

## “Improvisation.

# A “method” of philosophical consultation

by Neri Pollastri

The most frequently discussed theme in the field of philosophical practice is probably the method issue. Personally, I gave up the idea a long time ago that both philosophical practice and philosophy have a method, because the critics to the method concept in philosophy elaborated by philosophers as Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend and, before them, by Hegel, are extremely convincing. This doesn't mean that the method issue in philosophical practice could be disregarded, because it is very important for the *identity* of the discipline and for the possibility *to teach* it to apprentice practitioners.

If you look at philosophical practice, you can see that it is a *practical* activity, but it is connected with a subject, philosophy, specifically *theoretically*. Such an apparent contrast explains why the methodological problem has in itself a strong urgency: how can you be *practical*, by using only *theories*? Such a question once again reconnects the method issue in philosophical practice to the relation between this discipline and philosophy. My view on this matter is that philosophical practice is nothing but philosophy: “philosophical practice”, actually, means “practice of philosophy”. Obviously, you can “practice” philosophy in an academic way - reading and writing essays and books, dealing only with “abstract” problems - or in other ways, as the philosophical practitioners are doing. What are the differences?

Practicing philosophy in not an academic way means philosophizing: a) with not philosophers; b) dealing with (and starting from) concrete, individual everyday problems. Looking better at the various types of philosophical practices, you can see that some of them have partially definite methodologies. Nevertheless it happens because they include also aims and goals, which are not specifically philosophical. Philosophy is love of “Sophia”, and its aims are only knowledge and understanding; on the contrary, for example, *Philosophy for Children* has also a pedagogic purpose, and the “Socratic Dialogue” has the pursuit to reach a positive and shared result at the end of the sessions. These goals are the sources of their own methodologies, which have thereby their roots in other fields - pedagogy and psychology, in general. Obviously, they include also philosophical tools and competencies, and therefore they have fully philosophical dignity; nevertheless, they are “hybrid” practices (as already Shlomit Schuster wrote in his first book, *Philosophy Practice*).

But, I think, philosophical consultation is indeed a “purely philosophical” practice, namely it is “pure philosophy”. Therefore it cannot have a specific methodology<sup>1</sup>.

## A practical theory

The consultation acting, being *philosophical*, is essentially *theoretical*. It is dialogical, made of concepts and words, involved in stories, worldviews, understandings of problems, theories, conceptions of life, sense networks, systems of values. All these theoretical elements are introduced in consultation dialogue not by the consultant, but by the counselee, because they are what, by means of which he narrates, explains and justifies his problematic situation, the reason that has induced him to come to the consultant. The philosopher looks at them as elements of a *text* - a living text, responding and reacting to his analysis and suggestions.

This points out the modes of the relation between theory and practice in philosophical consultation: what happens between consultant and counselee is really *theoretical*, but it has already concrete results on both dialoguing partners' life, because philosophical consultation is a “practical theory”<sup>2</sup>, that is, in Gerd Achenbach's words, «a practitioner meta-theory, building itself only as a reflecting and practice process»<sup>3</sup>.

In such a way philosophical consultation (and the other “purely philosophical” practices, as for example *Café Philo* and some types of seminars) have to be seen in the light of the philosophical current starting from Plato. In *Phaedro* and *VII letter* he was criticizing “written” philosophy, which in his opinion solidifies the thinking

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<sup>1</sup> I have argued this thesis in my book *Il pensiero e la vita. Guida alla consulenza e alle pratiche filosofiche*, Milano, Apogeo, 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Neri Pollastri, *Teoria pratica e palle di biliardo. La consulenza filosofica come mappatura dell'esistenza*, in Walter Bernardi e Domenico Massaro (Eds.), *La cura degli altri. La filosofia come terapia dell'anima*, Arezzo, Dipartimento di Studi Storico-Sociali e Filosofici, 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Gerd Achenbach, *Philosophische Praxis*, Köln, Dinter, 1984, p. 59.

process *in motion*, reducing it in doctrinal and dogmatic shapes of knowledge. This doesn't occur, said Plato, in the oral practice of philosophy, which is an acting, a process, always including change. Several thinkers during the ages have worked according to this platonic line. Indeed all of them are worthy of the name of "philosopher": they wrote books and systems, but every time doubting more and more about their conclusions, questioning, correcting and sometimes rejecting them. In other words, they used writing as a way to communicate to other philosophers and men the provisory results of their speculation.

On this line of thought is the Italian philosopher Carlo Sini, who says that if man follows philosophy in its written shape, he «will acquire culture, but he will lose philosophy», because «culture distracts man from thinking and from pursuing truth. It deceives him to be philosopher because he reads books of philosophy (as the publisher grants), but having entirely forgotten, or never known, what really the exercise of philosophy and of thinking is: the philosophical *ethos*»<sup>4</sup>.

So, philosophy is not simply identifiable in a *corpus* of books and knows, but it requires something else - an *ethos*. What is it? Fundamentally, a way to look at the world and at its problems, a way to act dialogically, a way of life.

## Philosophy as a reflective and transcendental acting

The first characteristic of this way of life is its *intention*: it is *reflective*. This is an important difference from the majority of the other human behaviors, which aim to have effect directly on the surrounding reality. Such behaviors are of technical-strategic type, they use the "means-to-goals" logic, and therefore define methodology, to obtain their pre-defined purposes. Their direction goes *from* man *to* reality. On the contrary, philosophy has for its goals only understanding and knowing; it doesn't include the aim of having direct effect on reality. The only effect it has, is on the man himself, which is philosophizing. So, it is reflective.

How can philosophy affect the philosopher himself? Just because, by philosophizing, he changes his way of thinking the world (and himself), and so changing also his way of reacting to it. In such a way it is a "practical theory": one changes his theory and, immediately, also his entire being changes, including his emotional sphere, his decisional aptitude, his way of acting in the world.

In my Italian book, I have explained how this philosophical way of life is connected, in its core, to the Socratic approach to philosophy, as it is interpreted by Gregory Vlastos in his important Socratic studies<sup>5</sup>. I show there some other characteristics of philosophy, intrinsically connected with it, as: *critics*, issues from Socratic disavowing of knowledge; *analysis*, fundamental part of understanding; *improvement* of the knowledge available to the philosopher; *systematic re-construction*, rationally guided, of knowledge itself. But in such a frame the problem arises of how joining the "static" possession of these competencies with the "dynamic" element of philosophizing, its "know how".

## From method to improvisation as a method

In order to have an answer to the last question, it is spontaneous to think of a method. But we have seen that a unified method in philosophy is impossible. An Italian philosopher, Franca D'Agostini, says: «Philosophy has several methods: it is a multi-methodological activity»<sup>6</sup>. And what is valued for philosophy, it is also valued for "pure philosophical" practices. In fact, as a lot of practitioners affirm, there is not a method of philosophical consultation, and also the methods some of them have described seem to be more general schemes, useful to understand what happens during a session and to have in it an orientation, rather than something similar to a traditional "method". This happens because, if consultation is really philosophical, like philosophy it has several methods, not a specific one.

Thus, the problem becomes: how is it possible to link and to organize the plurality of philosophical methods and competencies in a general frame, which can give them a sense, a philosophical identity, and, at the same time, to help philosophers to practice consultation? To answer this question I am working on a particular concept, suitable to function as a flexible and open "method": *improvisation*.

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<sup>4</sup> Carlo Sini, *Filosofia e scrittura*, Laterza, Bari, 1994, p. 47.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991; Gregory Vlastos, *Socratic Studies*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994.

<sup>6</sup> Franca D'Agostini, *Metodi e tecniche filosofiche*, in "La società degli individui", 21, 2004, pp.129-130 (now in Franca D'Agostini, *Nel chiuso di una stanza con la testa in vacanza*, Roma, Carocci, 2005).

In philosophical practice literature some practitioners have already spoken about improvisation: Catherine McCall, who affirms «the practical philosopher working with people is always and in every instance improvising»<sup>7</sup>; Marc Sautet, who came up with the idea of improvisation while speaking about *Café Philo*, which is, in my opinion, the philosophical practice most similar to consultation; Ran Lahav, who indicates it as a type of method, describing it on the analogy of the way in which musicians operate: «a basis of variations, (...) a procedure which one is supposed to *approximate* in a rough manner, but not necessarily to follow exactly»<sup>8</sup>.

Trying to go more deeply in the same way and joining these reflections with my knowledge of jazz music, I am now persuaded that this concept of method is very important to understand what happens in philosophy and philosophical consultation. Musical improvisation is in fact, as philosophy, a multi-methodological activity: an improvising musician must have a large range of theoretical knowledge and practical competencies, thanks to he obtains, when required, a multiplicity of possible and different methods to express his musical ideas. So, for example, he must: 1) know musical notation, theory of harmony, structures of several compositions; 2) possess quite a specific knowledge of the history of musical styles; 3) master very well the field to which he refers his music; 4) have listened carefully to and studied analytically the masters of his instrument. Besides, he must have a good command of his instrument and know all of its secrets, but he must also have competence on the instruments of his music partners. Again, he must know how to listen to his partners, the public, the surroundings. Finally, he must have a serene aptitude to stage presence.

But all of these qualities are not sufficient, yet: as the Italian philosopher Davide Sparti observes, the improviser must also belong to a «community of practice»<sup>9</sup>, because «relevant knowledge aspects of the improviser can be learnt “without teaching”, that is in interaction contexts, without requiring explicit linguistic transmission and translation»<sup>10</sup>. This means that improvisation is «a practice organized in the context of specific communities, according to their traditions and norms»<sup>11</sup>; nevertheless, presupposing «a socialization and the decisive role of a tradition»<sup>12</sup>, it allows a *transformation* of all what is produced during the practice. Indeed, its characteristic lineament is just «the transformation of a sonorous texts *corpus* (...), that is their re-connotation or signification or re-contextualization»<sup>13</sup>.

This short description of improvising practice is sufficient enough to understand to what an extent it requires great and continuous study, exercise and attention to the matter, and therefore how far it is from being a trivial or superficial activity.

In this “improvisation method” two elements have important roles: *practice skills* (a “know how” in the field in which one want to act) and the *reference to a corpus of tradition*. The first element has some theoretical aspects (in learning skills you usually also need to know their theory), but above all it is characterized by the personal, psychophysical undertaking of “habits” and ways of being. This allows that the “knowledge” of skills and competencies one possesses, could become an “operative mastering”, a control of them without a direct mental employment of theory. Instead, the second element is closely related to knowledge, because it requires the study of theory and tradition; but it is not enough that these knows remain only “known”: they must be analyzed and criticized, valued and confronted, reconsidered and modified, until they are “metabolized” and become parts of the musician “way of being”.

Shortly, in both elements the cognitive aspects appear necessary, but not sufficient: knowing which key to touch to obtain a note, remembering which notes constitute a song, knowing the great masters’ interpretations of it, all this, however, doesn’t mean being able to play music, nor to improvise. To reach these capacities, you need to “embody” those knows and competencies, in a way that fingers go directly and at the right time on the right key, the musician’s stylistic ideas spontaneously spring from his mind and his heart, producing the “right” sonorous form.

What we have seen, allows us to understand how and why the practice of improvisation is similar to the practice of philosophy, in all its modes. Who wants to become a philosopher cannot either limit his training to

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<sup>7</sup> Catherine McCall, *Job for Philosophers: Philosophical Inquiry - Origin and Development*, in Wim Van Der Vlist (ed.), *Perspectives in Philosophical Practice*, Leusden, Vereniging voor Filosofische Practijk, 1996, p. 71.

<sup>8</sup> Ran Lahav, *Is Philosophical Counseling that different from Psychotherapy?*, in “Zeitschrift für Philosophische Praxis”, I, 1994, p. 34.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Davide Sparti, *Suoni inauditi. L'improvvisazione nel jazz e nella vita quotidiana*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005, pp. 128 e sg.

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 129.

<sup>11</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 130.

<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.

<sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 132.

learning the great thinkers' works, nor to knowing to list and to distinguish philosophical methodologies, argumentative modes, logic laws, thinking fallacies, nor just to giving contemporary problems answers which other people gave them in past. All these knows are essential presupposes, but they are not sufficient. It is necessary indeed having attended a community, that one defined by Matthew Lipman "research community", the one we can more generally call the eternal community of philosophy. Only in it you can learn to philosophize, by the examples of the masters, in collaboration with other companions, and finally venturing in personal ways to answer to open questions of the community, operating some original "variations" on them, but remaining "situated" in it and receiving by the other members confirmations of his "philosopher" qualities. Without this practice training in community, it is impossible to philosophize; you can be a good connoisseur, or expert, or teacher of philosophy, but you cannot be *philosopher*. You can be able to narrate philosophy, not to do it, because (as Sparti says about jazz music) its «stigma» is the «transforming appropriation», which produces «difference *by means of* repetition»<sup>14</sup>. It should be noted that this interpretation is based on a difficult and always provisory balance of tradition and innovation, in which an excess of repetition of the first nullifies the value of the (philosophical or artistic) work, and an excess of the second makes it either incomprehensible, or quackish. Just the imponderable of this balance shows why the only "method" suitable to describe it without pauperizing its creative function is "improvisation": having all (or large part of) the knows and competencies required to be an improviser, the philosopher, as the artist, is able to dose the reference to tradition and personal suggestion, to create original and appropriate variation to the theory.

## Philosophy and philosophical consultation

What is valid for philosophy, is also valid for philosophical consultation, because, as we have seen previously, there are no decisive differences between them. Obviously, the few little differences require some specific competencies. So, if philosophical consultation is usually practiced with people without a training in philosophy, it requires the philosopher to use a simpler, everyday language, which must be comprehensible. Then, being philosophical consultation usually oral, it requires the philosophical practitioner to have greater dialogical skills than an academic philosopher. Finally, if the "text" you have to do with in consultation is a "living text", reacting spontaneously and unpredictably, it requires – as in musical improvisation – greater attention and openness towards this. But, generally, these competencies are implicitly included in the philosopher's baggage: he loves knowledge and searching, he wishes to learn; and *wishing to learn* means *being able to listen*. Certainly, an academically trained philosopher often lacks openness and listening skills in front of people; but he only needs to improve his implicit qualities by training, getting himself used to practicing philosophy in dialogue, in direct interpersonal relationships, in public discussions, in his own difficulties in everyday life. In such a way he can develop and enlarge the philosophical aptitudes to look at problems with openness, curiosity and serenity. So, it appears that philosophical consultation requires some skills different from philosophy, but just related to the original *ethos*, which characterises philosophy. Improving them from theoretical to the wider range of life problems means to acquire an aptitude we can name "philosophical wisdom", the same treated by authors as Achenbach (who names it *Lebenskönnerschaft*), Lahav or Ruschmann. It is similar to the capacity to be on the stage of an improviser musician, and it is indispensable to do a good philosophical work with a counselee, but also to lead personally a good life.

## A simple case study as example

Now I would like to explain my conception by means of an example of my professional practice. First, a short premise. In the teaching experiences, I have been doing for five years in my Italian association, in universities, in conferences and seminars, I have never used pictures or images to explain my ideas. This is the first time I do that, and I have decided to use them to simplify the example. Later, I have also noted two singular occurrences: first, this case study has a conclusion centered just on the production of an image by the counselee; second, the general picture I have created to show the case has an interesting character, which gives a general sense to the whole consultation process. It could be exciting and useful reflecting on this role of images in this case study and, more generally, in philosophy.

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<sup>14</sup> Cf. *Op. cit.*, p. 130: «Difference *by means of* repetition - this transforming appropriation is the stigma of jazz».

The case of Daniel is one of the most linear, positive and shortest cases in my professional practice. It only took three sessions, each about two hours, and a short meeting two months later. It went on along few directions, we explored carefully, without pressure or anxiety. It ended positively, thanks to a result at which the counselee arrived by himself. Unfortunately, the consultations are not always so simple; nevertheless this case is coherent with other, more complicated situations, and it has the advantage to be easy to schematize, and therefore useful to show what happens in a consultation.

In the first picture I summarize the general scheme of the consultation, in my opinion reducible to three moments of it: *beginning*, *continuation* and *conclusion*. This reduction substitutes, in my view, the impossible method, and someone could think it too strong and therefore useless and futile, but I would like to remember that it is the same scheme Hegel used to distinguish and describe the parts of his philosophical process. It may appear “empty” but, just for this, it leaves room to every type of things, which can fill it.

In the second picture I show a scheme of an hypothetical beginning of Daniel’s case. In this picture you can see, in the colored boxes along the black lines, the real beginning of consultation and, in the gray boxes along white and hatched lines, some of the several and not realized ways from which it could start. As indicated, I started by leaving Daniel to tell his problem and his present understanding of it, as I prefer doing in almost all the cases. This is not the only possibility, and we must be ready to use other ways to begin, as anticipating counselee’s story by asking him, for example, about his choice to come to a philosopher instead of a psychologist or a psychotherapist, his worldview, type and style of life, interests, and so on. It is also possible to speak about the “contract” between consultant and counselee, explaining what philosophical consultation is, defining a working plan, giving some working norms the counselee must respect to go on in the sessions. All these possibilities, and the several others you can imagine, open different courses to the dialogical relationship, which are impossible to describe, because they depend on the dialogical events occurring during the relationship, which has not happened, yet. You cannot know what could happen if the relationship went along those hypothetical courses, in the same way you cannot know which notes could play an improviser musician if he had chosen a song in place of that he has really played.

It is important to observe that we must have a wide range of competencies, skills and literary knows, if we want to remain open to several of these possibilities. We need to be attentive towards the counselee, to take, among the several options, the preferable one. In order to be able to do that, we must possess the philosophical aptitude to be peacefully in front of the problems, that is a form of wisdom, we have to transmit (not to teach!) to counselee.

In the third picture we can see the scheme of the real beginning of Daniel’s case, as we have conducted it. Free to tell me his problem, Daniel spoke about his difficulties to have relationships in particular circles of people, that is in groups bond by the common interest in poetry or photography. Those were fields in which he had an interest and he desired to find a role and personal realization. But he said he found regularly difficulties in them to express himself, to speak with people and, finally, to stay there at all. He spoke about an “emptiness” he felt, a lack in his personality and a sense of worthlessness he always experienced in those situations.

The analysis and discussions we carried on about this matter is schematized in picture four. I asked him if he had a real and concrete care in these fields and if they were sheer interests for him. Then I asked him what his “life project” was and if those things had an important place in it. Interestingly, Daniel answered, he had never thought of a “life project” at all.

Shifting to the states of emptiness and worthlessness, I left apart their psychological aspects, to questioning the concept of “empty” (and the related concept of “full”), which Daniel was involved in. A careful examination was made on the symbolic meanings of the terms and on their “hidden” meanings, to understand what the conceptual use could concretely imply.

In the picture the most important moment of the various reflections is highlighted in red: the one which dealt with the life project. The lack of an explicit and conscious consideration of his life project seemed to me a relevant theme to discuss, and it strongly struck Daniel.

The fifth picture shows the passage to the second moment of the consultation, the *continuation*, consisting of two stages: my hypothesis to differently understand Daniel's problematic condition, and also the reflections

conducted on life project. As illustrated in the sixth picture, this was the most complex stage of the dialogical relationship, producing a large series of reflections and argumentations.

Picture six is therefore not easy to appreciate, because of its intricacy. Nevertheless I have preferred to leave it so: in such a way, we can understand that complexity is a fundamental characteristic of a consultation, also when it is rather simple, as in Daniel's case. I have omitted to indicate the several other available possibilities to proceed in the dialogical analysis, to avoid a complexity increase. But, I want to remember, also in these stages you could operate in other ways, as I have shown in my illustration of the first stage, the *beginning*.

The first step of continuation was an hypothesis on the possibility that poetry and photography were not interesting "for themselves". I suggested Daniel was running toward them only because his old friends, growing, were leaving him alone. We discussed here the meaning of the age passages in man's life and, again, the need and importance of a conscious and structured life project. This brought us back to this theme, and pushed us to a reflection on it.

We came in such a way to the first of four complex reflections which constitute the second step of the continuation (their concepts in picture six are colored in blue). We confronted the adolescent life project (consisting in having a nice time to spend with friends in various, light activities) with mature, adult life projects, in particular with the most frequent of them: the project of a family, based on a sentimental relationship and on a good profession. Here Daniel gave me clear answers: he was no more satisfied with his adolescent project, but he was not ready for the traditional adult project, yet. Before to begin a serious sentimental relationship, he desired to become autonomously a person, filling his emptiness.

We proceeded then on the theme of Daniel's interests, poetry and photography, exploring two hypothesis: were they peripheral or central for his identity? About the latter option, we considered the difficulties in facing the "risk", the anxiety not to be appreciated, and we questioned the idea of "lack in personality". This led us to distinguish and to understand the people circles Daniel was associating with: old friends, poets and photographers. We clarified in a short time that Daniel had difficulties because he needed a recognition by people, he had already had by his old friends but, on the contrary, he had to gain by poets and photographers. Besides, we clarified Daniel's difficulties were connected to the importance of things the people were doing in the circles: if things had little importance, as in old friends' circles, then he had few difficulties; if things had great importance, he consequently had strong difficulties. Our reflections went therefore on the things Daniel felt important.

Just this feeling was relevant, because it was the sign that those things could "fill" Daniel's emptiness. Then we observed, poetry and photography were both creative activities: by producing poems or photographs, Daniel could leave his "footprints", or "tracks", on the world, because they were autonomous from him, but at the same time "his" creation, or concrete expressions of his "abstract" interior. They were a sort of "his self outside himself", an "objective" self exposed to people's judgement. In such a way they satisfied Daniel's need to show himself and to be recognized. Daniel said, he had already felt to have creative needs, but he had never seen the relation we had pointed out. I underlined the importance of creative activities, and their analogy with the traditional life project, centered on the "creation" of children's life. It was the most important moment of this stage of discussion, and I have therefore highlighted it in red in the picture.

We ended here our second meeting and, as I saw later, we had already entered the final stage, the *conclusion*.

The third meeting Daniel arrived calmer, almost satisfied. He said to have thought an image, which had been very useful when, during the time between our sessions, he had had the opportunity to take part in some meetings with poets and photographers. He had imagined to have a bucket to send down in the well of his interior, to draw ideas and feelings inspiring his creativity. He had recalled this image during the meetings, discovering it gave him serenity and self-assurance. He was able therefore to attend the meetings and to have relations with people. It was always hard, because emptiness and worthlessness still arose, but the image helped him to fight them off. He was really relieved, hoping he could employ it again.

I explained to him the image gave concrete shape to the understanding we had gained by our reflections. It showed him, according to an Aristotelian terminology, his abstract "potence" to create something by his own, by drawing his ideas and feelings; giving them a clear and concrete frame of himself, the image helped him to put in "act" his "potence".

We concluded our meeting and, formally, our consultation, with a suggestion of mine: Daniel had to continue to use his image, until he had gone over his relational difficulties. We decided to meet again only if he had not been able to do it, or when he had arrived to a clear improvement.

We met indeed two months later, when Daniel told me he was continuously improving and he was meeting a lot of people in those circles he was interested. I had some other contacts with him, by mail and by phone, eight months later: he confirmed me his improvement, affirming conclusively: «When we met, it was a difficult period of my life, but it was sufficient to speak a little about it, to raise the blockade of my mental way, which was revolving around itself. Now my maturation has grown, and I see that, when I use my will, I realize my desires. To, first of all, my great satisfaction».

Concluding my exposition, I want to point out an exciting suggestion for the general interpretation of philosophical consultation, which can be seen in the last, eighth picture. It shows the complete scheme of Daniel's case, which I have composed and colored. Daniel is on the top, in a sky-blue background; our dialogue and its complex series of reflections and discussions is under him, in a brown background. It wants to symbolize this interpretation of mine.

Daniel, as every person, lives on the surface of the world; there, he meets problems and difficulties he must deal with, by his thinking. To explore thinking means to dig the ground on which one lives. A conceptual and emotional ground, and by digging it you can discover the complex network of your own *roots*. Digging more deeply, you can arrive to find out your real understanding of self and world: in fact, the deepest root Daniel found is the image useful to help him in his life difficulties.

If we take this frame as an interpretation of philosophical consultation, it is not so important having a “method” to do it, but it is just important to *dig deeply*, in every way we are able to do it. Philosophically spoken, it is important *searching a new, complex, deeper and deeper understanding*. Mind you, we will never know the complete network of our roots, because we will never dig as far as the end of the ground, but nevertheless, knowing that we always have the possibility, by digging and searching, to find out a lot of things we need.

Neri Pollastri  
Consultant Philosopher

Via della Petraia 14/a  
50141 Firenze (Italy)  
00393285753548  
neri.pollastri@inwind.it  
www.consulenza-filosofica.it