UBEconomics | Why do voters forgive corrupt mayors? Implicit exchange, credibility of information and clean alternatives

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Why do voters forgive corrupt mayors? Implicit exchange, credibility of information and clean alternatives

Muñoz J, Anduiza E, Gallego A (2016)

Local Government Studies, 42(4): 598-615

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Research fields: Political Economy | Show in personal profile |

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