Patrick Greenough

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Senior Lecturer
Home institution: 
University of St. Andrews

Patrick is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at St. Andrews University, and is an Associate Fellow of Arché and The Northern Institute for Philosophy. For 2003-4, he was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the AHRC funded project Vagueness: Its Nature and Logic, at Arché. In 2007-2008 he was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow for the ARC funded Epistemic Warrant project in the Philosophy Programme, RSSS, at The Australian National University. From September 2009 to August 2011, he will be a half-time Research Fellow at the Centre for Time, University of Sydney. He is currently the UConn Distinguished Visiting Professor for 2010.

He received his PhD from St. Andrews in 2002. Before that he taught at the University of Bristol 2000-2002. His main research interests are in the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language, and epistemology. He has a particular interest in vagueness, the liar paradox, indeterminacy, contextualism, relativism, minimalism, realism, truth, anti-luck epistemology, self-knowledge, basic knowledge, discrimination, assertion, belief, representation, and, the nature of time.

He is currently completing a book on indeterminacy.


"Discrimination and Self-Knowledge", in D. Smithies and D. Stoljar (eds) Introspection and Consciousness, Oxford: OUP, forthcoming 2011.

"Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming 2011. (.doc)

"Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion", in J. Brown and H. Cappelen (eds) Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford: OUP, 2011. (.doc)

"Deflationism and Truth-Value Gaps", in Cory Wright and N. Pedersen (eds) New Waves in the Philosophy of Truth, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. (.doc)

"Hold the Context Fixed, Vagueness Still Remains", (with J. Åkerman) in R. Dietz and S. Moruzzi (eds) Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic Oxford: OUP, 2010. (.doc)

"Vagueness and Non-Indexical Contextualism", (with J. Åkerman), in S. Sawyer (ed.) New Waves in the Philosophy of Language, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. (.doc)

"On what it is to be in a Quandary", Synthese, 2009, (.doc)

"Indeterminate Truth", in Truth and Its Deformities, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. XXXII, pp. 213-241, edited by Peter French, 2008. (pdf)

"Contextualism about Vagueness and Higher-Order Vagueness", Proc. Aristotelian Soc., Suppl Vol., 78, July 2005.

"Vagueness: A Minimal Theory", Mind, Volume 112, Issue 446, pp. 235-281, March 2003. (pdf)

"Free Assumptions and the Liar Paradox", American Philosophical Quarterly, 38:2, pp. 115-135, April 2001. (pdf)

 (please cite published versions as .doc versions may differ)


Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, co-edited with Duncan Pritchard, 2009.

Truth and Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, co-edited with Michael Lynch, 2006.





'Incoherentism’, weekly project seminar for Philosophy of Perspectival Facts and Thought, OGOS, Barcelona, 25th February 2011.

‘Truthmaker Gluts’, Metaphysical Indeterminacy Workshop, Leeds, January 2011.

‘Facts and Indeterminacy’, PETAF Workshop, Geneva, 8-9th December 2010.

‘Permissible Disagreement’, Workshop on the Nature of Disagreement, UConn, November 4th 2010.

‘Truthmaker Gluts’, workshop on Vagueness and Metaphysics, LOGOS, Barcelona, 16-17th September 2010.

‘What Price Common-Sense?’, Workshop on Composition, Constitution, and Parthood, University of Otago, NZ, June 2010.

‘What is it to Disagree?’, Workshop on Disagreement, Social Epistemology Research Group, Copenhagen, September 2009.

‘Truth-Relativism and Norm-Relativism’, Winter-School, Centre for Time, University of Sydney, 20th-21st July 2009.

‘Pluralism about Truth’, Winter-School, Centre for Time, University of Sydney, 20th-21st July 2009.

‘Knowledge for Nothing?’, Workshop on the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, ANU, July 16-17th 2009.

‘Wright on Entitlement’, Arché Basic Knowledge Workshop, St. Andrews, 13 – 14th June 2009.

‘Truthmaker Gluts’, Conference on Truth and Pluralism, University of Connecticut, May 2009.

‘Relativism, Assertion, and Belief’, Workshop for The Pragmatic Foundations of Language Project, University of Sydney, January 21st 2009.

‘Testing for Vagueness’, Workshop on The Psychology and Philosophy of Vagueness, Institute Jean Nicod, Paris, November 21st – 22nd 2008.

‘Assertion’, Epistemology Workshop, Australian National University, Kioloa Campus, NSW, Australia, 16th February 2008.

‘Contextualist Theories of Vagueness’, Pamplona Workshop on Vagueness, Navarre, June 2007.

‘Knowledge, Assertion, and Future Contingency’, Bled Conference on Epistemology, May 2007.

‘The Future’, The Edinburgh Philosophy Society, 15th February 2007.

‘Knowledge and Certainty: Reply to Stanley’, First Arché Basic Knowledge Workshop, 24th – 25th November 2006.

‘The Open Future’, Logic and Language Seminar,  University of Stockholm, 5th October 2006.

‘Contextualist Theories of Vagueness’, Final Arché Workshop on Vagueness, 3 – 4th November 2006.

‘The Open Future’, main speaker at Reasoning about Probability and Vagueness, Prague, September 5th – 8th 2006.

‘The Open Future’, Scots Philosophical Club Annual Meeting, 6th May 2006.

‘Higher-order Vagueness’, Joint Session of the Mind and Aristotelian Society, 10th July 2005.

‘Is Life a Lottery?’, Epistemology Workshop, University of Connecticut, 28th February 2005.

‘Safety, Luck, and Lotteries’, Epistemology Seminar, Brown University, 25th February 2005.

‘Truthmaker Gaps’, Truth Seminar, University of Connecticut, February 16th, 2005.

‘Truthmaker Gaps’, The ad hoc Seminar, Free University of Berlin, January 23rd, 2005.

‘Contextualism about Vagueness', Free University of Berlin, January 22nd 2005.

‘Truthmaker Gaps’, Conference on Metaphysics and Paradox, University of Leeds, 13th Nov 2004.

Commentator at Epistemological Contextualism, University of Stirling, 20th – 21st March 2004.

‘The Bearable Lightness of Knowing’, DeRose Workshop on Epistemology, Stirling, 15th March 2004.

‘From Modalism to Fallibilism’, Pre-conference for Modalism and Mentalism, Denmark, 27 – 28th January 2004.

‘From Mentalism to Fallibilism’, Pre-conference for Modalism and Mentalism, Denmark, 27 – 28th January 2004.

‘Looks’, Workshop on Vagueness, Institute of Philosophy, University of Bologna, January 2004.

‘Are We all Externalists Now? ’, NAMICONA workshop on epistemology, Kolding, Denmark, 5 – 7th December 2003.

‘Why is the (Phenomenal) Sorites so Seductive?’, First Arché Workshop on Vagueness, 1st – 2nd September 2003.

‘Logic for Liars’, Recent Thoughts about the Liar, SUNY/Buffalo, 19th October 2002.

‘Minimal Epistemology, Gettier cases, and Lucky Knowledge', The Limits of Knowledge, Berlin, 9th – 10th July 2002.

‘The Minimal Theory of Vagueness’, Workshop on Vagueness, University of Bologna, 22nd – 24th November 2001.

‘Margins for Error’, St. Andrews Reading Party, Raasay, Scotland, 25 – 27th May 2001.

‘Minimal Margins for Error’, symposium on Tim Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits, given at the conference The Limits of Warrant, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 18th – 20th May 2001.



‘Knowledge for Nothing?’, SEFA Workshop on the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Barcelona, 15-17th December 2010.

‘Permissible Disagreement’, Australasian Association of Philosophy, UNSW, Sydney, July 2010.

‘Truth and Indeterminacy’, Pacific APA, San Francisco, April 2010.

‘Deflationism about Facts’, AAP-NZ, Massey University, Dec 4th, 2009.

‘Truthmaker Gluts’, Australasian Association of Philosophy, Melbourne, July 2009.

‘Our Cognitive Homes’, SIFA, Bergamo, September 2008.

‘Our Cognitive Homes’, Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference, July 2008.

‘The Open Future’, Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference, New Zealand Division, Auckland, November 2007.

‘The Open Future’, Joint Session of the Mind and Aristotelian Society, 7th – 9th July 2006.

‘Truthmaker Gaps’, Fifth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy, Lisbon, 27th – 31st August 2005.

‘The Minimal Theory of Vagueness’, Fourth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy, Sweden, June 2002.

‘Free Assumptions’, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Poland, 20 - 26th August, 1999.

‘Anti-Realism and the Liar Paradox’, Logica ’99, Liblice, Czech Republic, 22 - 25th June, 1999.



‘Vagueness’, University of Brighton Philosophy Society, March 2011.

‘Permissible Disagreement’, Dublin, December 10th 2010.

‘Indeterminate Identity Defended’, UConn Logic Group, November 2010.

‘Pragmatics in Thought: the Case of Moore’s Paradox’, UConn, October 2010.

‘Pragmatics in Thought: the Case of Moore’s Paradox’, University of Singapore, July 2010.

‘Norm-Relativism’, University of Auckland, June 11th 2010.

‘Norm-Relativism’, University of Connecticut, Departmental Colloquium, April 2010.

‘Deflationism and Truth-Value Gaps’, University of Connecticut, Logic Group Meeting, April 2010.

‘Relativism and the Open Future’, University of Connecticut, Brown Bag, April 2010.

‘Relativism, Assertion and Belief’, Institute for Philosophy, London, February 12th 2009.

‘Relativism, Assertion and Belief’, RSSS, Australian National University, January 13th 2009.

‘Our Cognitive Homes’, University of Nottingham, 19th November 2008.

‘Our Cognitive Homes’, University of Leeds, 30th October 2008.

‘Relativism, Assertion, and Knowledge’, University of Sydney, August 5th 2008.

‘The Open Future’, University of Sydney, March 2008.

‘Our Cognitive Homes’, PhilSoc, RSSS, Australian National University, 29th January 2008.

‘The Open Future’, Philosophy Seminar at RSSS, Australian National University, 20th September 2007.

‘The Open Future’ LOGOS Seminar Series, University of Barcelona, May 2007.

‘Fallibilism’, University of Stockholm, December 2006.

‘The Open Future’, Central European University, November 2006.

‘The Open Future’, University of Sheffield, 3rd November 2006.

‘Phenomenal Continua’, NYU, 4th March 2005.

‘Phenomenal Continua’, Ohio State University, February 2005.

‘Phenomenal Continua’, University of Connecticut, February 2005.

‘Knowledge: A Minimal Theory’, University of Leeds, 11th March, 2004.

‘Phenomenal Continua’, University of Bristol, 5th March 2004.

‘Looks’, University of Stirling, 19th February 2004.

‘Phenomenal Continua’, University of Edinburgh, 13th February 2004.

Phenomenal Continua’, University of Glasgow, 21st October 2003.

‘The Title of this Paper is Not Meaningful’, University of Aberdeen, 12th December 2002.

‘Minimal Epistemology’, University of Bristol, 14th November 2001.


‘Truthmaker Gluts’, Winter Reflectorium, 11th January 2010.

‘Relativism, Assertion, and Belief’, Arché Contextualism and Relativism Seminar, May 2009.

‘Relativism’, St. Andrews Philosophy Society, May 2009.

‘Our Cognitive Homes’, Summer Reflectorium, 18th September 2008.

‘Contextualist Theories of Vagueness’, Arché Vagueness Audit, June 2007.

Knowledge and Future Contingency’, Knowledge and Language Seminar, February 2007.

‘How to be a Reliabilist’, Arché Epistemology Seminar, June 2006. 

‘The Open Future’, Arché Vagueness Seminar, 17th April 2006.

‘The Open Future’, Winter Reflectorium, 10th January 2006.

‘Contextualism and Higher-order Vagueness’, Arché Vagueness Seminar, 9th February 2005.

‘Safety and the Kripke-Closure Puzzles’, Arché Epistemology Seminar, 14th January 2005.

‘Shapiro on Vagueness and Higher-Order Vagueness’, Arché Vagueness Seminar, 24th November 2004.

‘Truthmaker Gaps’, Arché Vagueness Seminar, 10th November 2004.

‘Is Life a Lottery?’, Arché Epistemology Seminar, 1st October 2004.

‘Phenomenal Paradoxes’, 3rd Arché Vagueness Workshop, September 2004.

‘Compatibilism and Bivalence’, Arché Vagueness Seminar, September 2004

‘Raffman on Borderline Cases’, Arché Vagueness Seminar, August 2004

‘Truthmaker Gaps’, Arché Vagueness Seminar, 21st July 2004.

‘Epistemic Tolerance, Vagueness, and Ignorance’, Arché Vagueness Seminar, 5th May 2004.

‘Theorising About Vagueness’, Arché Vagueness Seminar, 28th January 2004.

‘Fallibilism’, Winter Reflectorium, 14th January 2004.

Respondent for Jim Mawby's 'Heaps and Heartbeats’, Arché Graduate Conference, 4th – 6th September 2003.

‘Vagueness: As Deep as it is Broad?’, Philosophy Society, 12th March 2003.

Higher-order Vagueness and the Dream of a Precise Metalanguage’, November 18 th, 2002.

‘Minimal Epistemology, Gettier cases, and Lucky Knowledge’, 14th May, 2002.