny any connection between the operation and the"Schengen" process. Instead, the operation aimed at clamping down on smugglers of illegal immigrants, Löschnak claimed. But an investigation by a Viennese daily newspaper soon revealed that the Interior Ministry had actually ordered the security authorities of Burgenland to carry out border controls "according to the provisions of the Schengen Agreement".
Some commentators speculate that the Nickelsdorf operation might have got out of control because of overzealous customs officers trying to prove their aptitude for membership of the Border Protection Force that is to be set up in view of the implementation of external border control measures of "Schengen" and the EU.The new Grenzschutz (Border Protection Force) will come under the control of the Interior Ministry (instead of the Customs Administration) and Customs officers fear for their jobs.The Grenzschutz is to recruit 4,400 officers within four years. Its task will consist in controlling Austria's 1,460 km long external border with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia, as well as with Switzerland and Liechtenstein.
At the "internal" Austro-Italian frontier crossing-point, customs checks at the border have been all but abolished. Instead, travellers are now often confronted with grim-faced, machine-gun toting Gendarmerie officers, posted on the road some hundred metres inside Austrian territory. Their task is to find so-called "passers" (smugglers of human beings), drug traffickers and wanted persons by carrying out random checks.
In March, the Austrian Government was negotiating with Italy on a reciprocal right of cross-border "hot pursuit" for the two countries' police forces, according to the Schengen provisions. The agreement would come into force at the moment of the entry into force of the Schengen Agreement in both countries. The bilateral agreement provides for the police forces of both countries to operate within a 10 km range inside the border of its neighbouring country.
A similar agreement between Austria and Germany is more "liberal": it contains no territorial restrictions on cross-border "hot pursuit" (see FECL No.26, p.4). The "discrimination" against the Italians by Austria once again reveals the different levels of "prestige" various national police forces enjoy within the EU.
Sources: Der Standard, 15.3.95; Kärntner Tageszeitung,
24.2.95, 7.3.95.
Switzerland
For months, Swiss police and security officials have been warning against the possible effects of the implementation of the Schengen Agreement for their country. A senior federal police official predicted serious impediments to Swiss cross-border traffic, once neighbouring states introduced increased control at their external borders with Switzerland.
Off the record, however, police officials in Switzerland, France, and Germany make reassuring statements that the entry into force of the Schengen Agreement will have little effect on the situation at Swiss frontier crossing points. The extent and economic importance of simple commuter traffic, for example in the Basle region, which borders both on France and Germany, prevents a strict implementation of external border control as provided for by the Schengen Agreement. German governmental sources also emphasise that there is actually no need for changes at the borders with its southern neighbour, "since Switzerland has gradually upgraded its border controls in recent years and keeps up with the Schengen states in other respects too".
As a matter of fact, Switzerland has to a large extent voluntarily harmonised its security policies with Schengen standards, by, among other things, setting up a plethora of new computer systems dealing with policing and internal security (see FECL No.9, p.6; No.13, p.7), by introducing new laws intended to combat organised crime and money laundering, and in the field of foreigners and asylum law (see FECL No.30, p.9; No.27, p.2; No.26 p.3; No.25, p.1; No.6, p.3). Swiss police and security agencies are also making successful efforts to develop cooperation with police and intelligence agencies of the EU member states on an informal level.According to the German Border Protection Force (Bundesgrenzschutz), a number of Swiss nationals are registered in the SIS. It is an open question whether Swiss security bodies are exchanging sensitive data with the SIS through the intermediary of Germany.
But it seems clear that Germany views Switzerland as a more trustworthy partner in policing than some EU and even Schengen partners. The Director General of the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police is confident about the future of police cooperation in the EU: "Our European partner states cannot have an interest in Switzerland becoming a `factor of insecurity'", he recently argued.
Sources: Luzerner Neueste Nachrichten, 25.3.95; Neue
Zürcher Zeitung, 23.2.95, 27.3.95; our sources.
Germany
On the Monday following the entry into force of the Schengen Agreement, Czech commuters working in Germany waited for up to three hours at the Philippsreut (Bavaria) crossing-point. The chief of the local border police said that commuters apparently had not taken the announcement of stricter border controls seriously and had not taken into account the longer waiting times at the border on the way to their work.Apparently, Polish commuters were more far-sighted.
No serious delays arose at crossing-points in the Land of Brandenburg, since many Polish commuters left their homes up to three hours earlier than usual, in order to get to their jobs in time. Thus waiting times did not exceed 30 to 60 minutes - "as usual", a spokesman of the Bundesgrenzschutz said. Within the first 24 hours of the entry into effect of the Schengen Agreement seven persons registered in the SIS were arrested at the border. An additional five were detained the following day. No delays were reported at Frankfurt international airport.
The State Secretary at the Federal Interior Ministry, Kurt Schelter, has announced that Germany wishes neighbouring states to introduce an obligation for their railway companies to sell tickets to destinations in Germany only to travellers in possession of valid travel documents.The move aims at extending "carrier liability" as already introduced for airlines to other carriers. Negotiations are already under way with Denmark and Sweden. Mr. Schelter pointed out that similar obligations imposed by Germany on Scandinavian ferry companies had produced the expected effect. Practically no ferry passengers any longer tried to enter Germany without valid documents (see FECL No.22, p.7).
The State secretary also said that the Bundesgrenzschutz was offering special training courses to carriers, namely bus companies, "enabling them, in particular, to recognise false documents". Mr. Schelter further pointed to the "good experience" with airlines. Since the introduction of carrier sanctions, the proportion of air-traffic in the total number of illegal entries into Germany had dropped from 20 to 2 per cent, he said.While the abolition of internal border controls has been generally welcomed by German politicians, many police and customs officers appear to be less enthusiastic.
Thus, for example, the Commissioner of the Bavarian Police in charge of Bavaria's frontiers with the Austrian Land of Vorarlberg, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, recently declared that "no alternatives exist to border controls". "The further away from the borders we move, the more success in the search of criminals becomes uncertain", he said. The Commissioner pointed to police statistics according to which 40,000 criminals had been stopped and 65,000 "undesirable persons" had been denied entry at the German borders in 1993.Paradoxically, in view of the entry into force of the Schengen Agreement, German border surveillance has been upgraded not only on the country's "external" borders in the East, but also at the "internal" border to France in the West.After the discovery, in December, of two bus-loads of "illegal immigrants" (mostly Albanian refugees from Kosovo) in a border town of Baden-Württemberg, 500 additional officers of the BGS have been sent to the Western border. According to a spokesman for the BGS, their task is to systematically track down "people with dark skin and southern looks".
Checks in trains heading for the border have also been increased.According to BGS statistics, from December to February, 82 "smugglers of illegal immigrants" were arrested at the border at Baden-Württemberg. However, only one of the alleged smugglers was actually convicted. This indicates that police statistics are often unreliable. According to various reports, BGS personnel tend to automatically consider drivers of vehicles carrying undocumented foreigners as "reckless smugglers" - an accusation rarely confirmed by the subsequent legal procedures.
Sources: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 28.3.95; Junge
Welt, 2.3.95; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26.1.95; Neues Deutschland, 24.5.95.
SIS breaks down on second day of operation
The German N-SIS (the national component of the SIS), broke down on Monday 27 March, after only one day of operation. The system, which is based at the BKA (Federal Office of Criminal Investigation) in Wiesbaden, was out of order for six and a half hours, according to the Bavarian Interior Ministry. The breakdown caused serious problems of communication between police computers inside Germany.
Some 8,000 stationary and mobile computer terminals are connected to the German N-SIS.The BKA had first blamed a failure of the Strasbourg based C-SIS (Central support of the SIS) for the breakdown. This assertion was quickly denied by France, which is in charge of the C-SIS. A spokesman for the C-SIS said that no failures had been reported by any member state. Apparently, the BKA did not report the failure to Strasbourg.The Germans later had to embarrassingly retract their hasty assertion that the French were to blame. The climb down once again reveals rivalries between the Schengen states about who has the best-performing computer technology (see FECL No.23, p.1).
The incident also highlights an on-going conflict between German Federal institutions and some Länder. Indeed, while the federal BKA tried to play down the incident, a spokesman of the Bavarian Interior Ministry rushed to call the incident "disquieting". "This has probably not happened for the last time", he predicted and pointed at Bavaria's long-standing demand for the decentralisation of the German N-SIS.
Source: Deutsche Presseagentur (DPA), 28.3.95.
Fuente: FECL 32 (March 1995)
http://www.fecl.org/circular/3201.htm
"SCHENGEN" AND THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES
The Danish Government has already applied for membership of the Schengen Group. And on 27 February, the Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson announced at a meeting of the Nordic Council in Rejkjavik that his government is preparing the country's accession to "Schengen". Carlsson's announcement came as a surprise to the leaders of all other parties represented in the Swedish parliament. Carlsson however emphasised that the maintenance of the Nordic Passport Union was a precondition to a Swedish membership in the Schengen Group. Both Norway's and Iceland's Prime Ministers have stressed their countries' preparedness to carry out external border controls according to Schengen requirements.
However, given Norway's and Iceland's non-membership of the EU, the matter is causing some headaches for diplomats both in Brussels and the Nordic capitals.Denmark too is unequivocal about the prerequisites of its membership of "Schengen". Recently, the country's negotiators clearly stated that the introduction of (external) border controls at the internal borders of the Nordic Union are "impossible from a political point of view". This indicates a harshening of Danish positions.
As late as November 1994, the Danish delegation considered that an "adaptation" of the Nordic Passport Union to "Schengen" requirements was possible.Denmark proposed the following possible solutions to the problem:
a) Without becoming members of the Schengen group, Norway and Iceland (both are non-EU states) carry out external border controls on behalf of Schengen, i.e. their borders to the Schengen territory become internal borders at which controls are abolished.Norway has already indicated its interest in joining the Schengen group on several occasions and stressed before the Schengen Presidency that such a step would not even require a referendum.
b) Schengen reaches a special agreement with the two countries.
c) Norway and Iceland implement part of the Schengen provisions or even join the Schengen group as members of the EEA.
However, the delegation of the Belgian Presidency of the Schengen Group has reservations regarding the Danish proposals, on the following grounds:
Based on the above, the Delegation of the Belgian Schengen presidency, according to a document dated 22 February, drew the conclusion that "it seems out of question to make substantial progress in the short term".The document also mentions Danish concern about increased controls at the German-Danish borders expected as a result of the entry into force of the Schengen Agreement.Both in Norway and Sweden, government plans aiming at gaining some form of Schengen membership have drawn angry reactions.Hitherto, accession to the Schengen Agreement could not be subjected to any conditions and permanent concessions demanded by one member state. The realisation of external border controls in the Schengen area implies access to the SIS, which is not granted to non-Schengen states according to the text of the Agreement. Even if Norway was granted access to the SIS, a problem would remain regarding the Schengen states' common visa policy and their mutual consultations on visa related matters. "For Schengen, the problem is not so much about Norwegians but concerns foreigners who could freely enter the Schengen area via Norway", it says in a report of the Schengen Central Group. A partial adoption of the Schengen Agreement by a non-member state would amount to a "Schengen à la carte". Moreover, in this event, Norway would have to implement decisions of other states on visa matters on its own territory. The membership of an EEA-country would not only require a change of the Schengen Implementing Agreement, but also result in the impossibility of integrating Schengen into the Third Pillar of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union at a later stage.
However, criticism of the Schengen Agreement does not focus so much on matters related to civil liberties, such as police cooperation, the SIS and increased external border controls, but rather on the abolition of internal border controls. In both countries their is a strong public belief that controls at national borders are an effective means of preventing the influx of narcotics.
Just as in Britain, the traditional "insularity" of Scandinavians might be the real reason for their opposition to the abolition of border controls.EU opponents in Norway claim that, by seeking to join the Schengen cooperation, the government is showing total disrespect for the people's will expressed in the Referendum on EU membership, and is deliberately playing down the political consequences of an eventual Schengen membership. This view is likely to be supported by a majority of Norwegians. Recent opinion polls show that the voters are not regretting their No vote to EU membership.
Sources: Compte rendu sur les entretiens entre la Présidence Schengen et le Danemark menés à Copenhague le 15 février 1995, Schengen Central Group, Brussels, 22.2.95, SCH/C (95) 13; Svenska dagbladet, 27.2.95; Dagens Nyheter, 28.2.95; Klassekampen, 28.2.95; Le Monde, 1.3.95.
Fuente: FECL 32 (March 1995)
http://www.fecl.org/circular/3204.htm
GERMAN PROGRESS REPORT ON SCHENGEN IMPLEMENTATION
In September the German government presented a report to Parliament on the first six months of operation of the Schengen Implementing Agreement (SIA). By the end of September 1995, the Schengen states' common police data register, SIS, contained a total of 3.4 million data records on persons and objects. Control activities at external borders have increased considerably, the report shows, and while internal border checks at official crossing-points have been abolished by all Schengen states except France, several member states have upgraded surveillance activities in areas close to internal borders. The report misses no opportunity to boast about the German leadership of the Schengen Group.
The situation at internal borders
The report stresses that, as a rule, German border police (BGS) are no longer carrying out any checks on persons except for checks justified by a specific suspicion or incident. This is not the case for Germany's Schengen neighbours, France and the Netherlands, the report points out. The Dutch have set up a mobile border police force operating in a vast zone behind its internal borders. The mobile units are authorised to stop and check persons at random. In French border districts, some 16,000 border police, Police, Gendarmerie and Customs officers are allowed to check persons without giving a reason. Moreover, France is still refusing to abolish checks at internal borders. (France recently announced that it was prolonging this measure for a further six months at least, due to the recent wave of terrorist attacks and to what the German report calls "alleged problems" in implementing the SIA). In doing so, the French government is referring to Article 2.2 of the SIA, which allows member states to reintroduce internal border checks for a limited period, where "public policy or national security so require".
The report suggests that the extensive internal border control activities of its neighbours are putting Germany's alleged willingness to reduce controls under strain. Since the entry into force of the SIA in late March 1995, the number of BGS officers posted at internal border crossing-points has been massively reduced to fewer than 200, it says. Their task is limited essentially to handling the readmission of foreigners according to the Schengen rules defining the member state of first entry. Between April and July 1995, Germany took back 7,556 individuals, while it returned only 728 to other Schengen states. The report blames this "disparity" on the intense French and Dutch control activities behind their internal borders. However, some lines below, it says: "Along the internal frontier an extra 500 BGS officers are keeping a watching eye". The main objective of the force is "to counter the continuing migratory pressure from Yugoslavia via Italy by the use of all possibilities still permitted under the Schengen Implementing Agreement".
Their tasks consist of "surveillance and reconnaissance
in "areas near the borders" and in carrying out checks in "concrete cases
of suspicion". These "discreet" BGS activities resulted in the seizure
of 496 illegal aliens and 29 "presumed smugglers of immigrants" in areas
near the border, between April and August 1995. The BGS further arrested
50 persons in border areas based on criminal search requests in the SIS.
The situation at the external borders
The report notes that all Schengen member states have reinforced their control and surveillance forces. Increased control activities at German external borders have not caused any major problems, it says, thanks to the BGS which "on the one hand is putting into practice the Schengen regulations but is on the other is proceeding with unbureaucratic flexibility". But queues of up to four hours are reported from the German-Polish borders.The average number of entries denied at German external borders (10,000 per month!) has not increased since the entry into force of the SIA. In the first six months of the SIA in operation, only 56 persons were denied entry due to registration in the SIS by other Schengen states.
There has been a steady rise in illegal immigration since
January 1995. In the month of August 1995, 3,135 persons were stopped for
attempting to enter Germany illegally.26,828 searched persons were arrested
at German external borders in the second quarter of 1995. Most of the arrests
took place at the Eastern borders with Poland and the Czech Republic. According
to the report, the increase in arrests at the external borders is not due
to the SIS (only 181 hits) but rather to an increase in personnel responsible
for border checks as required by the Schengen Agreement.
Schengen Information System
The information stored in the N-SIS of the seven countries in which the SIA entered into force on 27 March 1995 is now identical [N-SIS: the national components of the SIS, linked by the C-SIS, the central support of the system in Strasbourg].
A total of 30,000 terminals in the seven Schengen states have access to the SIS, of which 9,000 are in Germany.According to the report, the higher hit rate of the SIS as compared with national criminal search databases confirms its practical effectiveness.
At the end of September 1995, the number of data records stored in the SIS had reached 3.4 million records on persons, objects and orders of denial of entry. The overwhelming majority of records were entered by Germany and France (Germany: 2.3 million, France: 1 million).Of the 2.3 million German records, 701,534 concerned individuals, 290,000 motor vehicles, and 956,778 ID documents. The large majority of persons, 603,732, were "undesirable aliens (mostly rejected asylum-seekers)" registered for refusal of entry (under Article 96 SIA). The number of individuals registered on other grounds
The report expresses satisfaction with the technical functioning
of the SIS. However, the only evidence for this presented in the report
concerns one single month: in August 1995, the German N-SIS suffered "only
a single" one hour system breakdown. (This wording arouses one's curiosity:
what
is the total number of breakdowns of the C-SIS and all N-SIS in the first
six months of operation of the system?).
Common visa policy
"Important progress" was made in realising a common visa
policy. The Schengen countries' uniform visa, as affixed inside passports,
has technical security features which make counterfeiting all but impossible.Germany
would like the so-called "Grey visa-list" (the list of countries whose
nationals are subject to different visa requirements in the Schengen states)
to be reduced rapidly. "Due to pressure from the other member states, particularly
Germany", Italy agreed to re-introduce a visa obligation for citizens of
the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) in September, the report stresses.
Implementation of the SIA's asylum law provisions
The report identifies a tendency among member states to
refuse to take back rejected asylum seekers and other aliens from another
member state under the "first country of entry" scheme.In the opinion of
the German government, this is due to inadequately-prepared requests. The
report demands that requesting states must present "sufficient circumstantial
evidence" showing that the requested state is actually the country of first
entry into the Schengen territory. Moreover, the period for replying to
a request must be considerably reduced.
Police cooperation
A bi-lateral agreement on police cooperation already exists
between Germany and France, and similar agreements are currently being
negotiated with the Benelux countries. Cross-border "hot pursuit" and police
observation are already possible for the German police in all Schengen
neighbour states. The report lists 11 cases of hot pursuit between the
end of March and the beginning of July. All cases concerned the Dutch-German
border.The German government finds it "unsatisfactory" that the individual
member states have made different declarations as to space and time limits
of police cross-border operations. "Germany advocates a harmonisation and
extension of the provisions on observation and hot pursuit. The aim is
harmonisation on the basis of the German position: a right of pursuit and
seizure for foreign police on the neighbouring territory without any space
or time limits."
Fight against drugs
Referring to the French-Dutch dispute on anti-drug policies,
the "German government is prepared to once more put pressure on the Hague,
together with France" with the aim of obtaining a change in the liberal
Dutch policies on drugs. But hinting at the French unwillingness to abolish
checks at internal borders, the report also states that "the liberal Dutch
attitude in the field of drugs has long been known about, and has not been
a reason not to sign, ratify and put into force the Schengen Implementing
Agreement".
Overall assessment
Considering the complexity of the Schengen structure, Germany's assessment of cooperation is "predominantly positive". "As the spokesman for the other Schengen states, the Federal Republic of Germany is undertaking all possible measures to continue to propel the Schengen process forward and not to let it be paralysed by the continuation of internal border controls by France". The following action can contribute to achieving this goal: Steady enlargement of Schengen to all EU member states; making it more difficult for Schengen states to maintain checks at internal borders under Article 2.2 SIA, by the establishment of common criteria; "The full use by the Border Protection Police, the Federal Office of criminal Investigation and the Police of the Länder of the widened limits of cooperation provided by the SIA".
Source: Fortschreibung des Berichts über die bisherigen
Erfahrungen mit der Anwendung des Schengener Durchführungsabkommens,
German Federal Government, Bonn, September 1995.
Comment
Although the German report gives only figures and assessments of one Schengen member state, it contains some interesting indications as to the development of the Schengen cooperation.An important preliminary conclusion is that the member states are betraying the main declared aim of the Schengen Agreement - to realize the right of free movement within the Schengen territory. Most member states are simply replacing the former visible and foreseeable forms of control at defined crossing-points at their internal borders by invisible and unforeseeable surveillance in deep zones just inside the border.
France is going even further. It is making full use of the arsenal of "compensatory measures" of massively extended police control provided by the Schengen Agreement, while opposing the abolition of internal border controls.It is well known that police and security circles (and not only in France) while loudly promoting "compensatory measures", have never really accepted the idea of abolishing border checks and are attempting everything to have them re-introduced - formally, as in France, or informally, as in Germany and the Netherlands. Thus, we might soon find ourselves subject to increased policing as a "compensatory measure" for internal border checks that have never really been abolished.A serious legal deficiency of the Schengen Implementing Agreement also deserves mention. In refusing to abolish its internal border controls, France is pleading Article 2.2, just one of the plethora of exemption clauses that characterise this convention.
All other member states appear to agree that France is abusing this provision. However, they have few ways of forcing a French change. For this, the governments of the member states have only themselves to blame. Indeed, by agreeing a convention that does not provide for a common and independent court for its interpretation they have paved the way for conflicts such as the one which currently sets France in opposition to the rest of the Schengen-states. In the long run, this might well result in all member states applying only those parts of the Agreement that suit them, according to their political priorities of the day. This is unlikely to hamper increased police cooperation, but could well contribute to further undermining the rights and liberties of the citizens and in particular of asylum seekers and immigrants.
The German report makes mention of a steady rise of illegal immigration since the beginning of 1995 but sees no connection with the entry into force of the SIA. It would probably be more correct to say that increased illegal immigration is not only due to Schengen, but to generally ever more restrictive European immigration and asylum policies, of which the Schengen cooperation is a driving force. Be that as it may, their are growing indications from all Western European countries that illegal immigration is on a steady rise. This would suggest that the Schengen and EU policy of preventing immigration by increased policing is proving a failure. Some day, we may discover that by pressing migrants into illegality and thereby creating "outlaw" populations in the midst of our societies, so-called European "internal security" policies have become a threat to public security themselves.
Fuente: FECL 40 (December 1995/January 1996)
http://www.fecl.org/circular/4002.htm
ONE YEAR OF SCHENGEN IN OPERATION
On 26 March 1995, the Schengen Implementing Convention (SIC) entered into force in seven member states (Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Spain and Portugal). According to both the Schengen "Central Group" of senior officials and the German Interior Ministry, the results of one year of implementation are satisfactory, despite shortcomings in various areas. More than ever, the Schengen cooperation is presented as an engine of the European Union. The question is, how long it will remain outside the EU framework.
Internal borders
The checks at internal Schengen border crossing points (i.e. crossing points between two Schengen-member states) have been abolished, except for French controls at that country's borders with the Benelux countries.On the other hand, the Schengen states agreed on 24 October 1995 that the protection of the internal borders should be considered a matter of "common interest" and that the abolition of checks at crossing points should be compensated for by further improved cooperation between the police, the Customs and the judiciary, as well as by joint mobile controls in areas 20 km deep on both sides of internal borders.
The Permanent Conference of German Interior Ministers
describes common border zones as "sensitive crimino-geographical areas"
requiring continually improved transborder police cooperation.For this
purpose, joint bi-national police offices have been set up at the French-German
and the French-Spanish borders. Similar agreements are planned between
Germany and the Benelux countries. Germany regards this form of joint transborder
policing as "a model for a particularly intense form of European police
cooperation" and even considers concluding similar bi-lateral agreements
with Poland and the Czech Republic, i.e. countries neighbouring the Schengen
territory.In its annual report on the implementation of the SIC, the Schengen
Central Group notes that all member states are already "more or less systematically"
carrying out mobile controls in areas close to internal borders to control
the movement of third country nationals.
Cross-border observation and hot pursuit
The SIC provides for the police of one member state to cross the border of a neighbouring member state for observing or hunting criminals. However, the details of such cross-border police operations are defined in bi-lateral agreements between neighbour states. Germany has granted all its neighbouring Schengen member states a right of hot pursuit without time or territorial restrictions, while the German police are subject to varying restrictions in Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Germany is now pressing for a harmonisation of the bilateral agreements to allow unrestricted observation and hot pursuit.
For the time being, cross-border hot pursuits and observations
do not appear to occur very frequently. Germany, for example, reports only
51 cases of observation and 27 of hot pursuit from or to Germany, in the
first 12 months of implementation of the SIC.
External borders
Intensified control measures at the external borders under the SIC, such as the requirement to check every third country (non-EU) national entering the Schengen territory against the computerised Schengen Information System (SIS), have sometimes led to delays at crossing-points and increased working pressure for border personnel. Two-track systems enabling a separate processing of "difficult or dubious cases", as well as border control posts lying side by side and permitting close cooperation with the neighbouring third country, help speed up controls, the Central Group says.Surveillance is being steadily increased at the "green borders" outside official crossing points. Nonetheless, the Central Group reports constant illegal entry from Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and South America, particularly at the German borders with Poland and the Czech Republic, but also at the French-Italian and French-Swiss borders (which became external Schengen borders in March 1995).
Innenpolitik, a monthly magazine published by the German Interior Ministry, particularly mentions the Mediterranean port of Bar in Montenegro as an example for a "localised and geographically restricted source of danger". According to Innenpolitik, thousands of undesirable third country nationals - most of them Kosovo-Albanians and Turks take the ferry from Bar to the Italian port of Bari and then make their way to Germany and the Benelux countries via France.
Innenpolitik stresses that, with regard to external border
security, the extension of Schengen cooperation to the Nordic countries
will result in "the line of protection and defence being further advanced".As
the next step, Germany wishes to facilitate full Swiss participation in
Schengen cooperation. For the time being, the Schengen states should seek
bilateral agreements "made up of elements corresponding to the Schengen
Agreement" with the Central and Eastern European states and Switzerland.
The German objective is to "get these states to progressively bring their
security and immigration policies closer to Schengen standards".
Border controls moved to the countries of departure
With a view to the effective prevention of illegal immigration, pre-boarding checks at airports of departure outside the Schengen territory or joint controls at Schengen airports of destination are increasingly carried out on so-called "risk flights". According to the Central Group, the implementation of the SIC has led to increased checks on third country nationals - mainly transiting passengers, who were usually not controlled earlier. This has resulted in a "significant rise" in denied entries.
A general trend towards moving entry controls to countries of departure is highlighted by Innenpolitik. The magazine describes the Schengen member states' foreign representations as "advanced security posts" and stresses the need for close cooperation of embassies and consulates in processing visa applications. The integration of the automatised VISION-system for mutual consultation on visa applications is to be integrated into the SIS through the setting up of SIRENE II, the second phase of the electronic communication system for Supplementary Information Requests at National Entries.
The introduction of a common Schengen visa allowing its bearer to travel to all Schengen member states, has led to visa applicants filing their application at the consulate of the Schengen member state which suits them best with regard to accessibility, visa fees and liberal reputation. Since the beginning of the implementation of the SIC, the total number of visa applications has significantly dropped by 17 per cent, from 4,893,119 (1994) to 4,083,540 (1995). But the drop in applications varies strongly from one member state to another. Thus, the decrease was -34 per cent for Belgium but only -8 per cent for the Netherlands.
Innenpolitik also advocates a systematic enforcement of so-called "carrier sanctions" as provided for by the SIC. Carrier companies must be required to carry out their own pre-flight checks on passengers at airports of departure and should be fined whenever they transport insufficiently documented passengers. The article claims that, while carrier companies are usually made liable for the costs of the return of passengers denied entry, a number of Schengen member states have failed, as yet, to systematically enforce additional sanctions under the SIC.
On 22 December, the Schengen Executive Committee (the
Schengen Council of Ministers) agreed on the need for "pre-flight inspections"
to be carried out by officers of the Schengen state of destination stationed
at non-Schengen airports, and eventually at railway stations and sea ports
of departure. The problem in realising this scheme lies with the third
countries on whose territory the advanced border controls of the Schengen
countries shall take place. According to Innenpolitik, many third country
governments are opposed to foreign border control personnel operating on
their territory.
SIS: A new quality of search
In its annual report, the Schengen Central Group describes the SIS as the only criminal search system of its sort in Europe. Unlike Interpol, search requests of member states are immediately stored in the SIS and communicated to the national parties of the SIS, the N-SIS. According to Innenpolitik, a "new quality of search" has been achieved compared with Interpol, since the member states are liable under the SIC to enter all relevant information into the SIS. A search request in the SIS automatically comprises a request for preliminary detention in view of extradition. Thus, the lawfulness of an extradition is already established from the moment the search request is entered into the SIS. Innenpolitik further notes that, unlike the SIS, Europol has not been conceived as a criminal search system, but merely to enable the exchange of case-related information and analysis of trans-border criminality.
For these reasons, for the Schengen member states, "the
SIS prevails over all other means of information", but this "of course
does not mean that Interpol is no longer important". Interpol continues
to be necessary for searches in neighbour states of the Schengen territory
and in the rest of the world.The Schengen states are currently drawing
up rules defining the relation between the SIS and Interpol and particularly
the necessary system interfaces.
3.8 million search requests in the SIS
According to the statistic tables attached to the annual report of the Central Group, in early March 1996 the number of valid search requests stored in the SIS amounted to 3,868,529.939,758 of these requests concerned persons wanted on various grounds, including 507,859 persons denied entry to the Schengen territory (mostly rejected asylum seekers). Requests for "discreet surveillance" or "specific checks" under Article 99 number 8,254; 7,722 of these came from France alone. However no requests have as yet been entered under the controversial Article 99.3 of the SIC, which allows for observation and checks of persons not suspected of any specific crime on state security and public order grounds.
Other categories of data concern:
Judicial cooperation
The SIC contains a number of provisions on improved judicial
cooperation, such as the possibility for the judiciary in one member state
to send court documents to the addressee in another member state directly,
instead of requesting judicial assistance from the member state concerned.
The judiciary of one member state can also send requests for judicial assistance
directly to the judicial authorities in another member state, without involving
the Ministries of Justice.According to the Central Group, cooperation is
still hampered by problems. It is currently being examined how far a network
of prosecutors specialised in judicial assistance could improve cooperation.
Moreover, an agreement on judicial assistance on road traffic offences
and the execution of sentences is being considered.
The relationship of Schengen with the EU
In view of the European Union's Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the question of the relationship between the Schengen framework and the EU is once again being discussed.A Briefing on the Intergovernmental Conference and the Schengen Convention presented by the Working Party Secretariat of the European Parliament's "Task-Force" on the IGC, stresses that the SIC is "the precursor of or a sort of testing ground for the creation of a European area without frontiers where people can move freely", provided for in the EEC Treaty, the Single Act, and the TEU (Maastricht Treaty). It insists that the SIC "can and must be replaced by Community regulations valid for the whole Union". The Briefing further notes that, while the Schengen Convention does not formally appear on the IGC agenda, it will probably play an important indirect role in the improvements in Justice and Home Affairs cooperation, an important item on the conference agenda.
It further says that "Schengen and Union policy share a continuity and a common logic, especially as Article 142 of the Convention [SIC] requires the text to be adapted to changes in Community law intended to create an area without internal frontiers".Two future options for the Convention are described:
According to Mr Schelter, a majority of member states shared this German view at an extraordinary meeting of the Schengen Executive Committee on 25 March, while Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg rather believe that an integration of Schengen would improve EU cooperation. The Dutch Schengen Presidency announced its intention to draw up a framework together with the EU Commission for proceedings after the IGC. At the IGC, The Italian EU Presidency is expected to present a proposal for a "Schengen Protocol" that could be attached to the TEU.On its part, the European Commission says in a statement of 28 February that all items under the Third Pillar of the TEU, except criminal law and police cooperation, should be transferred to the First Pillar (i.e. Community law). "Such a transfer is particularly necessary in areas directly relevant to the free movement of persons, e.g. rules pertaining to crossing external borders, the fight against narcotics, immigration policies, policies regarding third country nationals, as well as asylum policies", the statement says and concludes: "In continuation of this line of thought it appears natural to integrate the Schengen Convention's provisions in the Treaty [on European Union]".
Sources: Schengen Central Group: Jahresbericht über die Anwendung des Durchführungsübereinkommens im Zeitraum vom 26. März 1995 - 25. März 1996 (Annual Report on the implementation of the SIC), Brussels, 26.3.96, SCH/C (96) 17 rev; Innenpolitik (German Interior Ministry), March 1996; Report of an Ad hoc working group to the Permanent Conference of German Interior Ministers (Federal and Länder) on the implementation of the SIC, 14.12.9, in German; Note of State Secretary Kurt Schelter, Interior Ministry, to the Internal Affairs Committee of the German Parliament, Bonn, 29.4.96; Briefing on the IGC and the Schengen Convention, Luxembourg, 30.1.96, European Parliament, PE 165.808; Statement of the European Commission on strengthening and widening the political Union (Den politiske union må styrkes og udvidelsen forberedes), Brussels, 28.2.96, in Danish.
Fuente: FECL 43 (April/May 1996)
http://www.fecl.org/circular/4301.htm
On 19 December 1996 the Danish Minister of Justice, Bjoern Westh, on behalf of the Danish Government, signed the Schengen Implementing Convention of 1990, thereby ending a seven month period in which Denmark had observer status. The ratification process will begin shortly and is expected to be concluded by the end of this year.
Danish membership of Schengen is supported by the Social
Democratic Party, the Social Liberals, the Liberal Party, the Conservative
People’s Party and the Centre Democrats. This is a majority of the parties
represented in the Folketing (Danish parliament).The opposition, which
is deeply divided in its arguments, consists of both parties to the left
- Enhedslisten (the Red-Green Alliance) and Socialistisk Folkeparti (The
Socialist People’s Party) - and to the right - Dansk Folkeparti (Danish
People’s Party) and Fremskridtspartiet (Progress Party).
The Danish way into Schengen
The idea of joining the Schengen Group was first taken
up in the beginning of 1991, and the first meeting between the Schengen
presidency and Denmark took place in May of that year. At that time, Denmark
had a Conservative-led right wing government. But in January 1993 that
government fell and was replaced by a Social Democratic-led centrist government.
The previous political reservations against joining Schengen, which until
then had found some resonance also inside the Social Democratic Party,
gradually disintegrated, leaving only the left and the extreme right in
the opposition. In May 1994 Denmark applied for observer status in Schengen.
This was accorded in May 1996, after the Danish Government answered a comprehensive
Schengen questionnaire on Denmark’s immigration, police and border control
policies to the satisfaction of the Schengen Group.The act of accession
consists of an agreement, a so-called final act, a protocol, and a statement,
which all define the conditions and responsibilities of the Danish government
and its institutions. These documents and the Schengen acquis1) constitute
the basis of the Danish membership.
Pressure from major EU countries
There is no question that one of the reasons why the Danish government decided to work towards Schengen membership was pressure from the major EU countries. As long ago as 1991, a representative of the then German Schengen presidency, Dr Glatzel, said in an interview about the reasons why the presidency had approached the Danish government: "We would very much like Denmark to join Schengen, and since Spain and Portugal are now joining, you are among the last in the chain to have your borders closed"2).
At that time, Greece was on its way to membership. With
Denmark inside Schengen, all continental EU countries would be part of
Schengen. Such a situation would make it possible to put pressure on the
negotiations on the External Borders Convention, which had started in 1989
but were and still are blocked because of a Spanish-British dispute over
Gibraltar. In this situation, the Schengen process was considered a powerful
engine to speed up the process and reach the same goal as the European
Union, but faster. This was however never mentioned openly as a reason
by the pro-Schengen lobby.
The political scene
The two main arguments of the proponents of membership was that Schengen would make it easier to fight international organised crime and that it would become easier to travel. Furthermore they argued that an "open Europe" would attract illegal immigrants and that therefore strong external border controls and internal control measures were necessary. The critics among politicians are divided into two categories: a nationalist wing and a civil libertarian wing.The criticism from the nationalist wing concentrates particularly on the lifting of internal border controls, which is perceived as opening of the country to a mass influx of "undesirable" foreigners - i.e. asylum seekers and illegal immigrants.
But the nationalists are also worried about the protection of the Danish nation as such. This viewpoint is held by the Danish People’s Party and the Progress Party.Part of the broad anti-EU movement (which covers the whole political spectrum from right to left) also subscribed to this point of view, but from a distinctly nationalist point of view. They argue that by joining Schengen another step is taken towards the elimination of Denmark as an independent nation.
The civil libertarian wing which mainly consists of the
Left wing and concerned lawyers, researchers, parts of the anti-EU movement
and human rights organisations, argues that Schengen will lead in direction
of a more police-controlled society with clear racist tendencies. Their
criticism has focused around the powers which the police and intelligence
services will get. Also the creation of computerised registers and information
systems (SIS and SIRENE) is viewed as a threat to the rights of the individual
and as an expression of a generalised suspicion of, not least, "foreigners".
Opposition inside the police
The Danish police are also divided on the issue. The chiefs are very pro-Schengen, but the Police Union warns against lifting border controls, stressing that border checks make it possible to catch criminals in a way that cannot be replaced by stepping up general control inside the country.The deputy chairman of the Danish Police Union, Peter Ibsen, said: "Open borders means that we deprive ourselves of some of the means of control we have today. It does not entail any saving of resources, but control will be less effective. No doubt about that".3)
Ibsen is also worried about the consequences of the Schengen Information System (SIS) which, he fears, will end up containing highly sensitive information based on "hearsay about people who are assumed to be doing something illegal".4) The police leadership does not appear to have the same concerns. The Chief of Rikspolitiet (the National Police) says: "It is absolutely necessary that we get some of the more advanced investigation methods, in order to be able to hit organised crime. For this purpose SIS is a good tool".5)
A less frequently admitted reason for the Police Union’s opposition is there fear that the net result of Schengen membership will be a cut in the number of police officers. The government has, however, promised that there will not be any major reductions of the police force in areas close to the internal borders.The irony of the pro-Schengen wing’s arguments is the strange contradiction between, on the one hand, the promise that it will become easier to cross the borders, and on the other hand their plans for more police control just behind the borders. In a note to the parliament the government explains the consequence of the abolition of checks at internal border crossing points as follows: "There ought to be a not insignificant police reserve in the areas near the internal borders (...) with the purpose of direct control, and patrolling and observation activities".6)
According to a bilateral German-Danish agreement on cross-border police observation and hot pursuit under the Schengen Implementing Convention, the right of the German police to operate on Danish territory is limited to a 25 kilometre deep zone behind the Danish border, and German police are not allowed to make arrests on Danish territory. No such restrictions are made by the German side: Danish police are authorised to operate freely on the whole territory of Germany.
Mads Bruun Pedersen (Copenhagen)
Notes:
1) The Schengen "acquis" consists of the 1985 Schengen Agreement, the 1990 Implementing Convention, four confidential manuals, the readmission agreement with Poland, the accession agreements with Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Austria, plus 59 decisions taken by the Executive Committee between 1993 and 1996.
2) Ugeavisen Klassekampen, no.24, vol.22, 28.6.91.
3) Berlingske Tidende, 20.12.96.
4) ibid.
5) Berlingske Tidende, 19.12.96.
6) Note on the Schengen Convention and the legal, financial and administrative consequences of Danish Schengen membership, 21.11.96, p.8.
Fuente: FECL 49 (December 1996/January 1997)
http://www.fecl.org/circular/4908.htm
IGC 'NON-PAPER' ON SCHENGEN AND THE EU
The Schengen Agreements are increasingly being regarded as a possible model for "flexible" cooperation within the Union. The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) is discussing a number of options, that allow an incorporation of the Schengen structures into the TEU (Maastricht Treaty), without taking the risk of the Schengen group's fast-track cooperation being stalled by vetoes of a small group of dissenting states. The magic words which will open the door to the incorporation of Schengen are "enhanced cooperation", "enabling clause" and "predetermined flexibility approach".
The incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the Union
is "a gradual process which is already under way", according to a "non-paper"
of the IGC of 4 February on "Schengen and the European Union".Indeed, seven
EU countries are already implementing the Schengen Agreements, while a
further six EU states have signed them. Only the UK and Ireland have refrained
from seeking Schengen membership. Britain is opposed to the "hard core"
of Schengen policies - the abolition of controls at internal borders. Ireland
has no choice but to follow the British position because of the common
travel area between the two countries. Since the British opposition leader,
Tony Blair, has made it clear that border controls in the UK would be maintained
even in the event of a Labour victory in the forthcoming elections, the
Dutch EU Presidency has given up earlier ideas of a "full incorporation",
based on a full acceptance of the Schengen acquis by all 15 member states.
Instead, discussions at the IGC are now concentrating on two approaches
which will enable a "flexible" incorporation of Schengen policies into
the TEU.
Two options for Schengen incorporation
The above-mentioned IGC non-paper describes two possible options.Both options would make it possible for the Schengen member states to continue their cooperation without the participation of the UK and Ireland, but within the institutions of the EU.
Option A: "Enabling clauses" flexibility approach
Under this option the TEU would contain enabling provisions
allowing for "enhanced cooperation" between particular groups of member
states in each of the three pillars of the TEU. Thus, the 13 Schengen states
would be authorised, through a procedure to be set up in the TEU, to establish
a 'Schengen' enhanced cooperation among themselves within the EU. The scope
of enhanced cooperation could comprise the whole of Schengen or parts thereof,
and would be defined by the member states concerned when applying for authorization
to set up a closer cooperation among themselves. The IGC non-paper notes:
"Accordingly, this approach would not imply a prior identification of the
relevant Schengen parts to be subject of flexibility nor of the specific
(first or third pillar) flexibility clause to apply".
Option B: "Predetermined" flexibility approach
Under this option, the 13 Schengen countries would be
authorised through a particular Schengen Protocol, attached to the TEU,
"to have recourse to the institutions, procedures and instruments of the
TEU for the purposes of adopting and applying among themselves the acts
and decisions required to give effect to their Schengen cooperation, to
the extent that such acts and decisions cannot be adopted by the fifteen".The
Schengen Protocol would authorise the Schengen states to continue to develop
within the Union's institutions a Schengen acquis, applicable only to them."Enabling
clauses" as referred to in Option A would allow enhanced cooperation also
in areas which are not covered by Schengen.
Draft Schengen Protocol
A draft Schengen Protocol attached to the IGC papers provides that:
The draft Schengen Protocol leaves out the sensitive issue
of whether and to what extent the administrative tasks under the Schengen
agreements presently conferred to the Schengen secretariat, the "Central
group" of high officials and a plethora of working groups of officials,
should be taken over by the General Secretariat of the Council and the
K.4 structures. But in the IGC non-paper it says: "Consideration should
also be given to a possible integration of the Schengen Secretariat into
the General Secretariat of the Council". Such considerations are said to
have created an air of uncertainty among Schengen staff. They fear that
EU officials might be tasked with taking on some of the functions currently
in the hands of Schengen officials.
Conclusions
While Option A could be described as a prototype of "flexibilisation", Option B is more of an "opting-out" solution. But the essential common feature of the two options is that they would lead to a two-track community, with a "first class" consisting of states that make full use of enhanced cooperation and thereby accelerating the process towards a federalist and centralised Union, and a "second class" made up of "anti-federalist" member states and, possibly, future new member states, regarded as not yet able to meet the requirements of "enhanced" cooperation.
Both options raise considerable institutional problems. First, Schengen contains elements both of the first pillar (internal market) and the third pillar (JHA: Justice and Home Affairs) of the TEU. This raises the question among others, of the European Parliament's future involvement. Secondly, Option B at least could lead to non-EU member states de facto having greater influence in decision-making at the JHA Council than certain member states. Finally, irrespective of the particular form eventually chosen, any flexibility approach threatens to lead to a confusing and barely manageable variety of legislation valid in the different member states. Legislation in the EU would resemble a self-service shop, where every member state picks the optional features which best meet the respective government's political priorities of the day.
In the Schengen case, for example, this could well lead to Britain participating in Schengen police and security cooperation, including the Schengen Information System, while maintaining its internal border controls. Both Option A and B include the idea of "enabling clauses", allowing enhanced cooperation among groups of member states even in the TEU and JHA areas which are not covered by Schengen. The "flexibility" approach would make it ever more difficult for EU citizens to know which sets of common rules apply in which member states. Moreover, "flexible" law-making as considered by the IGC, will not contribute to establishing common constitutional standards, but further extend governments' scope of action at the expense of legal security and democratic scrutiny.
Sources: Non-paper 'Schengen and the European Union', IGC Secretariat, Brussels, 4.2.97, Conf/3806/97, limite; annex 1: Enabling clauses flexibility approach; annex 2: Draft Schengen Protocol; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 13.2.97; European Voice, 6-12.2.97.
Fuente: FECL 50 (March/April 1997)
http://www.fecl.org/circular/5002.htm
On 6 June, after several postponements, the Greek Parliament ratified the Schengen Agreements. The Agreements had been signed by the previous 'New Democracy Government back in 1992, and Greece held the status of observer since 1991. In April 1997, two months before the ratification, a law on data protection was passed by the Parliament. The law aims to adapt Greek legislation to the corresponding 1981 Council of Europe Convention on Data Protection and the EU Directive 95/46. The implementation of the Schengen Agreement in Greece has been scheduled to begin this autumn.
The background of the ratification
Greece's accession to Schengen encountered severe reservations from all sides of the political spectrum, a great part of the Orthodox Church, and the more alert segments of Greek society. Nevertheless, the majority of Greek society remained essentially uninformed, and consequently confused and passive with regard to the contents and effects of Schengen. Neither the Government, nor the opposition parties, nor the mass social, labour, or scientific unions ever instigated a sober public debate, corresponding to the gravity of the issues involved.
This lack of essential information and overall inquiry about the Schengen Agreements was considered by many a deliberate act of the country's political establishment. At all accounts it contributed to a thorough disorientation of the country's public opinion: public attention was monopolised by sensational elements of pure theatricality. One example among many others was the day-long manifestations of public hysteria by throngs of members of religious groups outside the House of Parliament: hundreds of protesters, headed by clerics and monks, wielding icons and crucifixes, blocked the main avenues of downtown Athens, leaving no one in doubt as to their resolute opposition to the alleged "satanic" and "anti-Christ" treaty.
The hysteria reached its climax when a policeman left
his post to join a group of fanatic demonstrators.Passions surely did not
abate when the Minister of Foreign Affairs dismissed summarily all and
anybody opposing Schengen as "undisguised fascists", or when the Minister
of Justice hurled a number of ironic remarks at the President of the Athens
Bar. Out of a total of 300 Members of Parliament, eighty (coming from the
two biggest parties - the governing social democrat PASOK and the liberal
'New Democracy' in the opposition) absented themselves during the voting:
an unmistakable sign to their respective party leadership as to how they
feel towards the official pro-Schengen line of their parties.On the whole,
what was dearly missing amid all this show, was a serious in-depth inquiry.
The opportunity for an articulated and fact-oriented dialogue and counteraction
from the political and social groups opposed to Schengen was lost.
Arguing against Schengen
It is not easy to draw a straight line on the Greek political map, demarcating the supporters of Schengen from the opponents. Apart from the unanimous and absolute rejection of the treaty by the three smaller opposition parties (the 'Communist Party', the 'Coalition of the Left and Progress' and the 'Democratic Social Movement'), a serious rift divided the interior ranks of the two bigger parties. It clearly did not follow any preconceived political lines. However, absence and abstention from voting did not affect the eventual passing of the law and the ratification of the Schengen agreements.
Regarding the arguments put forward during the parliamentary debate, the Schengen supporters generally concentrated on what they see as positive effects of Schengen cooperation with regard to citizens' civil rights and the reinforcement of security along the country's borders, especially regarding clandestine immigration and organised crime. It must be recalled that Greece is the only member state of the EU that lacks a common land border with another EU state. All Greek borders are therefore considered external frontiers of the Union, and for this reason the country is exempted from implementing the controversial Schengen provisions on cross-border police cooperation.
As for the Schengen opponents, they emphasised what they consider the deficient protection of civil liberties in the Schengen framework, as compared to the level of protection provided by the Greek Constitution and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).
More precisely, the trend in favour of ratification was expressed mainly by the official positions of both the government and the leading opposition party. The governing party's (PASOK) stance, it must be admitted, suffered from a certain amount of inconsistency with respect to its former positions on the issue. Back in 1993, during another term of PASOK government, the then Minister of Justice pointed out to the political staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which was already then advocating Schengen membership) that the Schengen Implementing Agreement is not only incongruous with clauses of the Greek Constitution, but also hazy in regards to its conformity with the ECHR.
In fact, the long-lasting Greek prevarications and the quite extraordinary delay in the ratification procedure is mainly due to the differing assessment of the SIA by the two Ministries involved. However, the new PASOK government under Kostas Simitis quickly put an end to such discussions and opted for quick implementation of Schengen.Among the ranks of the Schengen opponents one can surprisingly count groups which, in every other issue, would follow diametrically opposed courses.
I will try to define somehow the situation prevailing in the anti-Schengen camp.Enumerating political forces, one encounters the three parliamentary opposition parties:
Only time and practice will show how well-grounded both the hopes and fears concerning Schengen are. And - who knows? - maybe the practical experiences of the implementation of the agreements will provide a new opportunity to start an open, to-the-point and in-depth discussion on the effects of Schengen on Greek society.
George P. Nikolopoulos, Athens
The author is a lawyer and criminologist. Contact: 18, Sepolion Str., GR-10445 Athens; Tel: +30/1 8826295, Fax: +30/1 3637955
Fuente: FECL 51 (May/June 1997)
http://www.fecl.org/circular/5107.htm
AUSTRIA AND ITALY: FULL SCHENGEN-MEMBERS
The Schengen Executive Committee has agreed on a step by step integration of Austria and Italy into full Schengen cooperation to be completed by 1 April 1998. The full integration of Greece was once again postponed and shall be decided upon in the second half of 1998 at the latest. Decisions to this respect were taken by the Schengen the Ministers in October in Vienna, after a lengthy period of squabbling between the countries forming Schengen's hard core and the newcomers.
Germany, above all, and, less vocally, even France have repeatedly expressed concern about the newcomer states' ability to protect their external frontiers against illegal immigration. Austria, Italy and Greece all have long external borders which are difficult to control. A July meeting in Austria between Prime Minister Romano Prodi, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Austrian Premier Viktor Klima appeared to clear up many German concerns over the security of Italy's and Austria's non-EU borders. Significantly, Greece was not even invited to that "mini-summit".
The Executive Committee's decision of October to grant Austria and Italy full membership not at once, but in a step by step way, reveals that Germany is still uncomfortable with the idea of abolishing controls at its borders with its southern Schengen-neighbours. Under the agreement reached in Vienna, Austrian citizens may travel without passport control to any other Schengen state, as from 1 December, provided, however, they travel by air. At land, checks at Austria's borders with Germany and Italy will be dropped as from1 April 1998.
The only concession made to Greece was its full participation
in the SIS as from 1 December. According to a spokesman of the Austrian
Interior Minister Schlögl, the Greek representative in the Executive
Committee had at first threatened to block the decisions pertaining to
Austria and Italy, if a positive decision was not taken at the same time
with regard to Greece. Italy then proposed the compromise formula that
finally brought about agreement.
Austrian clamp-down on migrants
To Austrian government circles the Executive Committees
decision came as a relief. In the year preceding the decision, the German
Land of Bavaria repeatedly and loudly claimed that its security was endangered
because of allegedly deficient Austrian border controls. The Bavarian accusations
triggered a range of Austrian police and customs operations at its Eastern
and Southern borders, aimed at demonstrating the country's ability to clamp
down on illegal immigrants.
Man-hunt in the Austrian land of Carinthia
The most spectacular operations took place in the Austrian land of Carinthia which borders on Slovenia and Italy. In a May prelude to this activity, the Carinthian police arrested 95 Kurdish immigrants hidden in a Croatian container truck. According to the police, they were on their way to Bavaria.In late August, 350 Carinthian Gendarmes carried out "Operation Network", a large-scale raid,, aimed against illegal immigrant workers. In one night, some 2,000 foreigners were identity-checked; many of them after being torn out of their beds. The operation resulted in the arrest of 5 illegal immigrants...One week later, again in Carinthia, border police and Gendarmerie, using modern night-sight devices, tracked down and surrounded a group of 30 unarmed Romanians who were preparing to cross the green border with Slovenia in the area of Gailitz. But apparently, something went wrong. Most of the immigrants escaped in the dark night. One police officer was thrown to the ground by an immigrant run-away. The officer shot and seriously wounded the man, allegedly in "self-defence". Six women surrendered to the police.
The regrettable incident in no way slowed down the ongoing operation. The following days, a whole company of gendarmerie, supported by a helicopter and dogs carried out what the Carinthian authorities themselves called a "large-scale man hunt". As if a war had broken out, the authorities dramatically called on the population not to "fall into panic when seeing a foreigner" and to report "suspects" to the police.Reacting to public criticism of the operation, the deputy head of the regional government, Michael Ausserwinkler, said: "The gendarmerie acted correctly and are merely fulfilling their duty, imposed by Schengen, to protect our external frontiers".
The police operations at the Austrian borders are accompanied
by alarmist media reports of a threatening and unprecedented mass influx
of refugees. In example, the Carinthian daily newspaper, Kärntner
Tageszeitung, quoting "unofficial information from top level Austrian government
authorities", claimed only days after the man-hunt that about 20,000 people
were waiting in Sarajevo alone for an opportunity to escape to Western
Europe and, in particular, Germany. Recent incidents involving migrants
in Carinthia were only the tip of an iceberg, the newspaper warned.
Austro-Hungarian relations at a strain
Austria's Schengen membership is also putting strain on the country's relations with Hungary. Austrian authorities' efforts to improve controls at its eastern frontiers have lead to traffic jams and long waiting times at the Austro-Hungarian border. Already in March the Hungarian government complained about the situation at the borders which threatened to affect the country's tourism industry. Moreover, Hungary is unhappy with recent Austrian restrictions for the Hungarian work force.
After a meeting with Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister Gabor Kuncze, in late October in Budapest, the Austrian Interior Minister, Karl Schlögl, said Austria was keen to help Hungary boost its border guard and stop illegal immigrants. "Hungary is currently in the lucky position of being a transit rather than a target country for illegal immigrants. But Austria, Germany and Italy are targets", Schlögl said. The Minister said a lot of illegal immigrants were arriving in Austria through the Hungarian border and added that "Hungary will probably be more interested in introducing stricter border controls with the improvement of the economic situation".
When the Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister pointed out that Austria handed over 1,600 illegal migrants to Hungary under a two-year-old readmission agreement, Schlögl replied dryly that Hungary had refused to readmit 400 illegal migrants between May and August 1997 alone. He added that problems usually occur when the illegal migrants are undocumented. "They are increasingly coming from Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or even Africa. Of course, Hungary's interest to take them back will be slim"."Our most important goal is that when Hungary becomes an EU member, it should be able, and mature enough, to implement the Schengen procedure as quick as possible", Schlögl continued. He stressed that in one year (1996) Austria had spent 3 billion Schillings (more than 288 million dollars) on high-tech equipment and deployed 5,000 more border guards to be able to come up to Schengen standards. The equipment included a carbon-dioxide detector, which enabled Austrian border guards to find 50 percent more illegal immigrants hidden in trucks than before.
Sources: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8.10.97, 13.3.97, 15/16.3.97; Kärntner Tageszeitung, 28 and 29.8.97; AFP, Budapest, 29.10.97; Report by Heinz Fronek, Asylkoordination, 2.9.97; European Voice, 18-24.9.97.
Fuente: FECL 52 (December 1997)
http://www.fecl.org/circular/5204.htm
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: DIFFICULT ADAPTATION TO SCHENGEN
Central and Eastern European countries seeking membership in the Union are tightening border controls and concluding bilateral agreements on the fight against "illegal immigration" and anti-crime cooperation. Refugees and immigrants on their way to the West are the first victims of these hectic activities aimed at demonstrating Schengen maturity.
Portrayed under headlines such as "Anti-Mafia Cooperation" and "Crime-Fighting" accords, several areas have seen enhanced cross border police operations targeting the movement of "illegal migrants". While both of the headlines in question refer to agreements by Ukraine (with the other parties respectively being Slovakia and Macedonia), this appears to be part of a broader trend.In February, Slovak Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner met with Viktor Bannych, head of Ukraine's State Committee for Border Protection, and "discussed the renewal of former bilateral cooperation in border protection". Pittner's objective was stated as developing the capability for "prompt interventions" with the proposed financing of this effort through the EU's "Phare" programme. Pittner noted that the "number of illegal migrants penetrating Slovakia from Ukraine has doubled recently".
Of particular significance, given this stated cross border movement and its implications as regards the Schengen agreement, Pittner noted he had "not discussed the possible introduction of visa requirements for Ukrainians", but that he expected Ukraine to "be more active in guarding its borders".The EU is reported to have welcomed the Slovak cabinet change which spawned Pittner's appointment, and Pittner himself took the opportunity of his Kiev visit to reiterate that Slovakia wants to meet conditions for EU membership. Ukraine wishes EU membership as well.
The same month, Ukrainian Interior Minister Kravchenko,
and Pavle Trajanov, his Macedonian counterpart, signed an agreement on
cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of the two countries.
The agreement was heralded as "the first step towards wide-scale cooperation",
and was stated to be explicitly "aimed at implementing control over the
so-called Balkan route, through which drugs are smuggled into Ukraine".
Further aims include joint action on car theft and international prostitution.
However, rather than quote the number of stolen cars found, wanted criminals
arrested, drugs intercepted, or guns confiscated, governmental statements
repeatedly highlight nothing but numbers of "illegal border crossings"
and "illegal migrants".
Czech dilemma
The Czech Republic has recently found itself in something
of a dilemma due to demands that meeting requirements for EU membership
have placed upon it. A late January report details how the Czech government
"will not hurry to introduce visas for Russian citizens". Czech Deputy
Prime Minister Egon Lansky noted that the introduction of visas for Russians
would mean that Russia would "certainly come up with some countermeasures
which will not be pleasant". Further, Mr. Lansky (who has responsibility
for security and foreign affairs) voiced doubts that issuing visas would
solve problems with the Russian mafia, drug smuggling, or refugees. However,
the Czechs must introduce visas for several countries before being allowed
to join the EU.
Continuing flow of refugees
In spite of tightened border controls, the flow of refugees on their way to Western Europe does not appear to have decreased. Recently, Czech police found a group of 53 refugees from Kosovo in the snow-covered forests of the White Carpathian mountains. Reportedly abandoned by their guide just past the Czech-Slovak border, the refugees told police that they had travelled by bus from Pristina, via Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, before entering the Czech Republic. They were heading for Germany. Under an agreement between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the refugees will be returned to Slovakia. Just several days before, police had found another group of 25 refugees, this time from Afghanistan and Iraq, huddled in the snow in woods near Bozi Dar, close to the German border.
Similar conditions exist in Austria, despite icy temperatures
and extremely tight border surveillance. A record number of refugees "were
arrested" in January, with 1,938 "illegal immigrants" being caught.The
end of February saw Ukrainian border guards detaining 13 Turkish nationals
who had tried to smuggle themselves into Poland in the false compartment
of a truck. A spokesman for the border guards said 1,500 people have so
far been "detained" through mid-February of this year.
Conflict of interests in Poland
Poland seems to be in less of a hurry to clamp down on "illegal immigrants". Aliens working illegally in Poland and their employers can feel relatively safe. It is estimated that between 150,000 and 200,000 aliens are working illegally there. Regulation of alien employment is pursued by the NIK (Supreme Chamber of Audit), which is demanding more powers for inspectors and tighter regulations on the hiring of aliens. However, with the wide-open market economy prevailing in most areas, the existing atmosphere is one where regulation appears most geared to assuring the integrity of business transactions, rather than concerning itself with exactly how the item transacted was made. Vague regulations, the very limited powers of those seeking to enforce them, and regulatory loopholes all serve to effectively illustrate this contention.
For example, as per Executive Order of 30 June 1995 of the Council of Ministers, "inspectors must show inspection warrants specifying the name and exact address of the company inspected". This makes it impossible to inspect both unregistered companies and those which change their name. Typically, bazaars, construction sites, and farms are key areas of illegal employment. But regulations are so loosely worded that "whether an alien, as the head of a business which consists of himself alone, should or should not have a permit and approval for employment" is not clear to the NIK. Be that as it may, the National Labour Office's section for verifying the legality of employment no longer exists, having been closed on January 1.
Sources: UNIAN, Kiev, 21.2.99; Economist, 20.2.99; CTK Business News, 17.2.99, 22.1.99, 20.2.99; Rzeczpospolita, Warsaw, 13.2.99; Reuters, 19.2.99; Kurier (Austria), 22.2.99.
Fuente: FECL 57 (March 1999)
http://www.fecl.org/circular/5707.htm