Political and Political Economy Literature on the ENP: Issues and Implications.

Vassilis Monastiriotis, Mireia Borrell

January 2012
Abstract
Seen from the perspective of academic enquiry, the European Neighbourhood Policy sits – sometimes uncomfortably – between the realms of accession/integration and external relations. Given the emphasis of the policy on strengthening security (internally) and stability (externally), and the fact that its structure is largely built on the pre-existing instruments of accession conditionality, the main body of literature examining the ENP is located in the fields of political science and international relations – and, less so, political economy. Consequently, much less emphasis is given on the role of the ENP as a tool for economic development and convergence. The political / institutional literature identifies a number of issues with the rationale, instruments and implementation of the ENP. Analytically, these have to do with three distinctive but inter-related categories. First is the question concerning the ultimate scope of the policy. In the literature, ENP is seen as struggling to meet two sometimes conflicting objectives: on the one hand the establishment of a common security policy with its neighbours and on the other the management of their (real, perceived, or potential) accession aspirations. Following from this, second, is the question concerning the role of the EU in this process and in particular the tension between a normative aspiration to instil ‘European’ values to its neighbourhood and a self-interested goal of achieving narrower economic (market access) and political (security, stability) objectives. Finally, a more central question concerns the effectiveness of the policy at large, given the above tensions. The use of conditionality, modelled as it is on the experience of past enlargements, has a number of unintended, but negative, consequences, as it blurs the objectives and scope of the policy and ‘entrap[s]’ the EU into a constantly deepening process of institutional convergence and integration – which either becomes ineffective due to the absence of the prospect of accession or makes the objective of ‘containing accession aspirations’ largely impractical. In this process, adherence to objectives of democratisation, market openness and integration becomes piecemeal and thus the overall goal of strengthening security and stability through the economic and political development of the EU’s external periphery is potentially compromised.
Keywords: Neighbourhood policy; transformative power; conditionality; security; domestic adaptation

Acknowledgments:
This research was supported by the Project Sharing KnowledgE Assets: InteRregionally Cohesive Neighhorhoods (SEARCH) within the 7th European Community Framework Programme FP7-SSH -2010.2.2-1 (266834) European Commission.
1. Introduction

As is evident from working paper 1.3 of the SEARCH project in the report of deliverable 1.2, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) occupies a central position in the EU’s external relations. Naturally, a significant body of academic literature has emerged since the early 2000s that examines an array of aspects in relation to this policy, ranging from analyses of its rationale and instruments to evaluations of its effectiveness and limitations. Given the historical development of the ENP, as a policy that emerged out of the EU’s experience with the so-called “fifth enlargement” and the accession conditionality that was applied to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that eventually became members of the EU, a large part of this field of academic enquiry has its origins in the accession conditionality literature. More specifically, it is located within the realm of political and political economy analysis and examines the ENP mainly as a conditionality and/or socialisation mechanism, which operates essentially as a means for instigating economic and political reforms in the EU neighbourhood. A distinctive but increasingly convergent volume of research originates instead from the international relations literature, focusing predominantly on issues of security and conflict prevention, as well as issues of political stability and diplomacy more generally. Given the strong political and security aspects of the ENP, the literature looking at the ENP from a more economics viewpoint is, rather unsurprisingly, limited. Of course, a number of studies have addressed the trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) effects of ENP specifically and the wider EU approximation process more generally, but the vast majority of these studies have a narrow economics focus and thus are not considered in this review. Studies that look at the economic and, especially, the developmental effects of ENP within a context and approach much more readily identifiable with political economy are largely missing from the literature (Vincentz, 2007). This is rather unfortunate, as ENP has the potential, if not the mandate, to play an important role in mobilising economic development in the EU’s external periphery. But it is also characteristic of the dominance of two (rather narrow, it could be argued) considerations in both the policy-making world and the academic literature on ENP: those concerning the issue of security and those relating to the debate about conditionality. It is essentially this deficit that the present project is seeking to address – by aiming at providing a large volume of original research on the national and sub-national developmental effects and potential of ENP for the countries located in the EU neighbourhood.

In support of this wider objective, in this section we offer a selective but critical review of the existing political and political-economic literature on the origins, objectives, instruments and evaluation of ENP. The review is selective in that it does not aim to provide a full coverage of
the studies that have looked at the ENP as an external relations and – unavoidably – an EU association process: this would be unnecessary given the wider objectives and interests of this project. But the review is critical in the sense that its main purpose is to highlight a number of key issues that concern both the implementation and the objectives of the policy, as a means for informing the subsequent discussions, both in this theoretical Work-package and in later ones that have a more empirical orientation, about the direct and indirect goals of the ENP and about its intended and unintended consequences. To do so, the review of this section addresses a series of questions that seek to inform the reader about the priorities and dynamics underlying the process of institutional and economic integration under the ENP as well as about the nature of this process. At large, there are three main questions that are key to the political-science and political-economy discussion concerning the ENP. First, whether the ENP represents a rationalist ‘negotiation’ of EU-centred interests or instead a constructivist ‘projection’ of EU values and norms. This question has been addressed in various forms in the literature, for example through discussions about the soft power of the EU, about whether the EU constitutes a hegemonic power or a normative force, and about whether the ENP itself constitutes a framework of conditionality or a socialisation strategy. Second, to what extent the ENP constitutes an external relations or, rather, an enlargement policy – or, almost equivalently, to what extent it is a policy that should be viewed as part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), thus encompassing issues of security, migration, stability and crisis management. Third, whether the framework under which the ENP has been developed is ‘fit for purpose’, in other words to what extent it is sufficiently coherent internally and consistently applied externally and able to mobilise the reforms that it trying to instigate. In the discussion of these issues, much of the focus is on the EU as an international actor and there is a relatively secondary attention to the extent of domestic adaptation and learning as a process that takes place not in the abstract space of EU–NC interactions but in the particular economic and political constituencies of the recipient countries – and which, by implication, is thus filtered through the unique political, economic, social and institutional characteristics and circumstances of these constituencies. Our approach in this section maintains this focus. Thus issues of domestic adaptation, preference convergence, policy downloading and institutional learning are not addressed in relation to specific countries (and national contexts) in the European neighbourhood, but rather solely in relation to the ENP policy framework as developed and ‘projected’ by the EU.

The remainder of this section is structured as follows. The next sub-section considers the rationale and motives of the ENP as have been discussed in the academic literature, focusing in particular on whether the policy serves predominantly the wider normative goals of the EU or rather narrower rationalist interests, but also extending to a discussion about the structure of the ENP, combining as it does multilateralist, regionalist and bilateralist elements. Section
3.3 looks at the framework of conditionality within the ENP and examines how this reflects a dual objective of establishing a security policy in the EU’s external periphery and managing accession aspirations in the EU neighbourhood. In section 3.4 we turn to questions concerning the effectiveness of the ENP as a policy seeking to stimulate political, economic and institutional change and the limitations to this that arise from the structural characteristics of the policy. The last sub-section concludes by drawing some implications about the role of the ENP as a tool for economic development and convergence in the region.

2. Rationale and motives of the ENP

A central question in the political and political-economic literature on the ENP concerns the rationale under which the EU engages in the development of strategic relations with countries in its immediate and farther neighbourhood – as well as why it does so in a, seemingly at least, multilateralist manner and under a broader institutionalised framework, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy. To address this question the literature places emphasis on the institutional character of the EU and on its innate qualities and characteristics as a global institution. In this vein, the ENP – and more generally the EU’s external relations with the countries in its broader neighbourhood – is conceptualised through the prism of the so-called “transformative power” of the EU. This concerns the ability of the EU, on the one hand, to instigate political and institutional changes towards democratic governance and market liberalisation and, on the other, to export its moral values and norms to countries outside its borders. Under this framework, a number of issues are addressed, relating to the rationale of the ENP as well as its structure, instruments and policy implementation.

The traditional, and perhaps dominant, view about the rationale of the EU’s external relations is based on the notion of the EU as a ‘normative’ or ‘ethical’ power (Manners, 2002 and 2006; Sjursen, 2006; Aggestam, 2008; Whitman, 2011). This view portrays the EU as a distinctively “European” institution that embodies a socially and historically specific set of moral values and norms with regard to both policy/governance and rights/society (democracy, rule of law, respect for minorities, economic freedoms). Given the strong role of the EU as an international actor, it follows naturally that the EU will seek to ‘project’ and extend these values and norms to constituencies (countries) beyond its borders. Under this view, the EU’s external relations today are seen as a continuation of its role, historically, as a ‘democratising force’ – following, for example, from its contribution to securing the ‘restoration of democracy’ in the countries of the southern (Greece, Spain, Portugal) and later the eastern (CEECs) enlargement. In this literature, a distinctive feature of the EU’s normative power is its ‘soft’ character (Wood, 2009), i.e., its emphasis on voluntary participation rather than on military or economic coercion. This is not to deny the fact that a power asymmetry exists
between the EU and the countries that wish a closer association with it, which tends to assign
to the EU a hegemonic role in the region (Biscop, 2010) – although others emphasise more
the role of the EU as a gatekeeper than as a hegemon (Grabbe, 2006; Bechev, 2011). But as
the EU does not possess sufficient military capacity (or a normative preference for it) and –
especially – as economic coercion through conditionality becomes delegitimised in the
absence of a credible commitment to enlargement (Tulmets, 2007; Haukkala, 2008a), the EU
is led almost inevitably to rely more on normative and soft aspects of socialisation rather than
coercion (Emerson and Noutcheva, 2005; Kelley, 2006; Sasse, 2008). Based on these views,
the EU engages in contractual relations with its neighbours in order to promote its values,
offering in exchange a range of rewards (knowledge transfers, political association, market
access) subject to the degree of adaptation by the neighbourhood countries and the EU’s own
‘integration capacity’ (see later).

The critique to this view comes from authors that adopt a neo-realist perspective and
emphasise the function of the EU as a ‘hegemon’ which uses its asymmetric power to
essentially project its own interests to its periphery (Diez, 2005; Hyde-Price, 2006; Gawrich
et al, 2010). Seen from this perspective, the main rationale and function of EU’s external
relations is the guarantee of stability, security (including energy security) and prosperity
internally, which is to be achieved through ensuring that external security issues are either
resolved in a “European fashion” or remain external. This line of thought asserts that the EU
engages in a number of processes with its neighbours not in order to ‘export’ its own values,
to ‘democratise’, but rather in order to contain negative spillovers (illegal migration, human
trafficking, arms trade, etc) and externalities (e.g., security concerns arising from involvement
or non-involvement in territorial conflicts) from being ‘imported’ into its own territory.¹
Although in a rather different line of argument, somewhat similarly Grabbe (2006)
emphasises the function of the EU as an “exclusive members’ club” which maintains its
(collective or member-states’) interests through exclusivity (e.g., the ‘threat’ of barring access
from the internal market) and not exclusively through the ‘transformative power’ of its
processes of association and membership.

Of course, in practice it is difficult to separate between normative and interest-based motives.
Indeed, Pace (2007) argues that the ENP constitutes a mixture of (normative) constructivism
and a more interest-based rationalism. In the same line of argument, Kratochvil and Tulmet
(2010) assert that from an empirical view-point both of these dimensions can find support in
the EU’s approach to ENP and that, moreover, this mixture is evolving over time, with
rationalist elements becoming stronger (especially as the countries in the EU neighbourhood

¹ It should be noted, however, that the ability of the EU to achieve this exclusion condition has
been questioned in the literature (Aliboni, 2005).
come to realise the limits to EU association imposed by the ENP), while the normative
elements are maintained on the side of the EU.

An interesting perspective under which this can be examined further is through the analysis of
the geographical approach that the EU has instilled in its Neighbourhood Policy. As the
literature notes, underneath the application of a complex overarching policy framework – the
ENP – there is substantial fragmentation of processes: on the one hand, through the
development of parallel sub-processes of regionalisation (Smith, 2005; Emerson et al, 2007;
Barbéa and Surrallésba, 2010); on the other hand, through the bilateralist relations that
underpin the ENP structure (Seeberg, 2009; Bicchi, 2010; Gawrich et al, 2010). The former
suggest a gatekeeping and socialisation role for the ENP: by emphasising and strengthening
existing and new sub-regional processes (EuroMed, Eastern Partnerships, Black Sea
Synergy), the EU seeks to strengthen the development and convergence of common values
and ideas (as well as regional cooperation and conflict prevention) in a much more
‘transformative’ than ‘hegemonic’ fashion. The latter (bilateralism) is instead meant to
maintain the asymmetric power of the EU and to guarantees its (normative) hegemonic role
(Haukkala, 2008a – see also Smith, 2005, Vahl, 2005 and Pace, 2007).

Irrespective of whether this multi-scalar structure is an intentional bridging of
coercion/conditionality and socialisation/soft power, it is important to note that due to this the
ENP constitutes essentially an aggregation of pre-existing and newly created external
relations policies, not all of which have the same origins and scope. Indeed, for some areas
policies have originally been designed to facilitate goals more closely linked to
democratisation and conflict prevention, while for others policies were developed more with
an emphasis on economic integration and (weak) association. For example, as Smith (2005)
notes, the ENP was not originally designed for, or extended to, the countries participating to
the so-called Barcelona Process, as for the latter security issues where less imminent and the
emphasis was more on the economic dimension while the EU had sought to keep a reasonable
distance from direct intervention on domestic institution building (Bicchi, 2010; Thepaut,
2011). Instead, the ENP was first launched as a policy for the EU’s immediate eastern
neighbourhood and as a framework that sought to incorporate processes that had developed
independently, such as the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements signed in the 1990s with
Russia, Ukraine and Moldova (Sasse, 2008; Niemann and de Wekker, 2010). Importantly, as
the ENP framework expanded geographically to include essentially all countries in the eastern
and southern neighbourhood, the regional and sub-regional processes remained and in some
cases existing processes were re-launched or new initiatives were developed seeking to
reconstitute pre-existing regions and processes. This is for example the case with the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation and the recently launched Black Sea Synergy (Emerson et al, 2007; Emerson, 2008; Andreev, 2008; Manoli, 2010; Tassinari, 2011).

In this sense, through its ENP, the EU attempts to incorporate important elements of regionalism in its overarching policy for its neighbourhood (Smith, 2005; Pace, 2007), not least as a means for mobilising policy cooperation, preference convergence and economic integration and development. Emerson and Noutcheva (2005) discuss how the launching of the ENP and the eventual inclusion of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) countries in the policy provided a new impetus to the EU’s relations with its southern neighbourhood and promised to be a catalyst for reform in the Mediterranean Countries after the partial failure of the Barcelona Process. This was particularly important as, despite the notable progress recorded by the Barcelona Process in terms of confidence-building and, to an extent, institutional convergence, the process had not been sufficient to act as a driving force for major economic, social and political changes –as the Arab Spring so bluntly revealed.

But it should be noted that with this support for regionalism comes unavoidable some horizontal fragmentation. For example, despite the effective incorporation of the EMP into the ENP, the instruments that apply to the EMP countries under the neighbourhood policy differ (although in many respects only marginally) from those applied to countries that form part of the Eastern Partnership (Aliboni and Amor, 2009). Moreover, the EU has signed a number of ‘Advanced Status’ agreements with some southern countries (Jordan, Morocco and prospectively Tunisia) within the ENP framework, while in the east the EU is progressing towards signing ‘Association Agreements’ and ‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area’ (DCFTA) agreements with countries such as Moldova and Ukraine. As we discuss later, this differentiation has implications for the coherence, credibility and overall effectiveness of the ENP as an overarching policy.

3. The strategic goal of ENP: security and (non-)enlargement

As has already been mentioned, the EU considers its Neighbourhood Policy to be its main policy tool for establishing a ring of countries around its periphery that will be “stable” and “friendly to the EU”. In this sense, the ENP is perceived as a predominantly external relations policy, one that seeks to stabilise politically and economically the EU’s external periphery and instil to it values and institutions that are shared amongst the EU member states. Despite this, the historical development and current structure of the ENP points for many scholars and analysts to a different interpretation of the policy’s goals and objectives.
Specifically, there is a wide recognition in the literature that the ENP is inexorably linked to the EU’s enlargement process, as it relies (a) on a structure that has essentially been borne out from the accession process of the Eastern enlargement and (b) on a process – conditionality – whose objectives and instruments have been defined exactly for this process of enlargement, as decided in the Copenhagen Council of 1993 (the so-called Copenhagen Criteria). Gordon and Sasse (2008) highlight an interesting dimension to this point: like the CEE accession process, in its initial phases the ENP was under the responsibility of DG Enlargement and was only later transferred to DG External Relations. Although to an extent this reflects simply the historical evolution of the policy, it also crystallises how the ENP sprung out of the 2004 enlargement process and the conditionality applied to the New Member States during their accession to the EU. Moreover, it illustrates the fact that the ENP has in many respects been developed as a means for managing the accession aspirations of its neighbours and containing the pressures for enlargement (Haukkala, 2008b).

Emerson (2004a) was among the first authors to make this point, suggesting that the ENP has been constructed in a way that seeks to address the dilemma that the EU faced after the fifth enlargement in 2004. This was a dilemma between, on the one hand, extending the enlargement process to neighbouring countries at the risk of seriously jeopardising its own governability and, on the other, irrevocably stopping the enlargement process, thus breaking with one of the core EU values (to be open to all European democracies) and losing its leverage over its neighbourhood – with the risk, subsequently, of endangering the emergence of negative political and economic effects in the neighbouring countries. In relation to this, Gawrich et al (2010), introduce the concept of “Neighbourhood Europeanisation”, as a distinctive category from Membership and Accession Europeanisation (internal and accession-related conditionality, respectively) and argue that this is an uneasy mixture of top-down interest projection and weak conditionality.

This point, about the question of managing accession aspirations, has been more broadly discussed in relation to the so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’ of the EU, in other words its increasing reluctance or inability to accommodate more members into its club. Although some key authors in the literature have occasionally questioned the extent to which enlargement fatigue is a real constraint to deeper integration (Schimmelfennig, 2008), the argument here is that the EU finds it difficult to continue its process of enlargement in the presence of deep internal imbalances as have been manifested both with the rejection of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty (and the subsequent problems with the Lisbon Treaty – Marchetti, 2007) and more recently with the Eurozone crisis. Anastasakis and Bechev (2003) and Grabbe (2006), among others, have made this point in relation to the Candidate and Potential Candidate countries of the Western Balkans (as well as Turkey). The issue of the EU’s
‘integration capacity’ specifically with regard to the ENP countries has similarly been discussed in studies such as those by Emerson et al (2006), Dervim and Schulz (2009) and Szolucha (2010).

Another dimension to this issue of ‘management/containment’ has to do with the role of Russia in the region. Smith (2005) considers the fact that the original application of the ENP concerned a small group of countries in the Eastern neighbourhood (and was at the time unrelated to pre-existing processes in the Southern neighbourhood, such as the Barcelona Process), which had historically fallen under the sphere of influence of Russia. Thus, while the EU wanted to forge its links with, and its influence on, countries such as Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, especially with regard to strengthening or stimulating their process of democratisation, it also wanted to do so in a way that maintained stability in the region at large and specifically in its relations with Russia (Zagorski, 2004; Dannreuther, 2006; Emerson et al, 2007; Youngs, 2008; Haukkala, 2008b). The effect of this was the implementation of a looser framework of association, under the ENP, which would maintain elements of leveraging and conditionality without having to fully commit to (or fully clarify) a process of institutional integration (accession) – and without aggravating Russia (Haukkala, 2008b; Popescu and Wilson, 2009).

Such geo-political considerations add to the ambivalence concerning the ‘final destination’ of the ENP which, as discussed earlier, reflects the EU’s own ambiguity about its priorities with regard to its engagement with the countries in its eastern and southern neighbourhood – and specifically the tension between its role as ‘democratising force’ and an exclusive club of self-interested constituencies. But as far as it concerns the question of whether the ENP can be best seen as an enlargement or an external relations policy, the literature, especially studies coming from the international relations tradition, finds the ENP’s dual origin and dual objective less problematic. Cremona and Hillion (2006) assert that although “the methodology underpinning the ENP heavily draws on the techniques of the pre-accession strategy” (p.15), it is nevertheless a comprehensive security-oriented policy, as is reflected in the strong linkages between ENP and the European Security Strategy, which is “designed to meet the challenge of ensuring coherence between the three EU pillars”. In a different, but consistent, line of argument, Browning and Joenniemi (2008) analyse the ENP as a ‘fluid process’ for the development of a flexible and dynamic geo-political strategy which aims at guaranteeing stability in its neighbourhood and security in its borders. As they argue, “questions of the Union’s borders (…) cannot be separated from questions regarding the Union’s security” (p.3). Under this view, the strong traces of pre-accession conditionality that can be found in the ENP framework do not constitute an obstacle to the policy but rather a constructive integration of different dynamics that support its coherence and adherence to the EU’s overall
objectives. Similar arguments are made in the collections of papers edited by Dannreuther (2004) and Whitman and Wolff (2010).

In a different vein, other authors question the ENP as an instrument that facilitates security issues. For example, Christou (2010) offers a much more critical evaluation of the security achievements of the ENP. He argues that the fragmentation of the process (e.g., the ‘double security narrative’ that emerges between the ENP and the Eastern Partnership) have so far failed to deliver the security and stability sought after by the EU. This is not only true in the case of the near eastern neighbourhood, where developments have historically been strongly linked with the regional role of Russia (Sasse, 2008; Haukkala, 2008b; Popescu and Wilson, 2009), but also in the cases of the South Caucasus republics and the southern neighbourhood in North Africa. In the first case, the ENP is seen as having played a positive but minor role, as the EU was unable to exert sufficient influence in the case of the Georgia crisis in 2008 (Fischer, 2009; Sadri and Burns, 2010; Delcour and Duhot, 2011). In the second case, in relation to the developments concerning the Arab Spring, the ENP is seen instead as having played, if anything, a negative role – especially as its pursuit of stability has often been seen as being in conflict with the wider and more value-based objective of fostering democratisation (Perthes, 2011; Emerson, 2011; Tocci, 2011; Ioannides, 2011; Thepaut, 2011). This reflects wider concerns expressed in the earlier literature about the ability of the ENP to deliver on its security objectives, for example due to the paradox of becoming increasingly involved in crisis management in its external periphery but without the tools that would allow it to exert so-called ‘hard power’ (Aliboni, 2005).

4. Incentives, effectiveness and domestic adaptation

The preceding discussion has highlighted two important issues that concern the structure of the ENP and the motives behind it. These are, on the one hand, the extent to which it aims at extending the EU values and norms to its external periphery or rather at protecting its internal stability and security; and on the other, the extent to which it constitutes a policy for association (and, perhaps, eventual accession) or instead a pure external relations policy. These dilemmas play a crucial role in the overall effectiveness of the policy, in the structure of the incentives it extends to the associated countries and, ultimately, in the degree of domestic adaptation and change in the EU periphery. In the literature, three issues are discussed in particular: the tension between securing economic interests and credibly pushing for democratisation and political-institutional change; the weaknesses associated to so-called ‘conditionality-lite’ and the lack of a firm commitment to accession as a device that locks countries into a stable reform path; and the concern that through its institutional entrepreneurialism and increasing involvement in the region the EU becomes ‘procedurally
entrapment’ into a process that is essentially one of pre-accession. In relation to these issues, various authors have discussed the ability of the ENP to act as a socialisation (rather than coercion) mechanism, the legitimacy of a policy that seeks to engineer political and economic change while maintaining the EU’s exclusive character (offering ‘all but institutions’), and the empirical problems associated to the so-called ‘capabilities-expectations gap’, i.e., the distance between how the ENP is perceived in the neighbourhood and what the EU can offer to its neighbourhood through the ENP.

As we discussed, the ENP has deep roots into the accession conditionality of the fifth enlargement as it has developed out of it both historically and institutionally. This path-dependency has significant implications for the ability of the ENP, as a policy, to deliver in its dual objective of managing accession aspirations while instigating political, economic and institutional change. The problem here is that conditionality under the ENP has lost its ‘bite’ and credibility, as it has been stripped of its “golden carrot of accession” (Kelley, 2006). Schimmelfennig (2005) asserts this by highlighting that the weak incentives entailed in the ENP raise the costs of domestic adaptation, thus hindering the effectiveness of the policy. Similar is the argument made by Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008). This has been taken further up by Sasse (2008), who argues that the ENP incorporates a form of ‘conditionality-lite’, where the lack of clarity (vagueness) with regard both to commitments (by the EU) and rewards (to the neighbourhood countries) weakens the pro-reform constituencies in the neighbourhood and affords more influence to euro-sceptic elites there. The lack of clear benchmarks, and especially the lack of a clear linkage between progress and rewards, is also highlighted by Gordon and Sasse (2008), in their comparative analysis of the performance of ENP conditionality in the eastern neighbourhood.

Paradoxically, however, despite this weakening of conditionality, the ENP also reproduces the accession aspirations of at least some of the countries in its neighbourhood. This is best understood under the notion of ‘procedural entrapment’ proposed by Sasse (2008), a concept that builds on the earlier notion of ‘rhetorical entrapment’ (Schimmelfennig, 2003). The logic of this is as follows. The EU is motivated by the need to establish stability across its borders as a means to ensuring security internally. In doing so, it offers some form of association to its neighbouring countries. But because it is not in a position to offer full membership (due to the ‘integration capacity’ discussed earlier), and in order to maintain the relevance of its conditionality for instigating reforms, it has to revert to offering participation to the EU internal market as the main carrot of the policy (Ganzle, 2009).² This however implies that it

² In fact, the ENP was initially thought to allow, eventually the neighbourhood countries to participate in the four freedoms. Given, however, that this approach blurred the distinction
has to enforce/incentivise institutional convergence on specific policy areas, which effectively necessitates the adoption of specific chapters of the acquis by the associated countries. This has three effects. First, the whole process of monitoring and evaluation becomes a technocratic matter (technocratic engagement – Sasse, 2008) that weakens the role of political actors in incentivising institutional change towards democratisation in line with the EU’s normative ambitions. Second, as adoption of the acquis requires strong domestic actors (strong states – Grabbe, 2006), it creates a conflict between the pursuit of institutional and economic integration and the very goal of democratisation. Third, it creates an oxymoron, as ‘good performers’ who adopt the acquis remain excluded from the EU club: this weakens further the incentives for compliance and institutional adaptation or, inversely, ‘entrap’ the EU into a procedure which inevitably leads to stronger claims for accession. This is the essence of the so-called ‘capability-expectations gap’ (Tulmets, 2007; Sasse, 2008 – see also Dannreuther, 2006), i.e., the distance between what the associated countries expect from their relations with the EU and what the EU has to offer, which demotivates the NCs and delegitimises the ENP as an external relations policy at large (Haukkala, 2008a; Thepaut, 2011).

Given these problems, many authors have placed more emphasis on the ‘socialisation’ function of the ENP – and have subsequently argued for the strengthening of this dimension of the policy. For example, Emerson and Noutcheva (2005) consider socialisation, namely the process of persuading the associated countries to adopt policies and institutions that are consistent with the EU’s own institutions and norms, to be a separate pillar in the EU strategy in the region that falls outside the reward/punishment logic of conditionality. Kelley (2006) defines socialisation as a process whereby “actors generate behaviour changes by creating reputational pressures through shaming, persuasion and other efforts to socialize state actors” (p.39) and argues that the EU has shown evidence of learning through its ENP and has shifted over time its strategy from hard conditionality to soft diplomatic socialisation. Barbe et al (2009) also discuss this, arguing that the EU policy towards its external periphery contains elements not only of top-down policy transfers but also of more horizontal policy convergence based on rules that are either adopted from third parties (e.g., the WTO) or developed bilaterally. Similar arguments can be found in Youngs (2008) and in Lavenex (2008), who proposes the shift to a model of non-hierarchical “network governance”, where the top-down process of policy transfers is replaced by a multi-level and polycentric trans-governmental network of policy exchange, policy learning and diffusion of policy-relevant knowledge.

---

between association and membership, the offer was reduced to participation in the internal market (Sasse 2008).
However, not all authors share this negative view about the ENP’s conditionality and top-
down governance approach. Ganzle (2009), for example, asserts that the ENP constitutes a
“form of externalised EU-centred governance in order to partially integrate third countries of
the immediate vicinity into ‘policy-taking’ rather than ‘policy-making’ processes of the EU”
(p.1716). This is achieved through the shifting of a number of ‘governance boundaries’ that
concern geopolitical, cultural, transactional (financial-economic), legal and institutional
aspects. According to Ganzle (2009), by shifting these boundaries depending on country-
specific circumstances and the bilateral context, the EU is able to manage the accession
aspirations of its neighbours and to decouple the process of association from the issue of
accession, as the “ENP partner countries … pursue further options beyond just falling short of
fully-fledged membership” (p.1729).

Similar ideas have been expressed by authors who argue in favour, not of a sidestepping of
conditionality (e.g., through an increasing emphasis on soft power, socialisation and
polycentric governance), but of transforming and instrumentalising it. For example, Trauner
(2009), talking about the case of the Western Balkans but in an argument that easily extents to
the ENP, has argued that the “dismantling of membership conditionality” (p.5) will produce a
stronger tool for instigating institutional adaptation and convergence through elements of both
coercion (policy downloading, monitoring, carrots-and-sticks) and socialisation (policy
learning, knowledge transfers, etc) – what he identifies as the “mechanisms of
Europeanisation” (borrowing from Grabbe, 2001). He proposes a move to policy-related
conditionality, where the EU leverage is decoupled from the overall question of accession and
the influence that the EU exerts is focused on specific policy areas which may evolve and
increase over time and depending on circumstances. Emerson and Noutcheva (2005) make
independently a similar argument, emphasising the central potential role of “sectoral policy
conditionality” as a driver of change in the ENP periphery, an argument that they link to the
strengthening of incentives for compliance through positive elements of conditionality (such
as increased financial assistance) and the process of competition amongst the countries that
belong to the EU neighbourhood. This argument links strongly to the idea about the mixing of
regionalism and bilateralism as an explicit EU strategy for the ENP region. In earlier work,
Emerson (2004a and 2004b) emphasised the importance of focusing the ENP towards the
creation of denser political, economic and societal links through a cobweb of overlapping
regions (sometimes encompassing existing member states) and policy spaces.3 Emerson et al
(2007) put forward the idea of an “ENP plus”, which will take into account more holistically
the changing geo-political context (the rise of China in the global field, the rising economic
and political strength of Russia, the declining prestige and legitimacy of the US as an

3 It can be noted that this is also consistent with Lavenex’s (2008) idea of network governance.
international power) and will draw dividing lines not across geographical areas but along the conceptual axis of willing-reluctant partners. Their proposal argues for the strengthening of the ENP’s facilitation of regionalist processes (e.g., the Black Sea Synergy) that will give a new character to the ENP, more towards a geo-political strategy of external relations and less so as a strategy for transformation, either through conditionality or through socialisation – both of which, the authors argue, seem to have reached, or exceeded, their limits. The emphasis on the regional and regionalist components of the ENP, as opposed to the bilateralist conditionality relations, is favoured also by Smith (2005) and by Haukkala (2008a), who proposes, as one of the options for resolving the capabilities-expectations gap and the legitimacy problems identified with conditionality as applied in the ENP, the adoption by the EU of a more modest (less hegemonic or top-down) strategy in the region, that will offer tangible cooperation in different areas while taking on board only those values and norms that are prerequisites for good governance.

Generally speaking, such proposals seek to address one of the two key weaknesses identified with the ENP, namely the loss of credibility, legitimacy and overall ‘bite’ in the absence of a firm commitment, or ability, to facilitate future enlargements. They seek to restore the incentives for political and institutional change, towards democratisation and economic reform, and the avenues through which these can take place in the EU neighbourhood. But besides this, under specific conditions the proposed compartmentalisation and ‘decoupling’ of conditionality, either geographically or sectorally (e.g., policy-related conditionality – Trauner, 2009; shifting boundaries of governance – Ganzle, 2009; overlapping policy spaces – Emerson, 2004a; or sub-regionalism – Emerson et al, 2007), may also prove suitable for addressing the other weakness identified in the functioning of the ENP, namely its goal conflict and inconsistency (Schimmelfennig, 2005). On this, the literature seems to stress the importance of mobilising domestic support for the policies that seek to instigate political, economic and institutional change and of being responsive to the diversity of the circumstances and context of the ENP countries (Gordon and Sasse, 2008). By shifting to a more contextual and less top-down approach to its neighbourhood the EU may be better equipped to instigate more targeted and more effective changes there (Gawrich et al, 2010; Biscop, 2010; Thepaut, 2011). Although coherence, consistency and credibility have long been identified as three key ingredients for the success of conditionality and the EU’s transformative power (Grabbe, 2006), the flexible and context-sensitive application of strategies of coercion (conditionality) and socialisation (learning) appears to be essential for the ENP to maintain its effectiveness and legitimacy. As Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) assert, the perceived appropriateness of the rules/values that the EU seeks to project through its ENP, and the overall legitimacy of the process, are crucial for the selection, adoption and implementation of these rules by domestic actors in the EU external periphery.
5. Conclusions

In this closing section we briefly summarise the main issues that have been covered in the review of the political and political-economic literature and develop some thoughts about the implications of the issues raised for the role and ability of the ENP to mobilise economic development and convergence in the EU external periphery through process of economic integration and institutional-political convergence.

As we saw, the EU approach to its neighbourhood, and the ENP in particular, entails a number of important dilemmas and tensions that bring to question the rationale, coherence and effectiveness of its policies. One first such dilemma concerns the rationale of the EU approach. It appears from this literature review that the ENP combines, sometimes uneasily, aspects of interest negotiation and of norm projection that do not always work in synergy. Thus, while the EU goal of democratising its external periphery by instilling to it European norms and institutions may in some respects not be in conflict with specific interests, such as containing negative spillovers in the areas of security and gaining access to markets and energy resources, in other respects this relationship is rather problematic. Institutional adaptation in the periphery requires strong states, some of which may not be democratic or may show resistance to some areas of reform while being positive to change in other areas.

This tension is reinforced by another dilemma, namely the contradiction between seeking to transfer policy rules in a largely top-down fashion and offering too little in exchange – at least in the sense of not being able to offer a clear route to full participation in the EU (membership). This weakens the credibility and legitimacy of the EU’s policy towards the region and ultimately its ability to instigate wholesale and sustainable change in its external periphery. Given the absence of a strong anchor to reforms (the “golden carrot” of accession) the ENP countries are allowed to cherry-pick on specific policy sectors and suffer little penalties if they exhibit hesitation and policy reversals. A third dilemma comes to add to this. Clearly motivated by a concern to avoid a ‘rhetorical entrapment’ that will make the offer of membership politically inevitable, the EU is moving to a model of policy-related conditionality which fragments the overall policy and allows differentiation in compliance across sectors within each ENP country. Moreover, unable (or unwilling) to offer the prospect of full membership, the EU has removed the participation in the ‘four freedoms’ from the list of rewards included in the ENP and has reduced this to an offer of participation in the internal market. Both of these developments tend to de-politicise conditionality. Paradoxically, however, as the monitoring of compliance is shifted to the technocratic level, the EU runs the danger of becoming entrapped in a procedural fashion, pushing countries in its neighbourhood...
to adopt an increasing number of rules that apply inside the EU and thus inevitably signalling full participation in the EU institutions as the ‘ultimate destination’ of the policy.

The response of the EU to these dilemmas is multi-faceted. First, the EU now treats the ENP as an almost exclusively external relations policy – thus trying to dissociate ‘neighbourhood conditionality’ from ‘accession conditionality’. Second, it seeks to introduce more flexibility in the policy, by allowing more horizontal policy and knowledge transfers within variable but overlapping policy and geographical spaces. This approach has at least three dimensions: the sectoral, the geographical and the functional. In sectoral terms, this is manifested in the separation of policy spheres and the application of the so-called policy-related conditionality which seeks to offer more incremental but also more immediate rewards (e.g., access to markets, financial assistance) for achievements registered in particular policy areas largely irrespective of developments in other policy areas. In geographical terms it is best exemplified by the EU’s support of regionalist processes and sub-regional initiatives and its quest to accommodate these and integrate them organically within its overarching (and seemingly multilateralist) framework of the ENP. Finally, in functional terms, it is reflected in the way in which this regionalist approach is integrated with the underlying differentiated and bilateralist fashion in which the EU develops its relations with its neighbouring countries (for example, the spatial status of Russia and its non-participation in the ENP, the ‘advanced status’ offered to selected countries in the southern neighbourhood, and the country-specificity of the Action Plans through which the ENP operates). The combination of the two allows the EU to instil elements of positive competition and policy learning through information sharing and trans-governmental networks of policy exchange.

Although the elaboration of this complex policy framework has obvious advantages, it is nevertheless susceptible to maintaining the weaknesses already identified with the ENP. Lack of consistency and coherence of the policy is an important impediment to legitimising the role of the EU in the region and to mobilising advocacy coalitions and, ultimately, sustainable reforms in the ENP periphery. Too much flexibility and differentiation can lead to processes of ‘de-learning’ and compartmentalise, rather than unify, the EU’s external relations in its neighbourhood – while the technocratisation of these relations may in fact maintain prospective claims for accession and full participation to the EU market and institutions.

What is the relevance of these issues to the question about the role of the ENP for the fostering of economic development, market integration and, above all, convergence in the neighbourhood countries? The answer we can give here can only be tentative and exploratory. It is clear from the above discussion that issues of economic development – and, moreover, of balanced and sustainable development not only at the national but also at the sub-national
level – figure rather peripherally in the ENP agenda. The dominant goals, of instilling democratisation and forging stability-security, put the economic-developmental dimension on a secondary role and turn it into an instrument for the successful application of the policy, rather than a direct policy concern in itself. Thus, conditionalities related to the building of western-like market institutions, the opening-up (externally) and liberalisation (internally) of domestic markets, and the implementation of effective and equitable economic policies are largely deployed and examined under the prism of the effective adaptation of domestic institutions to the EU legal (institutions, acquis) and normative (democratisation) agendas.

Nevertheless, the economic-developmental issue remains central in at least two other respects. First, the rewards associated to ENP conditionality remain largely (and, it can be argued, become increasingly) economic, related as they are to market access and financial assistance. Second, irrespective of conditions, the opening up of relations with the ENP periphery allows and encourages the development of closer economic ties between the ENP countries and the EU member states, as is manifested in the fast growth of trade and FDI flows registered over the last two decades between the two country blocks. Thus, both in institutional and in market terms, the ENP region becomes more closely integrated, but also more exposed, to the market forces operating inside the EU. In the absence of any prospect of accession to the EU, at least in the foreseeable future, and thus of benefits associated with the redistributive and developmental policies of the EU (CAP, Cohesion Policy), this exposure can have both positive and negative developmental effects. As has been observed in the cases of earlier (and deeper) associations (e.g., in Central Eastern and Southeast Europe), the economic gravity of the EU can distort domestic production structures, trade specialisations and orientations and, importantly, lead to an over-concentration of economic activity and human and financial capital (Monastiriotis and Petrakos, 2010). Further, as was also reflected more recently with the global financial crisis (see Bartlett and Monastiriotis, 2010), with processes of industrial restructuring, capital deepening, technological upgrading and production diversification progressing only slowly (especially in the more backward countries), speedy liberalisation and market integration (e.g., in the form of strong and fast inflows of FDI and speedy financial liberalisation) can create deep imbalances (e.g., unsustainable credit expansion and over-indebtedness) that will threaten to destabilise the economies in times of crisis.

It is rather unfortunate in this context that the process of economic integration falls outside the debates about the role and effectiveness (or, appropriateness) of the ENP. As the ‘economic’ (market access) becomes a carrot for the ‘political’ (democratisation, security), attention to institutional adaptation in the economic domain is reduced to the implementation of rules about market access – while attaining a critical stance to the process (and speed) of integration becomes counter-productive and anti-modernising (Euro-sceptic). Further, as
compliance with the ENP rules is imperfect and enforcement (conditionality) remains weak, economic openness also remains incomplete and asymmetric, thus generating greater exposure risks and threatening more imbalances in the young economies of the neighbourhood countries. These are some of the key issues that are addressed in subsequent parts of this project.
6. References

Anastasakis O. and Bechev D. (2003), EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process, mimeo, South East European Studies Programme, University of Oxford.
Bartlett W. and Monastiriotis V. (eds) (2010), SEE After the Crisis: a new dawn or back to business as usual?, LSE Research Unit on Southeast Europe, LSE.


Fischer S. (2009), The European Union and security in the Black Sea region after the Georgia crisis, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Volume 9, No3, pp. 333-349.


Schimmelfennig F. (2003), Strategic Action in a Community Environment. The Decision to Enlarge the European Union to the East, Comparative Political Studies, Volume 36, No1/2, pp.156-183.

Seeberg P. (2009), The EU as a realist actor in normative clothes: EU democracy promotion in Lebanon and the European Neighbourhood Policy, Democratization, 16:1, 81-99.


Trauner F. (2009), Deconstructing the EU’s Routes of Influence in Justice and Home Affairs in the Western Balkans, Journal of European Integration 31 (1).


