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‘A Cargo del Futuro’ – *Between History and Memory*

An Account of the ‘Fratricidal’ Conflict during Revolution and War in Spain (1936–39)

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**Abstract**

In this article I address conflict during the Spanish Civil War and the immediate post-war years by searching for any discernible social bases for the coalitions that confronted each other locally in a particular rural area in Catalunya. I try to address the real complexity of how civilians locally, and often violently, confronted their close neighbors and how this related to larger issues at stake. The careful reading of one document in this article enables an examination of the particular local expression of the civil war conflict, not just as a source of factual evidence but also as the expression of a particular kind of historicity, that of modernity. In the article I use the production of this document and the explicit aim of its author to confront present-day processes of the ‘Re-cuperation of Historical Memory’ that are being produced by a wide range of political groups, public institutions and private initiatives in Spain, and which have attracted wide exposure in the media. This leads to a discussion of the issue of the different ‘regimes of historicity’ that can emerge around the recuperation of memory and their political value.

**Keywords**

Catalonia ■ conflict ■ historicity ■ peasants ■ Spanish Civil War ■ violence

This article is inspired by William Roseberry’s paper on community and conflict in Pátzcuaro (2004). In that paper he sought to underline the complexities involved in the production of conflict in the area by drawing up a typology of disputes that underlined the local aspect of sociological processes of differentiation as they were linked to historical transformations of the Mexican state, mainly the disentailment laws. His aim was to go beyond an essentialist understanding of the political agents confronting each other during the Revolution, trying to highlight the weight of local experience and memories of long-standing and multiple layered disputes that social subjects had experienced personally. ‘When fighting for the big agrarian questions of the Revolution, they could “give names” and see recognizable faces. The local motives that informed their politics gave to the violence an intimate character’ (2004: 134).
In a similar way I have tried to address conflict during the Spanish Civil War and the immediate post-war years through the local modalities of confrontation in a particular rural area in Catalunya. My aim in so doing is twofold. First, I would like to search for any discernible social bases for the coalitions that confronted each other locally. In a context where political discourse about the Civil War in Spain is increasingly being reified into a simple dichotomy between ‘democrats’ and ‘fascists’ fighting each other, the real complexity of how civilians locally and often violently confronted their close neighbors, and how this related to larger issues at stake, must be addressed. Second, my aim is to explore the main document I will be using to probe into the particular local expression of the civil war conflict not just as a source of factual evidence. I wish to show how it expresses a particular regime of historicity, that of modernity, and to compare it to other forms of testimonial and memorial sources profusely at play in today’s accounts of the recent past. This refers to the value – in terms of history and memory – of the document that is at the base of my analysis, a private register of ‘facts’ produced just after the end of the war by a socialist peasant. I seek to confront the production and explicit aim of this document with present-day processes of ‘the Recuperation of Historical Memory’ that are being produced by a wide range of political groups, public institutions and private initiatives in Spain. As a conclusion I will try to weave together the two strands of thought in an attempt to show the relevance of going beyond discursive narratives of the past and into the analysis of historically produced conflict structures.

The setting

Les Garrigues, the area where I conducted fieldwork from 1985 to 1987 in the village of Cervià, is a dry-farming area of the province of Lleida in the interior of Catalunya, Spain. During the Civil War and the following dictatorship this area was subjected to violent revolutionary deeds and perhaps the strongest repression in Catalunya. The area was and still is mainly agricultural. The main commercial crop in Cervià has been olive trees for a couple of centuries, starting in the mid-18th century and covering 76 percent of the cultivated area by 1960. As I will develop later on in the article, the structure of property before the Civil War included large, medium and small landowners, as well as a sizeable number of share-croppers and landless day-laborers. Social relations of production were organized around the farm-household (*casa*), a production-reproduction unit that constitutes both a material reality, organizing domestic groups along lines that relate to the inheritance of landed property, and a strong corporativist ideology that obscures intra-household forms of exploitation. Moreover, day-laborers and share-croppers related to landowners in the
context of both a labor market and paternalistic labor dependency structures (Narotzky, 1989).

The document

The main document (from now on referred to as the Document) I want to analyze is a small notebook that was written by a young peasant from 1939 up to 1940 during a period when he was hiding from the victorious pro-Francoist forces after the end of the Civil War. The author was a socialist-communist and a Catalan nationalist affiliated to the UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) union. He had been in charge of the oil mill cooperative before the war and had fought with the Republican Army against the rebel army of Franco. The Document has an Introduction where he explains its intent as a form of memory, so that future generations can judge what happened during the period of the Revolution and the Civil War as it affected his village of Cervià.

During my captivity I write this little book of memories, in order to better occupy the time of my confinement. I include in it good and bad feats without any exception, so that my descendants can appreciate how catastrophic Revolutions and Wars are and the extremes that human fanaticisms reach.[. . .] Future generations are the only ones who can judge and analyze the feats, for I consider them impartial in the matter, which I leave in the charge of the future. (5 April 1939, ‘Año de la Victoria y Año de las Víctimas’, El Autor)

The form of the Document, however, is that of a register and not that of a memoir or narrative. Each double page has a title such as ‘Imprisoned by the National [Francoist] government’, and a series of columns under ‘Name’, ‘Casa’, ‘Age’, ‘State’, ‘Profession’, ‘Political Affiliation’, ‘Sentence’, ‘Time of imprisonment’, ‘Family members affected’ and ‘Observations’. These are meant to be ‘objective’ data and the author wants to produce a type of material devoid of the personal interpretation that his own positioning in the events would induce. In fact he leaves interpretation to ‘the future’ on the grounds that those looking back to this material from the distance of the future will not be ‘partisan’ to the ideologies that were involved in the ‘fanaticism’ that generated violence and war. This initial aim is met because we do get the extensive record of all those who were affected by the most direct forms of repression: death, imprisonment, exile, concentration camps, etc.

There are, however, several places where the author’s position (socialist/Catalan nationalist, UGT)2 appears as a narrative, a testimony, or as a moral assessment of particular people. Interestingly, these ‘subjective moments’ occur at the beginning and at the end of the Document, framing, so to speak, the ‘objective’ recounting of deeds. There is a general Introduction and there is a Conclusion and dedicatory, which are
emotionally colored, but are in the form of a general appeal to the ‘Court of History’.

At the end of the Document, before the final Conclusion, there is a double page that resembles the register form of the ‘objective’ account part of the document but is very different in content. The title is: ‘Authors and accomplices of those imprisoned, exiled, executed’, and it lists the names of all those that had positions of responsibility in the Francoist regime and actively participated in the repression. In this case their names are qualified by such adjectives as ‘Egoist’, ‘Usurer’, ‘Fratricidal’, ‘Female Pimp’, giving a clear idea of the general political position of the author as an opponent of Franco’s national Catholic regime.

Access to a capitalist market

I want to present here an overview of the social organization of production in the area of Les Garrigues at the turn of the 20th century and up to the outbreak of the Civil War (1936). Land and oil milling were the main means of production in this dry-farming area, producing the marketable commodity olive oil. Within the household (casa), different members were in different positions regarding access to the means of production. During this period, day-laborers, share-croppers, landowners and oil mill owners were all entangled in a thick web around differential access to resources. Some, such as day-laborers, had no access to land and sold their labor widely in the region at different moments of the year. Others, such as share-croppers, were dependent on large landowners for access to land and were coerced into selling their part of the olive crop to the owner’s oil mill. Small landowners had to sell their labor or enter share-cropping arrangements in order to get by, which made them dependent on the larger landowners as well.

Therefore, this situation produced a multiplicity of relations of production, where different forms of exploitation were intertwined. Access to the means of producing the commodity oil – land and mill – was the central point of the organization of production. However, access to land was not akin to ownership (e.g. heirs and share-croppers had access but not ownership), nor to control of the produce (e.g. heirs did not control what happened to the crop), and hardly ever implied control of the commodity oil (i.e. access to the market). Access to the mill implied control of the commodity, and this was the privilege of big landowners until medium landowners decided to establish an oil mill cooperative.

In 1906, a legal framework for agricultural cooperatives was established in Spain (Pérez Baró, 1987). Based on that law, the medium landowners of Cervià decided to found an agricultural cooperative for the processing and commercialization of olive oil. The cooperative (Sindicat) was founded in 1914 by a majority of medium landowners and some small landowners. Of
the 13 peasants who are inscribed in the records (*Acta*) of the founding meeting of the Sindicat, eight are medium landowners who pay sizeable taxes for their land (*Riqueza Rústica Imponible*, 1929, 1940 records). Of the medium landowners in the initial *Acta*, three are brothers who, if counted together, hold an important volume of production, an average of 50,000 kg of olives per campaign, which is considered the output of a ‘rich’ *casa*³ (as can be ascertained through the Production Records of the Sindicat for the years 1918 to 1935 as well as the years following the war).⁴ We will see below how this information can shed some light on the violent events that happened at the outbreak of the war. More generally, of the first existing list of Sindicat members, at least half of them were substantial producers. Presumably there were very few share-croppers because their produce was tied, through patronage links, to the owner of the land, who usually owned a private mill and counted on his share-croppers’ produce to keep it busy, and no day-laborers because they didn’t have any produce to process.⁵

It is important to underline two elements without which membership in the cooperative was, at the time, almost impossible: (1) ownership of land and (2) a certain accumulation of money. Both were necessary. Without previously accumulated money it was impossible to satisfy subsistence needs until the annual agricultural balance was drawn and deposited in every member’s account at the cooperative’s Credit Union. Only then could it be drawn in cash. Thus, many smallholders were unable to become members of the cooperative because subsistence expenses required immediate cash, and the only way to obtain it was by selling the produce to the private mill owners the moment it was collected, and by diversifying the sources of income according to labor market opportunities in the larger area.

The founding of the Sindicat required getting credits and mortgaging land as security. This was a serious risk that smaller landowners must have thought not worth taking (as opposed to medium landowners who had more to gain). On the other hand, membership in the Sindicat meant other, more immediate and structurally recurrent entrepreneurial risks: that of not selling or selling the oil poorly, and, in the best of cases, that of not being able to cash in profits until sales of oil were completed, around the month of June or later. Another more structural and recurrent problem was attached to membership in the Sindicat: the need for continuous investment. This was especially present during the initial years, when credits for investment had to be amortized by all the members according to the value of their land.

Access to the means of transforming olives into a commodity and entering into market relations was crucial for medium producers, especially at a moment where the market situation for olive oil was very favorable. If they wanted to realize the market commodity value of their produce, it had to be in the form of oil, not olives. In fact, substantial producers were losing prospective benefits to the oil mill owners. The oil
mill cooperative enabled them to become directly involved in a capitalist market process. It was, then, the desire to become fully capitalist farmers that pushed medium producers into a cooperative form. A double logic can be seen in this process: (1) that of freeing themselves from merchant capital’s exploitive relations and (2) that of maximizing profit in a capitalist market environment. In fact the cooperative (Sindicat) marks medium producers’ definitive entrance into the logic of capital.

Some significant events in recent Catalan history

To get a sense of the political context in which the events recounted in the Document erupted, we first need to have an outline of the recent Catalan past. Catalonia is nowadays an Autonomous Community within Spain, with its own Parliament and full or very sizeable policy-making capabilities in most government areas. The history of this situation is complex and begins with romantic nationalistic programmes among the Catalan bourgeoisie that opposed liberal centralizing ones during the 19th century. However, within broadly defined ‘Catalan nationalist’ politics the ideological spectrum was extremely wide ranging – from working people to the powerful and rich bourgeoisie. At the turn of the century parties were forming and disappearing constantly, and alliances changed all the time. I will just point out some dates that seem to me significant and which might help us understand the way events developed in Cervià during the war and after.

In 1913, through the pressure of the bourgeois Catalan nationalist party, Lliga Regionalista, the Spanish central government finally granted the possibility of political unification for the Catalan territory through the formal union of the four existing Diputaciones into a significant decision-making unit, the Mancomunitat. Francesc Macià, an army officer who moved to more radical pro-independence positions from positions close to the Lliga, and founded a party called Estat Català (Catalan state) in 1917, had married the heiress (pubilla) of an important propertied family of Borges, the chief town of Les Garrigues. Voting for him in this area had some of the components of the ancient ‘cacique’ system, with its personalized ties of allegiance, but was also part of a statement by the rural propertied classes that they be taken into account in the larger political arena by taking hold of the new party system’s mechanisms. Macià went into exile after the coup that installed the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in 1923; he was subsequently to lead an insurrection against the Spanish state (1926), was tried for it in France and remained in exile until the fall of Primo’s dictatorship in 1930. He then founded a left nationalist party (Esquerra Republicana), which won the 1931 municipal elections in Catalunya and, on 14 April, unilaterally proclaimed the Catalan Republic – although, following the proclamation of the Spanish Republic, he consented to an
autonomous institution within the Spanish state called the Generalitat, which he was to head as President until his death in 1933 (Termes, 2003: 334–55). In 1933, after the Right won the Spanish parliamentary elections, the Esquerra Republicana (the Catalan nationalist left), which held power in the Generalitat, was in an increasingly difficult position.

In this conjuncture, Macià’s successor, President Companys, tried to put forward one of the most important and polemical laws in the Catalan Parliament: the law of agrarian contracts, which favored share-croppers in their arrangements with landowners (Balcells, 1983). Large landowners were explicitly against this law and, although the law was passed in the Catalan Parliament, it was subsequently declared null by the right-wing Republican Spanish government, in response to pressure from Catalan landowners united in the Institut Agrícola Català de San Isidre (IACSI). By mid-June the Catalan Parliament had reinstated the law, which was again declared null by the Spanish state.

On 2 October, the Spanish government resigned to be replaced by another right-wing alliance, which included three openly fascist members of the CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas). The unions and parties on the left declared the General Strike (huelga general), which was particularly strong in some areas (Asturias, Catalunya) and was eventually repressed by the army. This was the famous revolution of October 1934. In Catalunya, however, there was a nationalist component to the strike, which served to qualify the class component that was hegemonic in Asturias for example. On 6 October 1934, Companys, the President of the Catalan Generalitat, proclaimed – as part of the anti-fascist revolt of the left in Spain – the ‘Catalan State of the Spanish Federal Republic’ as being the ‘indestructible stronghold of the essence of the Republic’ (reducte indestructible de les essències de la República). The Spanish government declared a ‘state of war’, and the movement was repressed very quickly, the president and many other significant participants being sentenced and imprisoned. The Catalan statute of autonomy was suspended and when, in April 1935, it was reinstated the Generalitat was deprived of control over public order (Termes, 2003).

In Catalunya in general, then, the uprising of October 1934 was a mix of class and nationalist interests and sentiments, and, moreover, the rural peasant component was as significant as the industrial one. Indeed, in the area of Les Garrigues, situated in the interior province of Lleida, the events of October 1934 were particularly significant (Mir et al., 1997: 156). We should keep in mind in this regard that: (1) this area was strongly attached to the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, the nationalist party founded by Macià, who was from the neighboring Borges Blanques, and consistently gave the majority of their vote in all elections to that party; (2) this area, with a large population of share-croppers, was directly affected by the law of agricultural contracts that was supported by this party in the Catalan government and nullified by the Spanish government twice; (3) the area
was also influenced by the Marxist Bloc Obrer i Camperol (BOC), founded in 1931 by Joaquín Maurín, an intellectual from Lleida who saw the claims of the peasants (day-laborers and share-croppers) as a crucial revolutionary element of class, and was in many ways closer to the anarchist union CNT than to the Communist Party. In the 1936 elections the electoral triumph of the Catalan left coalition – where Esquerra Republicana was the main party – was overwhelming (Mir, 1985).

Violent local events during the Revolution (Terror Rojo)

The events that followed General Franco’s rebellion in July 1936 were particularly violent in the small village of Cervià. A bloody confrontation pitted people ‘on the left’, who defined themselves as affiliated to the CNT (anarchist union), against others who defined themselves as UGT (socialist union). Eight villagers lost their lives in a single day, on 23 October 1936, and most of them were prominent local members of the socialist union UGT. What made a group of anarchist CNT-FAI members violently confront and kill seven members of the socialist UGT? Although the local branch of the anarchist union, following the general trend of the movement in Spain, was extremely revolutionary, so was the socialist union in many places at the start of the war. Locally, however, the UGT was quite moderate from the start, because of the small and medium landowner peasants who joined it. The CNT recruited mostly day-laborers and share-croppers, but also had small and even medium landowners as members. In structural terms, then, class differences could be at play in the actual confrontation that took place but local context is necessary in order to explain how the events developed that led to violence.

After the rebellion of 17 July 1936, the uprising was stopped in Barcelona with the help of the anarchist CNT-FAI and other non-governmental groups. The government of the Generalitat, with its nationalist majority of Esquerra Republicana, thus had to reorganize to take into account the real force that the CNT-FAI represented. What is of interest to our study at this conjuncture is (1) the revolutionary movement of the anarchists which, in the first days after the triumph over the military rebellion, led to a spontaneous collectivization of the private enterprises of those that were thought to be ‘afines’ (close) to the rebels because they were ‘rich’; (2) the Decreto de sindicación obligatoria (decree of obligatory unionization) of August 1936; and (3) the Decreto de colectivizaciones (decree of collectivization) passed on 24 October 1936.

In Cervià, soon after the Francoist uprising in July 1936, the revolutionaries immediately took control of the private oil mills, which still had a very large part of the oil from an excellent winter campaign in store. In August, the decree of obligatory unionization forced all the agricultural workers and farmers to become members of either the anarchist union CNT or the
socialist union UGT. Moreover, the agricultural cooperatives that already existed, such as the Sindicat in Cervià, had to integrate into their structure the unionized organization of cooperation. Thus, faced with few alternatives, the large land and mill owners decided to join the UGT, which seemed to them the lesser of two evils.

During the month of October the Catalan government discussed the decree of collectivization, which was passed on 24 October 1936 and seems to have been the retroactive ‘cause’ of the bloody events of 23 October 1936 in Cervià. What seems to have happened here is that, while the Cervià cooperative (Sindicat) was ‘collectivized’ by the CNT members of the village, the UGT members ‘collectivized’ the private oil mills, whose owners were formally members of that union since the August decree of obligatory unionization. However, when the UGT did this, the oil from the 1935–6 campaign was still in store, even though it had already been confiscated by the revolutionary CNT-FAI during the first days of the rebellion in July, because the rich owners (now reluctantly UGT members) had been considered ‘afines’ of the rebels.

Thus, UGT people seem to have wanted to ‘keep’ – in October – the oil that had been confiscated for ‘political’ reasons in July by the revolutionary CNT. The private mill owners ‘gave’ to the UGT – by entering that union – the oil that had been previously confiscated by the CNT, oil that was no longer theirs to dispose of. So when the CNT people went to the mills to take ‘their’ oil away – ‘legitimately’ acquired in the revolutionary uprising against the military coup – they were met by the resistance of UGT officials ‘defending’ the property of the oil mill owners that would be legally theirs to manage in the new collectivized structure of production, and violence erupted. The UGT saw themselves as ‘protecting’ the mill owners from the excessive violation of their rights by the revolutionary CNT-FAI.

In fact, most of the peasants belonging to the UGT were small or medium landowners (if we exclude the large opportunist landowners), and many had been pioneers in the founding of the cooperative Sindicat, yet they were against collectivization. Rather, the objective of the Sindicat’s founders and members had been to get access to the market for oil and thus privately benefit from a favorable price conjuncture. They were not landless laborers or share-croppers: they were small farmer entrepreneurs. In their view, cooperativism was indeed completely different from collectivization: not only did it not oppose private ownership of land and produce, but in fact it served to transform it into a real entrepreneurial project, a capitalist one.

It is significant that the clash in Barcelona (May 1937) of the ‘revolutionaries’ (CNT and POUM) with the Stalinist-oriented communist and socialist parties and union (PSUC-UGT) together with the Catalan republicans of the Esquerra Republicana, was in a very central way about revolution and the need to stop it: to win the war, but also to be amiable to Western democracies following Stalin’s strategy at that time. It is not so
far-fetched, then, to think of the bloody events of 23 October 1936 in Cervià as a premonition of this conflict (Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya i Font, 1989: 206–8). It is significant that this happened in a framework where cooperativism (the major manifestation of the third way at the turn of the 20th century) seems to have been the significant link that directed wrath against the UGT leaders instead of its being directed against the large land and mill owners.

Repression after the Civil War (Terror Blanco) in comparison

The Civil War ended on 1 April 1939, setting in place a national Catholic corporatist regime headed by a general – Franco – and supported by the agrarian and industrial oligarchy that had been in power before the advent of the Republic in 1931. Repression followed. It was particularly strong in Les Garrigues, the third most repressed area of Catalunya suffering 27 percent of the Consejos de Guerra (Court Martials) in all of Catalunya while it represented just 11 percent of its population (Mír et al., 1997: 87; Solé i Sabaté, 1985: 172–4). In the province of Lleida, Les Garrigues had the highest death penalty sentences (19.5%) and the highest rate among those executed (31.1%) (Barallat, 1991: 330). It also had the highest rate of executions (3.9%) in all of Catalunya. In proportion to the population census of 1936, the village of Cervià had 16.4 percent of its total population imprisoned (Barallat, 1991: 203). Moreover, if we take into account that, for the documentation referring just to the Tribunal de Responsabilidades Políticas (TRP, in charge of economic sanctions and patrimonial confiscations against the vanquished), 76 percent of individuals sanctioned in Les Garrigues were married and had an average of 2.46 children, we can get an idea of the impact of repression in this small rural area (Mír et al., 1997: 148; see Barallat for the impact of the imprisonment of individuals, 1991: 223). Also, 22 percent of the causes of conviction by the TRP in Les Garrigues were related to the events of October 1934, thus involving both class and Catalan nationalist causes – which in fact expressed and concentrated most of the ‘evil’ against which the military rebels had risen to ‘save’ Spain.

Now I would like to present some data relating to those who suffered repression in Cervià during and after the war, according to the Document and to its relation with other sources of information on the social and economic condition of those affected, such as the Property Tax (1929, 1949), the 1940 household census (Padrón), and the Sindicat cooperative archives from 1914 onwards (member’s production register, Actas). From this we can see the relationship between repressive practices and larger economic and political issues. What the Document presents as repressive practices are: (1) death penalty executions, (2) death penalty sentences commuted, (3) imprisonment, (4) concentration and labor camp internment, (5) forced exile.
First, of a total of 443 casas in the 1940 Padrón ‘only’ 160 appear as having directly suffered from the violent and repressive events as recounted by the Document – this represents 36 percent, over a third of the households. Most members of these households were described by the Document as people affiliated to the ‘left’ (UGT or CNT) – 31 percent of the total households. Only 5 percent are described as ‘Derechas’ (Rightists). Of a total of 119 members registered in the Sindicat, 49 percent suffered some kind of repression, suggesting the relatively major weight of small and medium landowners directly involved in the conflict. However, not all of the Sindicat members were repressed by the same faction (Red Terror or White Terror), while some were even repressed by both! Approximately 15 percent were repressed under the ‘Red Terror’, the rest under the ‘White Terror’. We do not find any member of the Sindicat in the category ‘Authors and accomplices’ of (Francoist) repression, however.

A further quantitative valuation of the data gives certain general trends. While battleground casualties (dead and wounded) beyond the village are pretty balanced between the various affiliations – roughly 35 percent CNT, 35 percent UGT, 25 percent Derechas (Rightists) – other forms of violence and repression during and after the civil war are clearly affected by political positioning and affiliation. During the Revolution (‘Terror Rojo’) eight people were killed: one was a priest, seven were from the UGT and none was from the CNT. Twenty people were imprisoned by the CNT-FAI: 12 pertained to the Right, 8 to the UGT and again none to the CNT. After the war (‘Terror Blanco’) we get 11 death sentences and executions all targeting the CNT. Of the 85 individuals imprisoned, 66 percent are from the CNT, 29 percent from the UGT and 4 percent without affiliation. Of the refugees who fled to France to spend months, years or never to return, 62 percent were from the CNT and 38 percent from the UGT. Of those who spent some time in concentration camps 33 percent were CNT, 50 percent were UGT and 17 percent were Derechas (Right). This last group generally was composed of soldiers who were fighting in the Republican army but were from right-wing households and they did not stay long in the camps. It is clear that repression after the Civil War, as it affected this particular village, was principally directed against people in the CNT.

We can obtain more significant series of data by cross-checking the people in the Document against the Property Tax registers (1929, 1949). For the dead during the Revolution, three have no property, one is a small landowner and four are medium landowners. Of the (eight) UGT people imprisoned by CNT-FAI, two are medium landowners and the rest either have no property (four) or very little property (two). Those from the Right (12) who were imprisoned were either large landowners (five) or had no property (also five), and only two were medium landowners. But the trend is much clearer with the repression by the Francoist regime. Of those sentenced to death and executed, six had no property, the rest (five) very little property. Of those imprisoned, 65 percent had no property, 21 percent were small landowners and 14 percent medium property owners.
For those who went to concentration camps (89% had no property) or were refugees (98% had no property) the trend is even stronger, maybe due to the fact that the mean age was lower and the *casa* property, if there was any, was still in the hands of the father.

**The structure of repression**

Let me first analyze the evidence the Document gives us. I will then compare this evidence to the kind of history being produced in the current ‘Recuperation of Historical Memory’, and I will end by proposing that the Document offers us a quite particular kind of historical narrative. To sum up the data, what seems to emerge is that during the Revolutionary ‘Red Terror’ repression hit all sorts of different people: (1) large land and mill owners who were imprisoned; (2) day-laborers and share-croppers who were either dependent on the mill owners and qualified as of the Right or were in the UGT and involved in the events of 23 October, in fact acting in defense of bourgeois property; (3) medium landowners who were UGT members and involved in the 23 October events. What I think transpires here is that revolutionary repression seems to have been geared by an ideology linked to a revolutionary project of a particular sort, and what ‘qualified’ victims was not so much their *social* position in terms of material assets – which was structurally diverse – but their ideological position in terms of how they related to the *idea* of property as the central structuring element of society. This ‘idea’ became exposed *in practice* either by a long-standing position as land and oil mill owners and labor exploiters, or by the subservient dependency of some landless workers who supported paternalistic relationships against class organization and demands. It also became clearly exposed during the 23 October events, as has been previously described.

On the other hand, what emerges from the period of the ‘White Terror’ is that repression was basically exercised by the propertied class and oriented toward those who were *socially* situated in a particular class position, in terms of lack of property (a classical class definition in material terms). There seems, then, to be a quite direct relationship between class as defined by property (especially the ownership of a mill) and the exercise of violence, thus expressing structural conflict.

It is significant as well that, of the people imprisoned by the CNT-FAI who pertained to the UGT (or were members of the *casa* of those who were killed during the 23 October events), *none* seems to have participated actively in the institutionalized repression of the Francoist regime. I do not deny that personal animosity existed and might have triggered violence and acts of denunciation and repression, however, *personal animosity seems to have been structured by clear-cut issues of class* in its various aspects of confrontation, solidarity and dependence. As compared with the accounts that exemplify...
the ‘fratricidal’ aspect of the Civil War and speak of families split between
the two factions, the particularity of this area – structured around the
household-family farm casa concept – is that all casa members seem to have
acted in a solidary manner in relation to obligatory union affiliation, and
to their participation in the different sides of the conflict, even if intra-
household differentiation between heir and non-inheriting members was
significant, and conflict between the father-owner and his successor was
frequent. This seems to underline precisely the structuring power of the
economic organization that I have described elsewhere (Narotzky, 1989),
where it is the casa that is positioned in terms of access to resources in the
capitalist context as opposed to the ‘individual’.

History and memory: ‘A cargo del futuro’

Let me now jump forward to present-day Spain and the ubiquitous mani-
estations over the ‘Recuperation of Historical Memory’, meaning the
memory of those who were repressed by the Francoist regime. This
phenomenon, which has largely become a media event, includes as its most
visible issue the opening of mass graves where local people of the left were
shot and buried during the Francoist repression. Several associations are
involved in the opening and forensic identification of the remains, with the
explicit objective of giving honorable graves to the victims of the Francoist
rebellion and dictatorship. While all of the associations agree that dignity
for the individual dead and their families is a paramount objective, some
disagree about other issues. The ‘Foro por la Memoria’, attached to the
PCE (Communist Party), insists that the focus on individuals and their
families, the emphasis on the personal and emotional side of the victims of
repression, in fact de-politicizes the issue of why these people were victims.
Most associations work under a general assumption that the victims were
all ‘democrats’ fighting for the ‘Republic’. This is also the institutional
position when the Congress or the (national or autonomous community)
governments speak broadly of ‘Republicans’, ‘Anti-Francoists’ or those who
‘died for Democracy’ (Narotzky, 2004). However, many of the victims were
not willingly involved in the defense of the ‘bourgeois Republic’ of 1931,
and were indeed waging a Revolution. Moreover, many on the side of the
revolutionary project did not share a single project nor a single strategy,
and the events in Cervià in October 1936 or in Barcelona in May 1937 are
a proof of this multiplicity.

In this respect, I find particularly telling that the preparatory document
for a Democratic Memorial of Catalonia (Memorial Democràtic de Catalunya)
– which is to become a center for the commemoration and study of the
‘Anti-Francoist struggle’, the ‘defense of democratic values’ and the
‘defense of the Republic’ – does not mention the confrontations within
the left, nor the existence of different parties and unions, nor that the
struggle was in many ways part of a revolutionary project. The Democratic Memorial program exposes a political will to construct a memory of democracy by producing clear-cut guidelines through the mass of historical events, stressing the construction of ‘democratic values’ and their relation to Catalonia:

It seems obvious [. . .] that we have made a reduction of history. It is a conscious reduction for – we want to insist again on this – we do not claim to explain the historical dynamics. We want in this case to remember the struggle of previous generations that made possible the construction of a democratic culture[. . .]. We want to give a unified body to the experience of the defenders of the Republic against the rebels, by searching for those elements that are easily recognizable and acceptable for all the social actors. Explanatory elements of a symbolic, evocative, conceptual character that transmit a very clear message: the Republic was the first democracy that enabled, for the first time, an autonomous Catalonia. (Vinyes et al., 2004: 135)

The proliferation of these various forms of memory and commemoration becomes a substitute for a debate (in the institutional political field) about ‘historical dynamics’, that is, about the field of forces and structural relationships that produced the conditions of possibility of the diverse confrontations that converged during the Revolution, the Civil War and the dictatorship. History here becomes, in a paradoxical manner, the necessary instrument highlighting symbolic continuities that are meant to produce ‘consensus’ in citizens’ interpretation of the past. This recuperation of an institutionalized glorious democratic memory is also a substitute for the constitution of a commission that would judge the political responsibilities of those who were actively involved in the dictatorship.

I believe that the process of ‘Memorialization’, simplifying multiple intertwined conflicts, is meant in fact to occlude the structural processes of differentiation and struggle that still pervade society, proposing instead a vague and generic confrontation – expressed in terms of a moral dichotomy – between ‘good’ (Democracy) and ‘bad’ (Fascism). I also believe that this process relates to the European project of cohesion, in which symbolic meeting points have to be produced in order to digest a past of recurrent violent conflicts. By reducing the real complexity of confrontation and struggle, and the structural dynamics that produced them, to ‘elements of a symbolic, evocative, conceptual character’ that are ‘easily recognizable and acceptable for all the social actors’, the institutional program of Recuperation of Historical Memory contributes to a banalization of historical reality.

Conclusion

What I would like to address in this conclusion, however, is the contrast between the present-day process of production and recuperation of
testimonies and memories of repression in Spain, and the Document I have been analyzing in this article. What strikes me in the Document is that it is written and ‘produced’ not as a testimony or a memory of experienced events but as a ‘historical document’, a register of ‘facts’, to be ‘objectively’ and ‘rationally’ analyzed and evaluated in the future. Although, as I have shown above, the ‘objectivity’ of the Document has its slippages into personal emotional memory, three issues seem to me particularly significant: (1) the explicit will to produce ‘history’, not ‘memory’ or ‘testimony’; (2) the confidence in the neutrality and rationality of the Future’s judgment, its ability to produce Truth; and (3) the confidence that these particular events will be an object of interest for future generations, that they will be a part of the selective Past of the Future.

This Document’s author strikes us as pertaining to a ‘modern’ regime of historicity, one set forth by Hegel’s vision of the philosophy of history (1965). Indeed, the author writes about events he has experienced as a loser from the point of view of a future winner, as Koselleck (2001: 91) said was the case of Marx when writing about the Paris Commune. But, very centrally, the Future is imagined as a place where Truth reigns supreme. The author is registering events in the Present for a history to be written from a definitive perspective in the Future. This is a Future determined by an ‘ending’ that gives order to Present and Past and bestows a ‘sense’ to time.14

In Clio, Charles Péguy (2002 [1932]) develops a critique of the appeal to history by the vanquished which throws an important light on how we might think about the Document. What he brings to light is the apocalyptic (and teleological) nature of the vanquished’s appeal to history, the hope that the future will not be another present and that the end must be good, a laicized version of the Supreme Judgment. Yet, Péguy warns, this can never be so in a truly modern, laicized, world. This kind of pessimism needs to be juxtaposed with Gramsci’s proposition that we need to produce a philosophy that structures present experience and creates the conditions of possibility for transforming reality in order to create that future (1987 [1929–35]). The only possible space for history is that of a thoroughly ‘political’ history, engaged in transformative projects that will never be fully accomplished – a history produced by the hope of a future different from the present, but not an irrevocable, unerring future.

Koselleck (2001) speaks of different temporalities: (1) the singular experience of an event that seizes an individual by surprise; (2) the repetition of certain types of experiences that produce a common space for making sense of them (something close to Raymond Williams’ structures of feeling); and (3) the long-term movement that displaces the wider context of experience (2001: 49–55). This last form of experience is not immediately available to consciousness: ‘we can only be conscious of it retrospectively through historical reflection’ (2001: 54). His model points to the tension between the unique experience of the individual taken by surprise
by an event that can be registered in a memoir, testimony or oral history, and the structure of knowledge that can explain the position of this event and its surprising effect in a larger, long-term coherence. The historian’s role is to mediate between the different temporalities in order to produce a knowledge that can shed light on the singular events and social realities of common perceived experience. History is always trapped in the dialectic struggle between the concreteness of empirical ‘surprises’ – to use Koselleck’s word – and the abstraction of signification. In this tension that makes the stuff of history, there is a point where materiality is irreducible to signification, a point of unlimited resilience, which is precisely what creates the space of possibility for other histories, for going back, looking back, making new sense. It is this materiality that the author of the Document tried to capture for future interpreters through the record of facts that would describe a resilient reality.

We have to learn to deal with all this complexity, and with our ethical position as intellectuals, instead of giving way to the unquestionable authority of testimony and memories of the past (Narotzky, 2004). In order to do this we have to keep, as William Roseberry taught us, the ‘tension between “real history” on the one hand and the historical commentaries and texts of social actors and intellectuals on the other’ (Roseberry and O’Brien, 1991: 12).

Notes

My warmest thanks go to the people of Cervià. I also want to specially thank some colleagues and friends for their help, insights and conversation: Paz Moreno, Gavin Smith, Ignasi Terradas, Jean Feutray and Vicente Palomera. The seminar organized in May 2005 at the Colegio de Michoacan by Salvador Maldonado provided a space to debate some of the issues in the article, for which I thank all the participants. I also want to acknowledge research funds provided by the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (Spain), project BSO2003–06832.

1 ‘A cargo del futuro’ is a legal term meaning a responsibility entrusted to future generations.

2 In fact the UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) was the official union of the Socialist Party, but people from a wide range of left-wing ideologies affiliated to the union, especially after the Decree of Obligatory Unionization in August 1936 (see p. 418). In Catalonia, the UGT comprised people ranging from socialist and communist leanings to liberal Catalan nationalist leanings, such as those of the Esquerra Republicana party.

3 The categories of casas in ‘emic’ terms are expressed in the number of sacs of olives (50 kg) produced during the olive campaign. Obviously the output will vary every year and small producers will have extremely bountiful harvests in particularly good years. But as an average of production: a ‘small casa’ produces 50–100 sacs, a ‘medium casa’ produces 400 sacs and a ‘rich casa’ produces more than 1000 sacs.
4 The records of the *Riqueza Rústica Imponible* and the Sindicat were found, unclassified, in the Ayuntamiento and the Sindicat (Cooperativa Agraria de Cerviá de las Garrigues).

5 However, there is evidence that the Sindicat had to deal with some produce grown under the share-cropping arrangements of some members, because the Records (*Actas*) try to assert what kind of obligation the peasant has to sell the olives to the owner of the land (presumably a mill owner as well) or whether he has the obligation as a member of the cooperative to bring his part of the fruit to the Sindicat. In sum, this debate questions what is the real ‘freedom’ of the peasant toward the fruit of his labor, one way or the other.

6 The Diputación is a territorial assembly representing the municipalities in a Provincia.

7 In fact in May 1937, during the Civil War, the combined forces of the Catalan government (Esquerra Republicana) together with the communist PSUC and the socialist UGT, violently attacked the POUM (the alliance of the BOC with the Trotskyist party of Andreu Nin, Esquerra Comunista) and the CNT.

8 The eighth victim was a priest.

9 I do not count here those people who were forced to fight in the army during the war and suffered from it, but just actual and willful *repressive acts*.

10 In 1946, closest date to the conflict.

11 I have searched and compared the information in both years and made an average. Due to the inheritance system it is difficult to ascertain that an individual was not part of a propertied *casa*, although he himself might have had no property to his name. However, if we do not find him in either of the two years (1929, 1949), even if he was a part of a propertied household he was in a dependent position within it.

12 Of the total 215 individuals who suffered repression according to the Document (I do not include here those that were conscripted during the war and suffered its consequences including death or injury), 6 percent suffered it during the Revolutionary ‘Red Terror’ and 94 percent suffered it during the post-war ‘White Terror’.

13 Most of the active collaborators with the Francoist regime pertained to the largest land and oil mill owning *casas*.

14 Kermode, in *The Sense of an Ending* (1973 [1966]), speaks about the transformation of pure chronicity (*chronos*) into a temporality with a sense and a meaning (*kairos*) framed by the apocalyptic notion of an ending:

   It has to be [. . .] an instant of what they [psychologists] call ‘temporal integration’ – our way of bundling together perception of the present, memory of the past, and expectation of the future, in a common organization. Within this organization that which was conceived of as simply successive becomes charged with past and future: what was *chronos* becomes *kairos*. [. . .] *kairos* is the season, a point in time filled with significance, charged with meaning derived from its relation to the end. (1973 [1966]: 46–7)

**Glossary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UGT</td>
<td>Unión General de Trabajadores (socialist union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNT</td>
<td>Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (anarchist union)</td>
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FAL: Federación Anarquista Ibérica (anarchist organization)
POUM: Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (Trotskyist party)
PSUC: Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (Catalan communist party)
PCE: Partido Comunista de España (Spanish communist party)
BOC: Bloc Obrer i Camperol (Marxist party, Trotskyist)

References

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