UBEconomics | Why do voters forgive corrupt mayors? Implicit exchange, credibility of information and clean alternatives

Back to Publications

Why do voters forgive corrupt mayors? Implicit exchange, credibility of information and clean alternatives

Muñoz J, Anduiza E, Gallego A (2016)

Local Government Studies, 42(4): 598-615

Share

Research fields: Political Economy | Show in personal profile |

Related working papers by similar research fields

Influence of parties’ behavioural features on motor compensation disputes in insurance markets
Number of accidents or number of claims? An approach with zero-inflated Poisson models for panel data
Modelling Quality of Life and Population Growth. The Case of the Barcelona Metropolitan Area
Non-formal education, overeducation and wages: evidence for Spain
Economic ideas and redistributive policy in the Spanish parliament: the 1900 debate on fiscal progressivity