WP B1: Issues in metaphysics - Publications

Papers in Academic Journals

Campdelacreu, M.

  • (2010): “Naturalness, Vagueness, And Sortals”, Metaphysica, Vol. 11, nº: 1, pp. 79-91; 2010
  • “Do we need two notions of constitution?” in Philosophia Vol. 41, pp.503 - 519; 2013.

García-Carpintero, M.:

  • 'Truth-Bearers and Modesty’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 82 (2011), 49-75.
  • 'Gaskin's Ideal Unity', Dialectica 64, 2 (2010), 279-288. 
  • “A Genealogical Notion”, Teorema 30 (2011), 43-52
  • “La filosofía analítica y nuestra contribución a ella. Respuesta a Guillermo Hurtado”,Diánoia 57 (2012), 151-158.
  • “Foundational Semantics I: Descriptive Accounts”, Philosophy Compass 7(6), 2012, 397-409 DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00484.x.
  • Vindicating Analyticity”, Disputatio 33, 4 (2012), 495-513. 
  • “Foundational Semantics II: Normative Accounts”, Philosophy Compass 7(6), 2012, 410-421 DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00485.x.
  • ‘Ofra Magidor’s Category Mistakes’, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2014, http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/48538-category-mistakes/.
  • ‘Josep Corbí’s Morality, Self-Knowledge and Human Suffering’, Dialectica, 68 (1) 2014, 151-161, DOI:10.1111/1746-8361.12055.
  • ‘David Chalmers’ Constructing the World’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92 (2) 2014, 388-391, DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2013.872156.

Horden, J.: (2014): “Ontology in Plain English”, forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly

Jorba, M.(and Vicente, A.): (2014). “Cognitive Phenomenology, Access to Contents and Inner Speech”. Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol 21, Issue 9-10, pp. 74-99.

López de Sa, D.:

  • ‘What does it Take to Enter the Circumstance?’, Phil Studies 159 (2012), 147–53
  • ‘Lewis vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many’, Synthèse 191 (2014), 1105-17
  • ‘The Aposteriory Response-Dependence of the Colors’, Croatian JP 13 (2013) 65-79
  •  ‘Vagueness as Semantic Indecision, Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Indeterminate Reference’, Metaphysica 14 (2013), 197-209
  • ‘Rigid vs Flexible Response-Dependent Properties’, in Hoeltje, Schnieder & Steinberg (eds.), Dependence, Philosophia Verlag (2013)
  • ‘Audience in Context’, Erkenntnis 79 (2014), 241-53
Marques, T.
  • 2014. Relative Correctness, Philosophical Studies 167, 2: 361 - 373. doi: 10.1007/s11098-013-0100-3
  • 2014. Doxastic Disagreement, Erkenntnis, 79 (1): 121 - 142.  doi: 10.1007%2Fs10670-013-9448-1
  • (and García-Carpintero, M.).2014. Disagreement about Taste: Commonality Presuppositions and Coordination, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92 (4), 701-723. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.922592.
  • (and Cohnitz, D.). 2014. Disagreements. Erkenntnis, 79 (1): 1-10 . doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9442-7
Martí G. & Martínez Fernández. J. 2011.
“General Terms, Rigidity and the Trivialization Problem." Synthese 181, 2 (2011), pp. 277-293; doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9802-7.  
Martínez Fernandéz, J.: Remarks on the Gupta-Belnap fixed-point property for k-valued clones. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 24 (1-2), 118-131, 2014.
Martínez Fernandéz, J.and Valor, J.: Eliminating Self-Reference from Grelling’s and Zwicker’s Paradoxes, Theoria, 29 (1), 85 - 97, 2014.
Merlo, G.: “Specialness and Egalitarianism”, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, vol. 2 (3): 248-257. 2013

Moya, C.:

 

  • “A dialogue on free will”, Methode. Analytical Perspectives, vol. 2, nº 3, 2013, pp. 124-134
  • “Doing one’s best, alternative possibilities, and blameworthiness”, Crítica, vol. 46, issue 136, 2014, pp. 3-26

 

Pérez Otero, M. (2010):

  • “Possible Worlds: Structure and Stuff”, Philosophical Papers 39, pp. 209-237.
  • y José Martínez Fernández (2013a): Reseña de Saul Kripke: Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers. Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, xii + 388 páginas), Teorema, XXXII/2, pp. 213-220. 
  • (2013b): “Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order Necessitism”, Theoria, vol. 28/3, pp. 393-406. 
  • (2014) “Boghossian’s Inference Argument against Content Externalism Reversed”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 89, Issue 1, pp. 159-181. First published online: July 2012; DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00613.x.

Pickel, B.:

  • “A Quinean Critique of Ostrich Nominalism,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 12 (2012) (with Nicholas Mantegani) 
  • “Variables and Attitudes,” Nous, DOI: 10.1111/nous.12044 (2013)
  • “Russell on Incomplete Symbols,” Philosophy Compass, 10:909-923 (2013)
  • “One Dogma of Millianism” (with Derek Ball), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12009 (2013)

Rychter, P.: 

  • “How Coincidence Bears to Persistence”, Philosophia 39, 2011: 759-770.
  • “Stage Theory and Proper Names”, Philosophical Studies 161: 367–379
  • Critical notice of What is this thing called Metaphysics, de Brian Garrett, Teorema, XXXI/2, 2012.
  • Rychter, P. (2014): “Truthmaker Theory Without Truthmakers”, Ratio 27 (3): 276-290

Rosenkranz, S.:

  • ‘European Functionalism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2011), 229–49.
  • ‘Objective Content’, Erkenntnis 74 (2011), 177–206.
  • ‘Radical Scepticism without Epistemic Closure’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00562.x
  • (with Fabrice Correia) ‘Living on the Brink, or Welcome Back, Growing Block!’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8 (2013), 333–50

Saul, J. (2011): “Politically Significant Terms and Philosophy of Language: Methodological Issues”.

Santos, G: "Numbers and everything", Philosophia Mathematica, 21 (3), 297-308, 2013. 2014. 

Schulz, M.

  • 2011: “Chance and Actuality”, Philosophical Quarterly 61, 105-129.
  • 2011: “A Note on Comparative Probability” (with N. Haverkamp), Erkenntnis, available as Online First.
  •  2011: “Modalised Conditionals: A Response to Willer”, Philosophical Studies, available as Online First.
  • 2014 “Counterfactuals and Arbitrariness”, Mind 123: 1021-55.

Torre, S.: “The Open Future”, Philosophy Compass, 6/5 (2011), 360–373.

Torrengo,G.:

  • 2012, “Time and Simple Existence”, Metaphysica, 13:125–130
  • (2013) “Ostrich Presentism”, Philosophical Studies (online first: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-013-0211-x
  • (2013) “The Grounding Problem and Presentist Explanations”, Synthese 190: 2047–2063 (online: http://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-011-9955-z
  • (2013) “Yet Another Confusion about Time-Travel”, Disputatio, 1, 35: 49-56   
  • (2013) “Experimental Philosophy and Metaphysics”, Methode. Analytical Perspective, II, 2: 195-205     
  • 2014 “Ostrich Presentism”, Philosophical Studies 170: 255-276 (online first: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-013-0211-x
Valor, J.; 2014 (with José MartínezFernández) “Eliminating Self-Reference from Grelling’s and Zwicker’s Paradoxes”, Theoria 29 (1): 85–97. Donosti (España). (ISSN: 0495-4548; eISSN: 2171-679X).
Vega, J.: 2011, ‘Técnica, normatividad y sobrenaturaleza. Una ontología para un mundo de artefactos’. Revista internacional de tecnología, conocimiento y sociedad.1 - 1,pp. 1 - 15.

Vega,J. & Lawler, D. (2012): “Realizabilidad múltiple y clases de artefactos”, CTS, N 19, vol. 7, Revista Iberoamericana de Ciencia, Tecnología y Sociedad

Woodward, R.:

  • Ersatz Counterparts, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2013
  • Noneism, Ontology and Fundamentality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87: 558-83 (2013). (Co-authored with Tatjana von Solodkoff)
  •  Worldmates and Internal Relatedness, Philosophical Studies 166: 419-427 (2013). 
  • Towards Being. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83: 183-193. 2013 
  • A Yablovian Dilemma. Thought 1: 200-209. 2013 
  • Counterparts. Philosophy Compass 7: 58–70. 2012 
  • Worldmates and Internal Relatedness. Philosophical Studies 2012 
  • Fictionalism and Incompleteness. Nous 46: 781-790. 2012 
  • “Is Modal Fictionalism Artificial?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92:535-50, 2011. 
  • Truth in Fiction. Philosophy Compass 6:158–167. 2011

Zardini, E.:

  • 2013, ‘Higher-Order Sorites Paradox’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 42, pp. 25–48.
  •  2012, ‘Luminosity and Vagueness’, Dialectica 66, pp. 375–410.
  • 2011, ‘Truth without Contra(di)ction’, The Review of Symbolic Logic 4, pp. 498–535.
  • 2013, ‘Luminosity and Determinacy’, Philosophical Studies 165, pp. 765–786.
  • 2013, ‘Naive Modus Ponens’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 42, pp. 575–593.
  • 2013, ‘Knowledge-How, True Indexical Belief, and Action’, Philosophical Studies 164, pp. 341–355.
  • 2013, ‘It Is Not the Case that [P and ‘It Is Not the Case that P’ is true] nor Is It the Case that [P and ‘P’ Is Not True]’, Thought 1, pp. 309–319.
  • 2013, ‘Higher-Order Sorites Paradox’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 42, pp. 25–48.

Books, Reviews, Commentaries and Contributions to Books

Celestino, G.:

  • “Reference Through Demonstration: Singular Terms, Propositional Attitudes and Fiction.” (UBC dissertation, October 2012, published online: https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/43441/ubc_2012_fall_celestin...)
  • Abstract of “It Is Not the Case that the Alleged Golden Mountain Exists”, in Libro de resúmenes del II congreso de ALFAn, Buenos Aires (Argentina), August 2012.
  • “Análisis crítico de las teorías de la verdad y de las teorías del significado”, in Ostalé, Julio (coord.): Filosofía, profesores de Educación Secundaria. Temario para la preparación de oposiciones, Centro de Estudios Académicos, Madrid, 2012.
  • “La filosofía analítica: De Frege a la filosofía del lenguaje ordinario”, in Ostalé, Julio (coord.): Filosofía, profesores de Educación Secundaria. Temario para la preparación de oposiciones, Centro de Estudios Académicos, Madrid, 2012.
  • “Wittgenstein y Russell: Realidad y lenguaje”, in Ostalé, Julio (coord.): Filosofía, profesores de Educación Secundaria. Temario para la preparación de oposiciones, Centro de Estudios Académicos, Madrid, 2012.
  • “It Is Not the Case that the Alleged Golden Mountain Exists”, in Actas del VII congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España, Santiago de Compostela, 2012.
  • Review of Work and Object, by P. Lamarque, Disputatio, VI: 39 (2014). Vinculado al marco general del proyecto

Corbí, J. (2012): Morality, Self-Knowledge, and Human Suffering. An Essay on the Loss of Confidence in the World. New York, NY: Routledge 

Gómez Torrente, M.: 2010. “The Sorites, Linguistic Preconceptions, and the Dual Picture of Vagueness”, en R. Dietz y S. Moruzzi (comps.), Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford,  pp. 228-253

Kapsner (Pietz), A.: Logics and Falsifications. A New  Perspectiveon Constructivist Semantics. Springer, 2014.

López de Sa, D.: ‘What Could Vague Objects Possibly Be?’, in Akiba & Abasnezhad (eds.), Vague Objects and Vague Identity, Springer (2014), 257-271

Martí, G. & Martínez-Fernández. J. 2010.  “General Terms as Designators: A Defence of The View.” H. Beebee and N. Sabbarton-Leary (eds.): The semantics and metaphysics of natural kinds. Routledge Studies in Metaphysics. London. Routledge (2010), pp. 46-63.

Martínez-Fernández, J. & Valor, J. (2011): “Review of Saving Truth from Paradox, by Hartry Field”. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

Merlo, G. : “Review of Ciuni, R., Miller, K. & G. Torrengo (eds.), New Papers on the Present (Philosophia)

Moya, C.:

 

  • “Les aspects causaux de l’explication de l’action”, in Rémi Clot-Goudard (ed.), L’explication de l’action. Analyses contemporaines, Paris, Ed. Vrin, 2014, pp. 187-206.
  • “Alternatives and responsibility: an asymmetrical approach”, in Anne Reboul (ed.), Mind, Values and Metaphysics. Philosophical Papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan, vol. II, Dordrecht and New York, Springer, 2014, pp. 25-37.
  • “La causalidad mental: el nuevo dualismo”, in Pio Colonnello (ed.), Ilsoggettoriflesso. Itinerary del corpo e della mente, Milano-Udine, Mimesis Edizioni, 2014, pp. 137-149.

 

Pérez, D. y Español, S. "Intresubjetividad y atribución psicológica", Cognición social y lenguaje: La intersubjetividad en la evolución de la especie y en el desarrollo del niño. Editores: Paola Cépeda, Carla Mantilla, Pablo Quintanilla. Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2013

Pérez, D. :

  • "Dualism and Physicalism in Contemporary Philosophy of the Mind", en Hurtado, Guillermo and Oscar Nudler (Eds.)  The furniture of the world. Essays in ontology and metaphysics. Ed. Rodopi. Amsterdam/New York, NY, 2012. pp. 223-238. ISBN 978-90-420-3503-4
  • Sentir, desear, creer. Una aproximación filosófica a los conceptos psicológicos.Ed. Prometeo, Buenos Aires, 2013, 277 páginas. (ISBN 978-978-574-599-5)

Pérez-Otero, M.

  • “Kripke: reorientaciones en el giro lingüístico-representacional”, en David P. Chico (coordinador) Perspectivas en la filosofía del lenguaje, Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, pp. 242-272. 
  •  (2013d): “Opciones posibles para el libre albedrío”, en F. Broncano, C. Peralta, M. Rivero e I. Roncero (eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh SEFA Meeting, Madrid. 

Pickel, B.:

 

  • “Review of Things by Stephen Yablo” (The Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 215- 217 (2012)
  • Complex Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties,” dialectica 68: 209-230 (2014)

 

Rychter,P.: “La relació entre les paradoxes de coincidència i les teories sobre la persistència a través del temps”. Enric Casaban y Xavier Serra (eds) II Congrés Català de Filosofia, Editorial Afers, Catarroja-Barcelona, 2012. (ISBN 978-84-92542-74-1)

Rosenkranz, S.: 

  • Determinism, Open Future and Branching Time’, in: Correia, F./Iacona, A. (eds.), Around the Tree: Semantic and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Branching and the Open Future, Synthese Library Vol. 361, Berlin 2013: Springer, 47–72
  • ‘Realism and Anti-Realism’, in: Pritchard, D. (ed.), Oxford Bibliographies: Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013), http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-...
  • (with Fabrice Correia) ‘Return of the Living Dead: Reply to Braddon-Mitchell’, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9, 376–89 (final draft submitted 5 February 2014, proof stage since 11 October 2014)
  • ‘Perspectives sobre el futur obert: Ockham, Peirce i Belnap’ (‘Perspectives on the open future: Ockham, Peirce and Belnap’),Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofía 25 (2014), 167–80
  • ‘In Defence of Ockhamism’, (originally published in Philosophia - Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 40 (2012), 617–31), to be reprinted in Fischer, J.M./Todd, P. (eds.), Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Fatalism, New York: Oxford University Press (forthcoming 2015)

Torrengo,G.:

  • 2012 “The Metaphysics of the Thin Red Line” (with A. Borghini), in F. Correia, A. Iacona (eds.), Around the Three, Berlin, Synthese Library, Springer Verlag: 105-125.
  • 2012 “Esistere” e “essere esistito” [“Existing” and “Having existed”], in Andrea Bottani and Richard Davies (eds.) “Ontologie Analitiche”, Rivista di Estetica, 49: 115-140
  • (2013) “Presentism and Cross-temporal Relations” (with R. Ciuni), in R. Ciuni, K. Miller, G. Torrengo (eds.) New Papers on the Present. Focus on Presentism, Philosophia Verlag: 211-252.  Task B1.2
  • (2013) “Propositions and the Metaphysics of Time” (Disputatio’s Symposium on Berit Brogaard’s  Transient Truths, Oxford University Press, 2012), Disputatio V, 37: 315-321.   Task B1.1
  • (2013) “Time Travel and the Thin Red Line”, in P. Graziani and M. Sangoi (eds.) Open Problems in the Philosophy of Science, London, College Publications: 245-258    Task B1.4
  •  (2013) “Una nota sulla filosofia dei viaggi nel tempo” [A note on the Philosophy of Time Travel], in U. Curi (ed.) Pensare il Tempo. Tra Scienza e Filosofia, Milano, Mimesis: 137 – 150   Task B1.1
  • Torrengo, Giuliano y Borghini, Andrea (2013) “The Metaphysics of the Thin Red Line”, in F. Correia, A. Iacona (eds.), Around the Three, Berlin, Synthese Library, 
  • Torrengo, Giuliano y Casati, Roberto (2013) “The Identity of Indiscernibles and the Principle of No co-location”, forthcoming in M. Dell’Utri, F. Bacchini, and S. Caputo (eds.), Realism and Ontology without Myths, Newcastle UKSpringer Verlag: 105-125. Task B1.4
  • Torrengo, Giuliano y Ciuni, Roberto y Miller, Kristie (eds.) (2013), New Papers on the Present. Focus on Presentism, to be published by Philosophia Verlag.
Vega Encabo, J.
  • Lawler, D. y Vega Encabo, J. (2014), “Creating artifactual kinds”, en M. Franssen, P. Kroes, Th. Reydon y P. Veermas (eds.): Artefacts Kinds. Ontology and the Human made world. Synthese Library, Special Volume VI, 2014, ISBN: 978-3-319-00801-1. Libro publicado en la colección Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Editors: Dirk van Dalen, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands; Theo A.F. Kuipers, University of Groningen, The Netherlands; Teddy Seidenfeld, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, U.S.A.; Patrick Suppes, Stanford University, CA, U.S.A.; Jan Wolenski, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland. ISBN: 978-3-319-00801-1. B1.1
  • (with María José Frapolli), “First Edition of the Lullius Lectures: Kitcher's Reconstruction in the Philosophy of Science”, Theoria. 28/2-77, pp. 181-184. 2013. B1.1
  • Vega Encabo J& Diego Lawler, "Creating Artifactual Kinds", in Franssen, M., P. Kroes, T.A.C. Reydon, and P. E. Vermaas (eds.), Artefact Kinds: Ontology and The Human-Made World, Springer, pp. 105-124, 2014. B1.1
Vicario, I.: (con Agustín Vicente): "Critical review of T. Burge’s Origins of Objectivity", Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, 44 (131), 2012, pp. 103-112.

Zardini, E.:

 

  • 2012, ‘Truth Preservation in Context and in Its Place’, in C. Dutilh Novaes, O. Hjortland (eds), Insolubles and Consequences. Essays in Honour of Stephen Read, College Publications, London, pp. 249–271.
  • Zardini (2014): ‘Evans Tolerated’, forthcoming in A. Abasnezhad, K. Akiba (eds), Vague Objects and Vague Identity, Springer, Dordrecht.