

What to do to tame *what is said*
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The aim of this paper is to discuss some theoretical questions that an experimental approach to the topic of *what is said* should address. We will scrutinize several recent alternatives to individuate *what is said*, the proposition expressed through the utterance of a sentence with respect to which we exhibit particular responsibility, that seem to be specially suited for experimental treatment: Bach's iq test (Bach 1999), Recanati's availability (e. g. Recanati 2004, Recanati 2010), Stojanovic's "saying the same" criterion (Stojanovic 2008), and Cappelen & Hawthorne's agreement criterion (Cappelen & Hawthorne 2009). Not only will an experimental comparison of these alternatives require paying close attention to theoretical debates already present in the literature, such as the discussion on the status of the experts' intuitions, the debate surrounding intuitions-based philosophy vs. modal facts, or the difficulties to focus the relevant experiments on the usage rather than the theoretical intuitions of the group to be tested; moreover, we will argue, at least two topic-specific issues need to be addressed. The first theoretical issue that could drastically affect experimental strategies is the distinction between *pragmatically oriented* and *semantically oriented* theories of *what is said*. Only theories belonging to the first group consider speakers' intuitions about the truth of what they say to be the raw data of the theory, and therefore these theories are in no way revisionist towards speakers' intuitions. On the other hand, theories within the second group could accept that many times speakers are "semantically blind". The second topic-specific theoretical issue that we will pay attention to is related to the extent to which these theories take the notion of *what is said* to be either *primitive* or *derivative*. Some characterize this level of content in terms of certain key-locutions what can be used to construct critical tests –indirect reports, "saying the same", "agree", etc– while others refuse to do so. Both topic-specific questions should be added to the agenda of issues to be solved in order to extract safe theoretical conclusions out of our empirical studies concerning the philosophical notion of *what is said*. Finally, we will point that empirical studies focusing on intuitions are not the only way through which philosophical views can gain experimental support. This support can also come from considering how specific and plausible the theory's assumptions about the cognitive processes involved are, and also from taking into account the theory's relation to well established empirical theses of other sciences.