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UID:634@ub.edu
DTSTART:20231129T130000Z
DTEND:20231129T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T195305Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/arguing-for-irrationality/
SUMMARY:Arguing for irrationality
DESCRIPTION:Is irrationality (sometimes\, under some conditions) defensible
  by (sound or at least convincing) argument?The idea should sound at least
  a little paradoxical. Isn't "defensible by argument" tantamount to "ratio
 nally defensible"? How can irrationality be rationally defensible? Indeed\
 , on mainstream philosophical construals\, &ldquo\;rationality&rdquo\; den
 otes a normative notion so &ldquo\;thin&rdquo\; that it&rsquo\;s difficult
  to see how irrationality could ever have something to recommend itself &n
 dash\; except\, perhaps\, in very recherch&eacute\; and outlandish scenari
 os.At the same time\, irrationality &ndash\; or at least something going b
 y that name &ndash\; has its defenders\, both among the learned and the fo
 lk. It seems likely that these &ldquo\;irrationalists&rdquo\; are not talk
 ing about the exact same thing as us contemporary philosophers would when 
 using the words "rational\," "irrational" and cognates. It also seems like
 ly that they are not talking about something completely unrelated.In this 
 paper\, I would like to consider a range of folk arguments for irrationali
 ty in this vein\, with the aim of figuring out- What their proponents mean
  by "rationality" and "irrationality."- If there is a way to construe "rat
 ionality" and "irrationality" such that these arguments are sound or at le
 ast make sense.- How the resulting construals relate to the "thin" normati
 ve notion that philosophers usually have in mind.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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