Biosafety laboratory level 3 (NCB 3)

Biosafety level 3 laboratory (NCB 3) This level is suitable for handling biological agents that can be transmitted by aerosols, which often have a low infectious dose and can produce very serious or fatal diseases (group 3), as well as large volumes or concentrations of biological agents of group 2, because they entail a higher risk of aerosol diffusion.

This level of containment is applicable to special diagnostic and research laboratories.

All the measures described for biosafety level 1 and biosafety level 2 laboratories will be applied in addition to the ones inherent to biosafety level 3.

Biosafety laboratory level 3
Biosafety laboratory level 3 . Image source: Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd edition, WHO; 2005.

Index:

Special practices

  • Access must be strictly controlled, only authorized personnel may enter.
  • Particularly sensitive people are not allowed to enter.
  • All manipulations shall be carried out in a suitable CSB or by means of equipment offering similar protection.
  • All HEPA filters must be certified and tested. They shall be installed in such a way as to allow for decontamination in situ prior to removal.
  • Any spill or accident resulting in overexposure of personnel to infectious material must be reported to the health and safety officer or to the biosafety officer and to the medical service for evaluation, control and the necessary medical treatment, and a record of the accident must be kept (according to article 9.1 of RD 664/1997).
  • A contingency plan will be drawn up to deal with accidents occurring in the laboratory in which local or national authorities will be taken into account.
  • The presence of animals or plants not related to laboratory work is not allowed.

Safety equipment

  • It will have CSB, preferably class II or III.
  • It will be necessary to wear clothes for exclusive use in the laboratory.

Facilities

  • It is advisable that the laboratory is separated from other activities that are developed in the same building, by means of a hall or room with a double door that can serve as a dressing room, shower and storage room for personal protection equipment.
  • The double access doors to the laboratory must be self-closing and have an interlocking mechanism, so that only one door is open at a time.
  • The laboratory shall be designed in such a way that cleaning is convenient and accessible, with surfaces that are easy to clean, impermeable and resistant to the action of acids, alkalis, solvents and disinfectants, and cracks and corners shall be avoided. In addition, the land will be anti-slippery.
  • The laboratory room will be airtight, with sealing of external joints (frames and doors, pipe entry) to ensure adequate sealing at the time of decontamination.
  • The doors will be made of break-resistant glass and will always be locked and sealed.
  • It is advisable that the air inlet and outlet are controlled so that the system creates a unidirectional air flow from less contaminated areas to the inside of the laboratory, so that the exhaust air goes directly to the outside without recirculation, creating at the same time a decreasing pressure gradient from the less contaminated areas to the inside of the laboratory.
  • The air coming from the laboratory will pass through a HEPA filter before going outside. The installation of HEPA filters will be carried out in such a way as to allow the decontamination of gases and the performance of the filter verification tests.
  • Vacuum lines must be protected with disinfectant traps and HEPA filters or equivalent.
  • An approved decontamination method for infectious material (autoclave, chemical methods, incinerator) should preferably be placed in the same laboratory or in an annex room.
  • The water connection for the laboratory will be independent of the drinking water connection. Drinking water supply will be protected against reflux

The University of Barcelona does not have containment level facilities above biosafety level 2. Therefore, type 3 and 4 activities cannot be carried out at the UB due to the lack of adequate facilities.