BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//wp-events-plugin.com//7.4.0.1//EN
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:205@ub.edu
DTSTART:20140402T130000Z
DTEND:20140402T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T094525Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/actualism-and-modal-semantics/
SUMMARY:Actualism and Modal Semantics
DESCRIPTION:               Strong actualism involves the following two thes
 es:&nbsp\;SA1: For any two different possible states of the world\, there 
 is some non-modal proposition that is true in one and false in the other.S
 A2: For any two different modal hypotheses\, there is some non-modal valua
 tion that is possible according to one and impossible according to the oth
 er.&nbsp\;Weak actualism involves the following two theses:&nbsp\;WA1: For
  any two different possible states of the world\, there is some propositio
 n that is true in one and false in the other.WA2: For any two different mo
 dal hypotheses\, there is some valuation that is possible according to one
  and impossible according to the other.&nbsp\;SA1 entails:&nbsp\;Superveni
 ence: For any two possible states of the world\, if there is some modal pr
 oposition that is true in one and false in the other\, then there is some 
 non-modal proposition that is true in one and false in the other.&nbsp\;SA
 2 carries a commitment to:&nbsp\;Invariance: A modal proposition has the s
 ame truth value in every possible state of the world.&nbsp\;We might not w
 ant to treat Invariance and Supervenience as sematic truths\, and then we 
 won&rsquo\;t want to treat SA1 and SA2 as semantic truths either.&nbsp\;Bu
 t we might still want to treat WA1 and WA2 as semantic truths.&nbsp\;Howev
 er\, the tools deployed by contemporary modal semantics to avoid treating 
 SA1 and SA2 as semantic truths also fail to treat WA1 and WA2 as semantic 
 truths.&nbsp\;This lends support to the following hypothesis:&nbsp\;If WA1
  and WA2 are semantic truths\, then the same goes for SA1 and SA2 (and hen
 ce for Supervenience and Invariance)&nbsp\;This hypothesis is false. It is
  possible to provide a semantics for modal propositional logic on which WA
 1 and WA2 come out as semantic truths but SA1 and SA2 don&#39\;t.&nbsp\;
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR