INTRODUCTION

            International security problems are important for one reason above all others: their human consequences are staggering. In the 20^th century, armed conflicts killed tens of millions of people, wounded tens of millions more, and drove tens of millions of people from their homes. In addition, the economic costs of security problems – the costs of defense preparations, the costs of wartime military operations, and the costs of post-conflict reconstruction – have been enormous.

            When the Cold War ended, it is no exaggeration to say that hopes and expectations soared in many parts of the world. One of the most moving statements about the possibilities of the post-Cold War era came from U.S. President George H.W. Bush. Addressing a joint session of the U.S. Congress on September 11, 1990, he outlined his vision of a “new world order.” He foresaw the advent of  “a new era – freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the worlds, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony.” Bush maintained that a “new partnership of nations has begun,” and he foresaw the emergence of  “a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.”^[i]

            The end of the Cold War had tremendously important, positive effects on international security. With the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Soviet military threat that had loomed over Western Europe for decades vanished. At the same time, the threat of an all-out nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union faded. Many of the regional conflicts that had been fueled by superpower patronage – in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, and Nicaragua, for example – wound down and began to move toward settlements.

            At the same time, hopes for a new and predominantly peaceful world – so widespread at the beginning of the 1990s – were dashed by the deadly conflicts that followed. The leading powers did not form a new partnership of nations and create “a new world order.” International responses to war, slaughter, and starvation in Bosnia, Somalia, and other lethal locations were appallingly inadequate. Nowhere was this more tragic than in Rwanda, where an estimated 800,000 people were killed in a genocidal slaughter that went on for 100 days in the spring and summer of 1994.

            In the first 12 years of the post-Cold War (from 1990 to 2001), 57 major armed conflicts took place in 45 different countries. Since 1998, the number of conflicts has held steady at around 25 conflicts per year.^[ii] As of 2003, conflicts seethed and raged in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan.

            Almost all of the armed conflicts of the post-Cold War era have been either intrastate conflicts or intrastate conflicts with regional complications.^[iii] This is significant. In intrastate conflicts, the stakes are high – survival, territory, power, wealth. These conflicts frequently escalate into military campaigns designed to drive out or kill civilians from rival groups. Civilians are consequently subjected to direct, deliberate, systematic attacks. Intimidation, expulsion, rape, assassination, and slaughter are commonly-employed instruments. The numbers of people killed or displaced in such conflicts are often counted in tens and hundreds of thousands. It is estimated that 6 million people were killed in armed conflicts in the 1990s.^[iv]

            Two things are clear about the prospects for international security in the 21^st century. First, security problems will continue to be widespread and deadly. It would be naive and irresponsible to assume that current problems will simply go away or that new problems will be neutralized by the positive benefits of globalization. International security issues will be momentous policy problems for the foreseeable future.

            Second, the security agenda will be far more complex than it has been in the past. It will include continuing security problems, such as great-power rivalry, interstate confrontations, and intrastate conflicts. It will also include problems that are changing due to the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization. These problems include the changing dynamics of weapon proliferation, the changing character of energy markets, the intensification of demographic pressures on many countries and regions, and the growing capabilities of  transnational actors – criminal and terrorist organizations – who operate outside the parameters of the state system. The security agenda of the 21^st century will also include genuinely new security challenges, such as those posed by advances in information and genetic engineering technologies. All of this will take place in the context of an intense globalization process that no one controls.

            In this paper, we argue that, although the use of military force and the causes and consequences of wars are central issues in security affairs, security is not just a military issue. The origins of most security problems are not limited to military developments, and the solutions to security problems are rarely limited to military actions. This is not to say that the military aspects of international security should be set aside altogether. Rather, if we want to develop a through understanding of the dynamics of security problems in the contemporary world, we must examine the full range of military and non-military factors that influence these problems around the world.^[v] Security problems are multi-dimensional, and they have to be studied in broad, inclusive terms.

            We have three main goals in this paper: to develop a framework for thinking about current and emerging international security problems, to assess the prospects for international security over the next decade or two, and to derive policy lessons that will help to promote international security in the future.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN SECURITY AFFAIRS

            Experts in the field of international relations disagree sharply about the impact of the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization on international security. Some contend that the fundamental features of the international security landscape have not changed at all, while others insist that everything has changed.

            At one end of the spectrum, realists argue that the main features of the international system have not changed, even though the Cold War has ended and globalization has become a growing force in international relations. The international system, they contend, is still anarchic in that states and other actors still have to provide for their own security; there is no international authority capable of providing security for one and all. States, they maintain, are still the dominant actors in the international system, and states are still determined to preserve their survival. The result, they say, is that security competitions and confrontations will still be common features of international relations in the 21^st century.^[vi]

            At the other end of the spectrum, some analysts argue that the nature of the international system is indeed changing. They contend that powerful, technology-driven developments – the advent of the information revolution, the proliferation of global telecommunications systems, and growing economic interdependence – are changing the nature and distribution of power in the international system. States, they say, have lost their information monopolies and control over their economies. They contend that states are therefore becoming less important while non-state actors are gaining ground. They predict that increasingly empowered individuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations will form a new international civil society that will supersede the state system.^[vii]

            We believe that there is both continuity and change in international security. The fundamentals of the international system have not yet changed: the international system is still anarchic, states are still the dominant actors in international relations, states still seek security, and interstate security competitions and confrontations will continue to be important features of the security landscape. At the same time, globalization is increasingly impinging on state power, non-state actors are becoming increasingly influential, and the security agenda contains an increasingly complex set of issues. Many of the issues that are on the security agenda today do not fall under the rubric of interstate problems. Some of these problems are entirely new and potentially momentous.

            If there is both continuity and change in international security, it is not enough to say that the truth is somewhere “in the middle.” We need to differentiate as sharply as we can between and among different kinds of security problems. We can start by distinguishing between three sets of security problems: continuing problems, changing problems, and emerging problems.

Something Old

            Continuing problems are the hardy perennials of international security: competitions and conflicts between states. The names of the players and the arenas of competition of course change over time, but the interstate character of this important set of problems remains the same. These problems have been central features of international relations for centuries, and they will continue to be important in the 21^st century.

            Specific problems include the possibility of armed clashes between states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to dangerous states and unstable regions, and the rise and fall of great powers. Current concerns include the possibility of recurring war between India and Pakistan or armed conflict on the Korean peninsula, perhaps involving other powers. The acquisition of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons by states such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea is a major worry. The open acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in 1998 has complicated the stability equation in South Asia; the potential consequences of war between these two regional powers are now many times more devastating than they were in the past.

            Although the United States currently stands alone as the world’s one and only superpower, great-power competition will also be an important feature of international relations in the 21^st century. A key issue will be the evolution of relations between the United States and China, as the latter’s economic power and regional aspirations grow.^[viii] Interstate security problems – these and others yet unknown – will continue to be critical security problems in the 21^st century.

Something New

            A second category of contemporary security problems can best be described as changing problems. These problems have long-standing roots in national and international security affairs, but they have changed qualitatively due to the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization. This large set of problems includes a wide range of interstate problems, intrastate problems, and transnational problems.

            Changing interstate security problems include the evolving nature of the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia; the former has re-energized its effort to deploy national missile defenses, and the latter has experienced nuclear command and control problems due to the deterioration of the Russian nuclear establishment. More generally, Russia is in the midst of a profound political and economic transformation that has weakened the ability of its military establishment to maintain custody over its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons stockpiles. It is now a potential source of nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities for would-be proliferators – including state and non-state actors. The international trade in conventional weapons and technologies has also been transformed by the end of the Cold War. The driving forces behind conventional arms transfers are no longer political, but economic. This makes conventional proliferation substantially harder to control.^[ix] Although it is not yet clear if technological advances in sensors, information processing, precision-guidance, and other advanced conventional weapon systems will constitute a true “revolution” in military affairs, it is clear that the United States has developed conventional power-projection capabilities that are vastly superior to those of any other country – including its allies. This is affecting the prospects for great-power military intervention as well as alliance relations between the United States and its partners. Finally, important changes are taking place in non-military arenas, with defense industries becoming more integrated, the global energy market becoming more interconnected, and advances in information technology all having implications for interstate relations in the 21^st century. New links and new vulnerabilities are being created at the same time.

            Intrastate security problems are not new, but they are changing. It is often said that security problems in the developing world were neglected during the Cold War, but the historical record suggests otherwise. The United States and the Soviet Union were deeply concerned about and involved in security problems in what was then called the Third World, but their actions were often destabilizing. The superpowers viewed the Third World through Cold War lenses and sought political advantages wherever they could. Their support for different actors intensified, militarized, and prolonged many armed conflicts in the developing world. At the same time, their interest in keeping local and regional conflicts from escalating into superpower confrontations helped to control escalation in some cases.^[x] Now that the Cold War has ended, the dynamics of conflict in the developing world have changed dramatically. Conflicts that were driven to a large degree by superpower patronage – in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, and Nicaragua, for example – have moved toward settlement. Other conflicts are no longer constrained by external moderating forces and have escalated. Today, intrastate security problems are driven by a wide range of non-military issues, including environmental and demographic pressures, resource competitions, fierce competitions for power, and crises over the political stability and legitimacy of states. Weak, failing, and failed states are increasingly serious concerns. Intrastate violence is facilitated by the changing nature of the conventional arms market: state and corporate suppliers are eager to sell weapons, and the black market in light weapons and small arms has grown substantially.^[xi] The result is high levels of violent conflict.

            A final sub-set of changing security problems is transnational in character. This includes relatively localized, regional problems as well as transnational problems that transcend any one area. Some of the latter are global in nature.

            Many intrastate conflicts have regional dimensions.^[xii] When intrastate conflicts become violent, refugees often flee across international borders in large numbers. Refugees are not just humanitarian problems; they are also security problems. Fighters often mingle with refugee populations, using refugee camps to rest, recuperate, reorganize, rearm, and relaunch their military campaigns. Large refugee populations can strain economic resources, aggravate ethnic tensions, and generate political instability in host countries. Today, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have fled their homes but stayed within the borders of their own countries is at least 5.3 million. The number of people who have crossed international borders and acquired refugee status is at least 12 million.^[xiii]

            Intrastate conflicts can also affect neighboring states at a military level. The territory of neighboring states can be used to ship arms and supplies to insurgent groups, which can lead to interdiction campaigns. Outlying regions of neighboring states can also be used as bases from which terrorist assaults or more conventional attacks can be launched. This can lead to hot-pursuit operations across borders and reprisals. Although they pretend otherwise, neighboring states are not always the innocent victims of turmoil in their regions. To the contrary, they often meddle in these conflicts for self-serving reasons. In short, many intrastate conflicts have regional dimensions that do not fit neatly into either the “interstate” or “intrastate” categories. These are complex, hybrid, regional conflicts that can best be thought of as transnational in character.

            The expanding capabilities of transnational media organizations, transnational criminal organizations, and transnational terrorist organizations are also growing security concerns. Although media organizations have long played important roles in national and international security affairs, the advent of around-the-clock, television news in the early 1980s was a watershed development. The impact of the “CNN effect” on policymaking is often over-stated, but the growing influence of these organizations is nonetheless real.^[xiv] Transnational criminal organizations pose increasingly grave threats to stability in a growing number of countries. It is estimated that 120 of the more than 190 states in the international system are now challenged by medium-to-strong criminal networks.^[xv] These networks undermine the rule of law, human rights, economic development, and governance in general. They are not just crime problems; they are security problems. Many of these networks operate throughout and across regions; some have global operations.

            The threats posed by transnational terrorist organizations – Al Qaeda, in particular – have become horrifyingly clear, but the worst may be yet to come. Although Al Qaeda’s base of operations in Afghanistan has been decimated, its capacities for action have not been eliminated. One possibility might be a physical attack on a target in the West combined with a cyber attack that would disrupt response capacities. Another might be an attack involving nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons. This is another long-standing security problem that is changing in potentially devastating ways.

Something Out of the Blue

            A third and final category of security problems consists of developments that are genuinely new. Since their trajectories and implications are not yet perfectly clear, it might be useful to call these issues emerging problems. The driving force in this area is technology: Information technology is already changing the world in a multitude of ways, and the implications of genetic engineering are just starting to be appreciated. Some of these developments will have incremental effects on international security, while others could bring about truly revolutionary transformations. (These issues will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.)

The New Security Landscape

            The debate over the composition of the contemporary security agenda is mainly a debate over parameters and priorities: What exactly is a “security” issue? What are the most important security problems?

            Realists tend to answer these questions in narrow terms. Security problems are issues involving states, and they involve the threat, use, or potential use of military force. For realists, the most important issues on the security agenda today are the same issues that have been on the agenda for centuries: the search by states for security; competitions among states for security; and the interstate competitions, confrontations, arms races, and wars that result from these quests.^[xvi] Sophisticated realists understand that there are other conflict problems in the world – at the intrastate level, for example – but they believe that the security landscape is dominated by interstate problems that have prominent military dimensions.

            Others have a more expansive conception of the security agenda.^[xvii] Many argue that intrastate and transnational security problems should be added to the agenda. For example, Michael Klare argues: “Many of the most severe and persistent threats to global peace and security are arising not from conflicts between major political entities but from increased disorder within states, societies, and civilizations along ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, caste, or class lines.”^[xviii] Edward Kolodziej similarly contends that it is misguided to confine the security agenda to “state-centric analysis.”^[xix] Many scholars and analysts have suggested that the security agenda needs to be expanded to consider a wider range of non-military influences on conflict problems. Richard Ullman warns that “defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality.” This is dangerous, he says, because “it causes states to concentrate on military threats and to ignore other and perhaps more harmful dangers.”^[xx] Jessica Mathews maintains that global developments call for a broader conception of national security that includes resource, environmental, and demographic issues.^[xxi] Advocates of “human security” argue that the focus of concern should be redirected from states to groups and individuals, and that a very wide range of issues should be added to the security agenda: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, and political security.^[xxii] Michael Klare goes so far as to argue that, given the prevalence of intrastate, non-military security problems, “it is questionable whether there is a role for military power at all.”^[xxiii]

            We believe that each school of thought is half-correct. Realists are correct to point to the fundamentally anarchic nature of the international system and the continued importance of states and interstate problems within it, but they focus too narrowly on traditional, interstate, military security issues. Realism’s critics are correct when they argue that intrastate, transnational, and non-military factors must be placed on the security agenda, but they broaden the concept of “security” to the point where it has no meaning.

            Advocates of “human security,” for example, define security as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression.” For them, security “means protections from sudden and hurtful disruptions in patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs, or in communities.”^[xxiv] If one employs this broad definition, then “security problems” and “public policy problems” become indistinguishable. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde argue that a public policy issue becomes “securitized” when it requires “emergency measures” and “actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”^[xxv] If one follows this line of thinking, then “security problems” and “public policy emergencies” become indistinguishable. This is unsatisfactory. As Lawrence Freedman convincingly argues, “Once anything that generates anxieties or threatens the quality of life in some respect becomes labeled a ‘security problem,’ the field risks losing all focus.”^[xxvi]

            The challenge, therefore, is to broaden the agenda to include the full range of factors and actors that can affect the prospects for security, while defining meaningful parameters for this set of problems.

            We believe that the central issue on the security agenda – and the heart of the field of security studies – is the problem of violent conflict. We should therefore endeavor to understand the full range of military and non-military factors that can contribute to the causes of violent conflicts, including the most organized, most intense forms of violence – war and genocide. Non-military factors that can contribute to the outbreak of violent conflicts include historical, political, economic, social, cultural, religious, demographic, environmental, and technological issues and developments. The security agenda should also include all of the issues associated with the conduct of violent conflicts, including  the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation, as well as the threat and use of military force and other deadly policy instruments. Another set of critical issues involves the challenges of conflict control, including efforts aimed at conflict prevention, conflict management, and conflict resolution.

            The scope of this agenda is broad; some structure is therefore needed. We argue that it is useful to distinguish the military and non-military challenges that create security problems, on the one hand, and interstate, intrastate, and transnational arenas, on the other. (See Table 1.)

Table 1.           The New Security Landscape: A Framework with Some Illustrations^[xxvii]

           Interstate security problems include traditional military competitions, arms races, and armed conflicts, as well as weapon proliferation to aggressive regimes or unstable regions. As discussed above, these problems will continue to be on the security agenda in the future. Many interstate problems will be driven by non-military disputes; those that have the potential to become violent conflicts qualify as security problems. Some of the possibilities include: resource competitions over water, oil, and gas; interstate disputes over cross-border economic migration or refugee populations; and changes in defense industries that have the potential to affect national military capabilities.

            Intrastate security problems are often driven by underlying non-military developments that generate social, economic, and political instability, thereby making violent conflict more likely. Particularly important in this regard are demographic developments (population growth and population movements) and environmental developments (resource degradation and depletion) that can combine to produce intrastate resource competitions. The resolution of these competitions frequently depends on the political and administrative capacities of the states in question. Unfortunately, resource competitions in the developing world are common in places where institutional capacities are weak. Violence is often the result.

            Many intrastate conflicts are simply the products of elite competitions for power – between civilian factions, between factions of the military leadership, or between civilian and military leaders. Many of these disputes have ethnic dimensions, but it would be a mistake to categorize all of these problems as “ethnic conflicts.” Leaders who are motivated primarily by personal gain – political and economic – often claim to be the champions of their ethnic constituents and they often polarize ethnic relations over the course of their political campaigns, but it is important to distinguish between the parochial motivations that galvanize these conflicts and the ethnic consequences that follow. Many intrastate conflicts are driven primarily by parochial political and criminal agendas.^[xxviii]

            Finally, transnational security problems can also have either non-military or military dimensions. Transnational media organizations are non-military in character, but they can have effects on the course and conduct of military operations. Transnational criminal organizations are motivated primarily by profit and power, but their operations can undermine state authority and their black market operations often involve the sale and transfer of weapons. Proliferation issues can range from comparatively benign to truly terrifying. The proliferation of information technologies, for example, might not have immediate, direct effects on political conflicts, but they could have powerful, longer-term implications for stability and security. The proliferation of weapons – nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, in particular – is of course a more immediate and deadly security threat.

            Specific policy priorities will of course vary from country to country and region to region, and they will also evolve over time. At this juncture, some parts of the world – Latin America and Southeast Asia, for example – mainly have to contend with intrastate and transnational security problems. Others – Northeast Asia, for example – find interstate security issues higher on the agenda. Some countries and regions have to contend with almost every kind of security problem imaginable; others with relatively few. This simple framework is most certainly not the final word on a complex and changing set of issues. That said, it provides a useful starting point for distinguishing between the many security problems that are on the security agenda today.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

            When one looks at the international security agenda issue by issue, one is forced to conclude that the prospects for the next decade or two are grim. There are only a few issue areas where policy problems are easing. Some issue areas will see a continuation of the current, dangerous state of affairs, while others will probably witness gradual deterioration or even a more dramatic turn for the worse. Cataclysmic developments – such as terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction – cannot be ruled out. It might be hard to imagine and distressing to contemplate, but international security problems will probably become more widespread, more intense, more complex, speedier, and deadlier in the future.

Military Challenges

            The least pessimistic forecasts are in traditional security areas, mainly involving the military position of the United States, nuclear balances, and interstate weapon proliferation. But even here, the picture is far from encouraging.

            The United States will continue to be the dominant military power in the world for at least the next decade or two. Indeed, its current military advantages – both quantitative and qualitative – will probably grow due to its high levels of defense spending. Currently, U.S. defense spending comprises more than 38 percent of worldwide defense expenditures, and U.S. spending is projected to increase dramatically over the course of the decade – from $397 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 to $470 billion in FY2007. The United States spends more on military research and development (almost $54 billion in FY 2003) than any other country spends on total defense, so its technological and qualitative advantages will probably continue to grow as well. The gap between the United States and its potential military adversaries becomes even more impressive when one takes U.S. allies into account: The United States, its NATO allies, Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea account for more than 67 percent of worldwide defense expenditures; other allied and friendly states add to this total.^[xxix]

            Although the United States will retain its current military preponderance for some time to come, this does not mean that others will be powerless. Any U.S. military action will involve the projection of military power over long distances; this will complicate the task for U.S. military planners and diminish military effectiveness. Some adversaries will be capable of mounting significant resistence to U.S. military actions, possibly by employing unconventional tactics, engaging in asymmetric warfare, and perhaps resorting to terrorism. Timothy Hoyt expects that, contrary to the images of highly effective, surgical air strikes generated by recent U.S. military operations, combat in the future will be “much murkier, less decisive, and less controlled.”^[xxx] In any event, even if U.S. military preponderance is seen as benign and stabilizing in many quarters, it will be viewed differently in places such as Baghdad and Beijing. The impact of U.S. military power on national and international security will be seen by many – but not by all – as positive.

            The prospects for the control of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are mixed at best. The good news is that the United States and Russia are continuing to make deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals, and U.S. efforts to push ahead with national missile defense has not derailed the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. In addition, India’s and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests have not yet triggered an intense nuclear arms race between these bitter rivals – as one might have expected.^[xxxi] Even so, it is hard to be optimistic about the nuclear balance in South Asia, given that India and Pakistan have a volatile relationship marked by intense political disputes, periodic open warfare, and now, rudimentary nuclear arsenals.

            The bad news is that many problems remain, some appear to be intractable, and others are getting worse. The United States is exploring the possibility of using nuclear weapons in new ways – perhaps in preemptive attacks, perhaps to retaliate against the use of biological or chemical weapons against U.S. military forces or the U.S. homeland. Russian nuclear forces are still on a launch-on-warning posture; this would be dangerous even under the best of circumstances. Unfortunately, as Bernard Finel, Brian Finlay, and Janne Nolan observe, Russian command, control, and early warning capabilities are “deteriorating badly.”^[xxxii] The possibility of a nuclear catastrophe involving Russian nuclear forces cannot be ruled out. China’s nuclear modernization program could embolden Beijing and make a U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan more likely.

            The proliferation picture is ominous with respect to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The main challenge in the nuclear arena is preventing the proliferation of Russian nuclear weapons, fissile materials, component parts, and expertise to other state or non-state actors. Unfortunately, the U.S.-Russia programs to deal with these issues have been underappreciated and underfunded. As a result, these programs have addressed “only a small percentage of the weapons and materials still held and often times inadequately secured by Moscow,” according to  Finel, Finlay, and Nolan.^[xxxiii] Controlling the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons will be inherently difficult because of the dual-use problem: many biological and chemical facilities can be used to produce either civilian products or weapons. This makes arms control in this area exceedingly difficult. Globalization compounds the problem: trade in general is growing, border controls are weaker, and weapon proliferation is consequently facilitated. Significant progress in this area is unlikely; significant deterioration is more likely.

            Unfortunately, international efforts to address these proliferation problems have been stymied by a policy split between the United States and most of the rest of the world. The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush favors unilateral approaches to these problems, with preventive and pre-emptive military attacks being among the options under consideration. Almost every other leading power favors multilateral arms control initiatives. Coordinated international efforts to address proliferation problems are therefore stalled at a critical juncture in world affairs. This deadlock is unlikely to be broken by the current cast of characters.^[xxxiv]

            The forecast is also dismal in the area of conventional weapons proliferation. The international market in conventional weapons and technologies is now driven by economics. Large inventories of weapons, excess production capacities, and reduced levels of defense spending combine to give many countries and corporations irresistible economic incentives to export arms. According to Jo Husbands, supplier restraint is “unlikely” in the foreseeable future unless there is a shock to the system. In addition, the black market in conventional weapons is growing. Unfortunately, the powerful forces that are driving the conventional arms trade are not being met by vigorous policy responses in the West. To the contrary, Western countries are among the most energetic participants in this market. Arms control successes, Husbands says, have been “small and infrequent.” She concludes that the policy challenges are “enormous” and that available policy tools are “woefully inadequate.”^[xxxv] In short, the best that can be hoped for is a continuation of the current, discouraging state of affairs.

Non-Military Challenges: Economic, Demographic, and Environmental

            The dominant trend in the economic arena is international integration. This will have important effects on defense economics, the international energy market, and the prospects for security in both areas.

            Defense and defense-related industries comprise an important economic sector in transition. The important military advantages currently enjoyed by the United States and its allies depend to a large degree on advanced technologies in the areas of microelectronics, data processing, telecommunications, cryptography, sensors, precision-guidance, propulsion, and materials. Theodore Moran notes that, in recent decades, an increasing portion of these technologies has been coming from “innovations developed by commercial companies for the commercial market.”^[xxxvi] The future of these firms is therefore an increasingly important national and international security question.

            Many countries face formidable challenges. Europe and Japan are hampered by rigidities in labor and capital markets than impede innovation. Given the enormous size of U.S. research, development, and procurement budgets and existing U.S. technological leads, Moran contends that European and Japanese firms might be relegated to “a second-class and possibly subordinate status” for years and perhaps decades to come.^[xxxvii] Russia must institute regulatory and tax reform and rein in the oligarchs who currently dominate key sectors of the economy. This is easier said than done. It will be difficult for Russia to generate internationally competitive, high-tech firms in the near term. China also needs to bring companies up to international standards, but the prospects are brighter here. To make this great leap forward, it will seek to forge alliances with Western firms to improve program management and system integration capabilities.

            Looking ahead, greater international integration in these key industries is likely. Moran expects that non-American, high-tech firms will seek to have a presence in the United States because this will give them important competitive advantages. This means that the U.S. military will continue to have access to a wide range of new, high-performance capabilities. At the same time, because of “a macro-economic tidal wave” caused by low U.S. savings rates and high U.S. balance of payments deficits, foreign ownership of U.S. corporate assets is likely to increase from 13 percent in 2000 to 24 percent in 2015; it could reach 50 percent in some high-tech sectors. This will reduce the ability of the United States to confine high-tech capabilities to the United States. More importantly, this growing economic inter-penetration will constrain American economic and political autonomy, thereby diminishing the magnitude of U.S. unipolarity.^[xxxviii]

            The global energy market became increasingly integrated in the final decades of the 20^th century. This trend has continued since the end of the Cold War and is likely to continue in the future. Martha Harris predicts that the future is not rosy. Global energy consumption is expected to increase by two-thirds over the next twenty years, which means that interruptions in energy supplies could be highly disruptive. Unfortunately, key components of the energy infrastructure – pipelines, terminals, power plants, and transmission grids, for example – are increasingly vulnerable. Policymakers consequently face “significant security challenges ahead.”^[xxxix]

            Harris argues that the increasingly integrated character of the global energy market and rising energy demand call for a fundamental departure from the parochial, national approach that dominated energy policy in the 20^th century. A broader conception of energy security and a multilateral approach to these problems are needed in the 21^st century. “The reality,” she says, “is that no country can achieve energy security independently today.” The United States must take the lead in adopting a global perspective and a multilateral approach to energy security problems – and not for purely altruistic reasons. According to Harris, “the reality is that the United States will not be secure if competition for national control of energy resources around the world leads to conflict, market disruptions, and environmental disasters.”^[xl]

            Demographic and environmental factors will continue to generate intrastate and interstate security problems in the future. The world’s population is expected to grow by approximately 50 percent – from around six billion to a projected nine billion – by 2050. It is expected that at least 95 percent of the increase will be in the developing world – the part of the world least capable of sustaining additional population pressures. In addition, more and more of the world’s population will live in cities. The portion of the world’s population living in cities of more than 100,000 people is projected to grown from around 50 percent today to over 60 percent in 2030.^[xli] Populations movements – migration, urbanization, and populations displaced by violent conflicts – will continue to be sources of tension in many countries and regions.

            Demographic and environmental factors often interact to generate instability and security problems. Significantly, important ecological buffers – forests, fisheries, fresh water – are shrinking and will continue to shrink in the years ahead. This will generate more economic and environmental migration. This in turn will generate economic, social, and political tensions, and perhaps violence. Water and oil will continue to be sources of contention and perhaps contributing factors in interstate conflicts. John McNeill observes that “environmental perturbation has grown to a point where it must be reckoned a serious factor in all manner of human affairs, security included.” He believes that linkages between environmental and security issues will “exist with greater force in the future.”^[xlii] It is highly probable that demographic developments, environmental factors, and resource scarcities will become increasingly important security issues in the future.

            Although security problems in the developing world pose increasing threats to international security, international responses to these problems continue to be inadequate. According to Timothy Hoyt, some regions have been “virtually abandoned by the international community.” He concludes that it is “in the enlightened self-interest of the West to pay greater attention to the developing world, to develop a better understanding of the causes of instability, and to craft long-term responses to these problems.”^[xliii] This, he believes, will require a level of leadership and engagement that the United States has not yet demonstrated.

Non-Military Challenges: Technological

            Information technology and genetic engineering are two areas where forecasts range from generally pessimistic to potentially catastrophic.

            The likely effects of advances in information technology on security are “not encouraging,” according to Dorothy Denning. The number and severity of cyber attacks has increased dramatically in recent years, and this trend is likely to continue. Information technology is becoming faster, more powerful, more mobile, and more ubiquitous around the world. As a result, she says, “There are more perpetrators, more targets, and more opportunities to exploit, disrupt, and sabotage systems.^[xliv] In addition, computer networks are becoming increasingly integrated with critical infrastructures such as telecommunications, transportation, banking, electrical grids, oil and gas distribution systems, water supply systems, government services, and emergency services. Cyber attacks on these infrastructures have already become common, and deadly attacks on increasingly vulnerable systems could be launched in the future. Terrorists could combine a physical attack with a cyber attack on government response and emergency services systems, for example. “The bottom line,” Denning says, “is that we will never have secure systems.” In the future, “we can expect to see more attacks, and more mass attacks.”^[xlv]

            Genetic engineering might have truly cataclysmic implications for international security, according to Loren Thompson. In the near term, genetic engineering could be used to fashion extremely potent biological weapons, or weapons targeted at specific groups of people. Alternatively, genetic engineering might enable people to live decades longer; this, in turn, would have momentous demographic effects. In the long term, Thompson maintains that genetic engineering “may change the course of evolution, in the process redefining human nature.”^[xlvi] Thompson maintains that these new technologies need to be understood, monitored, and in some cases regulated and suppressed. However, for better or worse, many of these technological advances will be socially irresistible and nearly impossible to control for technical reasons. Even if they could be regulated, economic interests would oppose the creation of control mechanisms. He concludes, “Major consequences for world order would appear to be inevitable.”^[xlvii]

            One final point about technology and security in the 21^st century should be kept in mind. As Timothy Hoyt points out, the nature of international competition is becoming increasingly knowledge-intensive. Many technologies could have potentially momentous consequences for the international balance of power and international stability. The United States and the West will not necessarily dominate in all of these areas, and controlling the diffusion of technology will be difficult. In the future, Hoyt concludes, “Education will become a major security asset.”^[xlviii]

Transnational Challenges

            As discussed above, transnational media organizations, transnational criminal organizations and transnational terrorist organizations are not new actors in international affairs, but their influence has increased due to the developments that collectively comprise globalization. Advancing information and communications technologies, increasing in international trade, eroding border controls, and declining state capacities in many parts of the world have created environments that allow transnational organizations to operate more freely. The scope of transnational organizations has increased accordingly. Unless a catastrophic shock to the international system brings about a breakdown of the system, these trends will continue in the years ahead.

            The arrival of around-the-clock, television news operations in the early 1980s made transnational media organizations qualitatively more important than they had been in the past. Their influence has continued to grow since the end of the Cold War. Although transnational media organizations will continue to be important actors in national and security affairs in the 21^st century, several problems are unfolding. First, as more media organizations have launched new commercial operations, the competition for profits and ratings has intensified. Diana Owen argues that these economic pressures have already had pernicious effects on the quality of news coverage: news-gathering operations are being scaled back to cut costs; journalists with genuine expertise are being replaced by personalities known more for their celebrity; and increasingly, speed is being stressed over accuracy.^[xlix]

            Another problem is that the most powerful transnational media companies in operation today – CNN and BBC – are Western-based organizations. Since the ability to control information and shape images is an important source of power, the ability to shape the global conversation on many issues is uneven – and largely in Western hands. This is generating considerable resentment elsewhere. In the future, Western dominance of the transnational media scene will erode. Satellite technology is relatively inexpensive, and non-Western organizations are launching media operations of their own. This will lead to alternative sources of information and commentary for many, but new problems as well. The West’s ability to control the flow of information around the world – which was always far from absolute – will continue to decline.

            Finally, the emergence of such extraordinarily powerful transnational organizations is having effects on the international state system itself. Owen predicts that, in the future, “traditional barriers to the flow of information, such as state boundaries, will be obliterated.”^[l] What this will mean for the nature of international politics remains to be seen.

            The trend lines for transnational criminal organizations are even more worrying. Roy Godson contends that national and transnational criminal networks are already undermining political and economic stability in many countries and regions. He warns that “in an era of increasing globalization, the problem reaches into most corners of the world.”^[li] These problems will probably intensify and become more widespread in the future.

            To date, policy responses have been inadequate. This crisis is starting to be recognized as an important policy problem, but it is still not universally recognized as a security problem. Many international actors fail to appreciate that these networks are complex security problems driven by combinations of political, economic, and cultural problems that vary from place to place and over time. Many focus instead on the criminal components of the networks, which leads them to treat it as a straightforward law enforcement issue. Unfortunately, narrow policy diagnoses lead to narrow and deficient policy remedies. To be effective, policy responses must be multifaceted, adaptable to circumstances, and flexible over time. According to Godson, the outlook is “not particularly encouraging.” Given the growing magnitude of the problem and the lag in effective policy responses, “it is difficult to find reasons for optimism.”^[lii]

            Transnational terrorist organizations will continue to pose grave threats to national and international security in the future. Audrey Kurth Cronin argues that, if the current wave of terrorism is indeed an intensely violent backlash against U.S.-led globalization, then it is “not likely to be short-lived.”^[liii] She observes that many people in many states are being left behind by globalization, and that this is happening in highly visible ways. Expectations around the world are being raised by the information revolution at a time when global disparities are growing. The possibility that terrorist organizations might acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons is a growing concern. Terrorist organizations that are not constrained by state sponsorship – such as Al Qaeda – might be inclined to use these weapons, and they might be impossible to deter.

            Cronin argues that the United States and other Western powers need to develop a two-track strategy for preventing and countering terrorism: “a set of short-term actions that address immediate threats and challenges; and a set of longer-term actions that will shape the environments that enable terrorist networks to develop. The latter must focus on those globalization has left behind.”^[liv] This will entail devising a comprehensive strategy for sustainable development in the developing world – a vision that includes economic growth, good governance, education, and the provision of basic needs such as health care. The most effective policy instruments in this long-term campaign, she concludes, will be non-military instruments.

POLICY LESSONS

            One of the main reasons why the prospects for international security are grim is the inadequacy of current policy responses. We propose three sets of guidelines for those who will have policy responsibilities in the security arena in the future: timing lessons, conceptual lessons, and international lessons.

Timing Lessons

            A good place to start is with timing: When should policymakers begin to tackle security problems? And what planning horizons should they adopt?

            First, it is naive and dangerous for policymakers to neglect current and emerging security problems, hoping that they will take care of themselves or go away on their own. Policy problems are rarely self-correcting. To the contrary, if left to themselves, policy problems usually get worse as time goes by. Wishful thinking is not a policy; it is the self-deluding refuge of the short-sighted and the faint-hearted. Unfortunately, policy problems are often ignored until they become crises; then and only then do they find their way onto the agendas of busy policymakers. The result is that policy problems are neglected when they are relatively easy to solve, and they are addressed only after they become formidable. In effect, policymakers wait until problems become unsolvable before they try to solve them. This overstates the decisionmaking dynamic – but not by much. The policy lesson is to engage security problems as soon as possible, even if these problems have not yet become deadly conflicts. Security problems become much more formidable once the violence threshold is crossed.

            Second, in a dynamic and increasingly fast-paced world, policymakers no longer have the luxury of waiting for events to unfold before devising policy actions. In the 21^st century, policymakers must become accustomed to thinking five, ten, and twenty years into the future. This will be inherently difficult for most policymakers; their planning horizons are tied to the daily press of events, legislative calendars, and electoral cycles. Many policymakers do not expect to be in office ten or twenty years down the road; it is difficult for them to expend time, energy, and political capital in the short term when the policy benefits – if any – will be reaped by someone else in the long term. The costs of policy engagement are immediate and often quantifiable; the benefits of far-sighted actions are reaped only in a distant future, and they are often unquantifiable. These incentives and calculations are inherent in the policymaking process, and they will continue to discourage policymakers from strategic thinking. Wise policymakers will work to overcome these structural pressures. The policy lesson is that, in the 21^st century, those who simply react to events will be overtaken by events.

            Third, policymakers generally hope that security problems can be solved quickly and permanently; they hope for quick, permanent fixes to the issues before them. Unfortunately, most security problems are not amenable to quick fixes, and many cannot be solved at all; they can only be managed. Security threats and violent conflicts will be deadly facts of life throughout the 21^st century. There is no light at the end of this tunnel. The policy lesson is that policymakers must prepare themselves psychologically and politically for the long haul. This means thinking about problems in long-term time frames, as discussed above, and it means making long-term and even open-ended policy commitments.

            It is generally difficult for policymakers to make long-term and open-ended programmatic commitments. In the United States, for example, presidents are challenged to outline their “exit strategies” whenever they deploy U.S. military forces abroad. Even so, post-Cold War history suggests that long-term, open-ended commitments can be made at least some of the time. NATO brought three new members into the alliance in March 1999, and in November 2002 it extended membership invitations to seven additional countries. These were open-ended security commitments to the alliance’s new members; these commitments did not come with expiration dates attached. In short, making long-term and open-ended policy commitments is difficult – but not impossible. This is a security challenge that policymakers will have to strive to overcome in the 21^st century.

Conceptual Lessons

            We also propose three guidelines about the way security problems should be conceived and how security policies should be framed.

            First, many policymakers still define security problems in narrow terms, giving undue weight to interstate conflicts and the military dimensions of security problems. As discussed earlier in this paper, policymakers should develop broader security agendas that give appropriate weight to the full range of interstate, intrastate, transnational, military, and non-military challenges that are unfolding today. The policy lesson is to think inclusively about the security agenda.

            Second, if security problems are complex, multidimensional, and inter-connected, it follows that security policies should be multifaceted. Unfortunately, policymakers often favor simple, single-factor policy approaches; they hope that a single “silver bullet” will solve complex policy problems. This is another example of wishful thinking. The main policy lesson here is that complex, multidimensional security problems do indeed require multifaceted policy responses – often involving a combination of diplomatic, political, economic, and military elements. This is often challenging conceptually and politically, but it is nonetheless necessary.

            A third and related lesson is that many contemporary security problems are not amenable to simple military solutions. Policymakers often hope that complex security problems can be solved by a military “silver bullet,” but military responses often turn out to be inappropriate, ineffective, and even counter-productive. The use of military forces often appears to be a panacea, but this is all-too-often illusory. Problems that have non-military roots will almost always require a range of non-military policy responses, even if military actions are part of the equation as well.

International Lessons

            Finally, we offer several lessons about the international dimensions of contemporary security problems and the international dimensions of suitable policy responses.

            First, many security problems in the 21^st century will be transnational phenomena. They will cross national borders and cut across regions. Some will be truly global in scope. It will be beyond the capability of any one actor – even a superpower such as the United States – to tackle these problems on its own. National leaders who try to tackle these problems unilaterally will fail; national interests will correspondingly suffer. Therefore, one of the most basic principles of security policy in the 21^st century will be multilateralism: Transnational security problems will require multilateral policy responses. Multilateralism will henceforth not be an option – it will be a necessity.^[lv]

            Second, multilateral initiatives will require leadership. Although the United States will not be able to lead on every issue at every juncture, it will continue to be the world’s one and only superpower for the foreseeable future. American leadership – in identifying problems, devising strategies, forging coalitions, providing resources, and taking actions – will therefore be key. If American political leaders play a more energetic and effective global leadership role, many national, regional, and international security challenges will become more manageable. If American leaders are unwilling, disinclined, or unable to play this role, a wide array of security problems will become increasingly formidable.

            A short-term challenge for the United States will be undoing the diplomatic damage caused by the Bush administration’s handling of the Iraq crisis and by the U.S.-led war in Iraq in 2003. Although U.S. actions in Iraq had the active support of some governments and the tacit support of others, large numbers of people around the world were shocked and appalled by what they saw as unconstrained American unilateralism. Addressing these concerns and overcoming these impressions will require sustained American diplomacy.

            More generally, American officials need to develop a better appreciation of what effective international leadership entails. Since the end of the Cold War and cutting across both Democratic and Republican administrations, the prevailing American approach to international problems has been to set a U.S. course and assume that others will ultimately follow---willingly or grudgingly. Complaints about American presumptuousness and arrogance have consequently become increasingly common. American officials would be wise to appreciate that true leadership is based on true consultation. It is not enough for Washington to inform others of what it intends to do. The United States needs to consult with allies, friends, and others about goals, strategies, and actions. And above all, Washington needs to make a genuine effort to take the views of others into account. The United States clearly has the capacity to undertake unilateral actions in the international arena, but it will be able to lead only if listens.

            This leads to a third and final set of lessons. Those who seek to forge or sustain multilateral initiatives should keep several operational guidelines in mind. For starters, multilateralism cannot be turned on and off and on again. Building multilateral patterns of cooperation takes steady, sustained engagement. The United States, which often suffers from international attention deficit syndrome, will have to pay continuous attention to the maintenance of multiple international coalitions. A related guideline is that multilateralism is not an à la carte proposition. The United States cannot champion multilateralism when it is convenient for Washington to do so, and slight it the rest of the time. The United States must be prepared to engage on issues across the board. In addition, multilateralism is a two-way street. The United States must be willing to give as much as it gets. Indeed, one would hope that the world’s wealthiest and most powerful country would be inclined to give more than it gets.

            Finally, for multilateralism to endure, it needs a strong institutional foundation – the United Nations. It is certainly true that the United Nations has many structural and political flaws, and that it frequently exasperates even its staunchest supporters. It is also true that the United Nations has a unique and important role to play in promoting international peace and security. In the twenty-first century, international actors will have to take coordinated steps to address common threats, and the United Nations provides an indispensable mechanism for facilitating multilateral actions. The United States and the other leading powers in the international system would be wise to put the diplomatic trauma of the Iraq crisis behind them and work to develop the United Nations into a more effective instrument for the promotion of international peace and security. Building a strong, effective, and respected United Nations is in the enlightened self-interest of the world’s leading powers---the United States, in particular.

Back to Basics                   

            Most of these policy lessons are simple and commonsensical: act early, think ahead, plan for the long haul, avoid simple conceptual schemes and simple policy responses, recognize the limitations of military actions, and recognize the need for multilateral initiatives. They would be banal – but for the fact that policymakers around the world routinely fail to meet even these minimal standards. The first step, therefore, is to master these policy fundamentals.

This paper is adapted from Michael E. Brown, “Security Challenges in the Twenty-first Century” and “Security Problems and Security Policy in a Grave New World,” in Brown, ed., Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21^st Century (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003), pp. 1-13, 305-327.

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            Los problemas de seguridad internacional son importantes principalmente por un motivo: sus abrumadoras consecuencias humanas. En los conflictos armados del siglo XX decenas de