BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//wp-events-plugin.com//7.2.3.1//EN BEGIN:VEVENT UID:906@ub.edu DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20250508 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20250510 DTSTAMP:20250922T112841Z URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/barcelona-mental-content-works hop/ SUMMARY:Barcelona Mental Content Workshop DESCRIPTION:POSTERMAY 8Aula 20510:30&ndash\;11:40 &ndash\; Marc Artiga\, Un iversity of Valencia &ndash\; Deception\, computation\, and mental content .11:40&ndash\;11:50 &ndash\; Pause11:50&ndash\;13:00 &ndash\; Antonella Tr amacere\, Università\; degli Studi Roma Tre &ndash\; Does embodied c ognition change our understanding of the evolution of the mind?13:00&ndash \;15:00 &ndash\; Lunch15:00&ndash\;16:10 &ndash\; Krystyna Bielecka\, Univ ersity of Warsaw &ndash\; From Korsakoff confabulation to psychodynamic ps ychotherapy:  \;An error-based teleosemantic account of memory and aff ect.16:10&ndash\;16:20 &ndash\; Pause16:20&ndash\;17:30 &ndash\; Luc&iacut e\;a Gonzá\;lez Arias\, University of Barcelona &ndash\; Gluing the past back together: Episodic memory\, implicit attitudes\, and the accurac y framing problem.\nMAY 9Seminari de filosofia10:30&ndash\;11:40 &ndash\; Karl Bergman\, Uppsala University/University of Barcelona &ndash\; Do prop er functions constitute norms?11:40&ndash\;11:50 &ndash\; Pause11:50&ndash \;13:00 &ndash\; Stephen Mann\, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anth ropology\, Leipzig &ndash\; The benefits of structure.13:00&ndash\;15:00 & ndash\; LunchThe workshop was made possible thanks to the funding of the F aculty and Department of Philosophy of the University of Barcelona.ABSTRAC TSMarc Artiga &ndash\; Deception\, computation\, and mental contentN/A\nAn tonella Tramacere &ndash\; Does embodied cognition change our understandin g of the evolution of the mind?This talk explores how different theoretica l frameworks&mdash\;classical modular\, cultural\, and embodied&mdash\;acc ount for the evolution of content-oriented cognition\, using mindreading a s a case study. While classical views explain mental content through inter nal representations shaped by natural selection or cultural scaffolding\, embodied approaches challenge this assumption by emphasizing sensorimotor interaction and participatory engagement. I examine both the promises and limitations of these embodied views in accounting for the phylogenetic and developmental gradients of mindreading. The central argument is that if e mbodied cognition is to serve as a genuine alternative\, it must show how changes in bodily features give rise to flexible cognitive capacities&mdas h\;without reverting to modular assumptions.\nKrystyna Bielecka &ndash\; F rom Korsakoff confabulation to psychodynamic psychotherapy:  \;An erro r-based teleosemantic account of memory and affectThis talk develops a sin gle explanatory spine that runs from severe episodic-memory pathology to e veryday psychotherapeutic change. The spine is an error-based teleosemanti c model in which representations are produced\, stored and consumed only w ithin systems that possess a live capacity for error detection.  \;I b egin with Korsakoff&rsquo\;s syndrome.  \;In these patients the intern al &ldquo\;evaluation consumer&rdquo\; that normally cross-checks retrieve d memories against other cues is physiologically damaged.  \;Because t he comparator is missing\, mnemonic outputs cannot be flagged as inaccurat e\; the result is the familiar mixture of provoked and spontaneous confabu lations.  \;Although caregivers often supply corrective information\, their feedback rarely takes root&mdash\;there is no functional place insid e the patient where the correction can be evaluated and learned.The second half of the talk exports the very same producer / channel / consumer arch itecture to psychotherapy and augments it with an affective track.  \; Drawing on container&ndash\;contained theory\, I show that the therapist t emporarily assumes the role of an external Evaluation-plus-Regulation Cons umer for both channels.  \;Cycles of projective identification\, inter pretation and return create a distributed feedback loop: raw affect and di storted memories are &ldquo\;metabolised&rdquo\; by the therapist and re-p resented in forms the patient can gradually internalise.  \;Over the c ourse of treatment\, the patient rebuilds their own comparators\, restorin g triangulation among multiple information sources and re-coupling truth-t racking with affect regulation.\nLucí\;a Gonzá\;lez Arias &nda sh\; Gluing the past back together: Episodic memory\, implicit attitudes\, and the accuracy framing problemErrors in episodic memory&mdash\;errors i n remembering past events&mdash\;are more the norm than the exception. Som e are trivial (e.g.\, remembering one&rsquo\;s first day of school as sunn ier than it was)\, but others can be serious (e.g.\, falsely remembering h aving turned off a gas valve). Among the serious cases are misrememberings influenced by implicit attitude (IA)\, such as racially biased distortion s of legally relevant facts\, even when these biases conflict with an agen t&rsquo\;s explicit\, egalitarian attitudes. Accommodating these memory er rors&mdash\;especially those implicating IAs&mdash\;challenges the two lea ding theories of remembering: Reliabilism (in particular its simulationist variants) and Causalism.A factive view of successful remembering treats a ny discrepancy between the memory and the original event as inaccuracy. In contrast\, constructivist theories acknowledge that some distortions &mda sh\;such as the aforementioned &lsquo\;relatively insignificant&rsquo\; on es&mdash\; do not compromise memory&rsquo\;s epistemic status. However\, c urrent constructivist theories\, either causalist or reliabilist\, fail to offer a principled criterion for distinguishing tolerable from problemati c distortions\, such as those arising from IAs. I call this theoretical im passe the Accuracy Framing Problem (AFP).In this paper\, I argue that this challenge arises from a deep tension between endorsing constructivism and maintaining a factive criterion of successful remembering&mdash\;one that naturally aligns with content preservationism. This tension underwrites t he AFP.To resolve the AFP\, I propose a revised causal theory of episodic memory&mdash\;the 3C model&mdash\;which supplements the standard Causal co ndition with two additional requirements: Correspondence and Coherence. Ac cording to the Correspondence condition\, the core elements of a memory mu st match those of the original experience. The Coherence condition require s that the non-core elements are reconstructed in a way that maximises the probability of matching the original event by drawing on statistically gr ounded cognitive heuristics. &lsquo\;Core&rsquo\; elements are identified not only through empirical investigation but also via pragmatic relevance: different contexts may impose distinct task-sensitive criteria for what c ounts as core.This framework preserves the virtues of causalism while refi ning the notion of accuracy in episodic memory. It also offers a novel def ence of memory traces as necessary bearers of core content (content preser vers)\, anchoring reconstruction and guiding successful remembering. By ar ticulating a principled way to distinguish acceptable from distorting memo ry errors\, the 3C model advances our understanding of memory&rsquo\;s epi stemic function and its vulnerability to IAs.\nKarl Bergman &ndash\; Do pr oper functions constitute norms?Proper functions seem to constitute norms\ , of a kind. To say of the heart that it has the function to pump blood is \, it seems\, ipso facto to say that it is supposed to pump blood\, or tha t it ought to pump blood\, or that a heart that fails to pump blood is a b ad heart. Within teleosemantics\, this putative normativity of proper func tions has been considered key to understanding the would-be normativity of mental content. However\, not everyone is willing to grant that these put ative norms are norms in anything but a deflationary\, insubstantial\, or metaphorical sense. This situation motivates a thorough\, systematic effor t to address the titular question\, which is what I attempt in this paper. I construct a conceptual framework within which the question can be fruit fully addressed and the various possible ways of making it precise duly di stinguished\; all with an aim to single out those interpretations of the q uestion\, if any\,  \;that render an affirmative answer both defensibl e and interesting.\nStephen Mann &ndash\; The benefits of structureSeveral authors have noted that structural isomorphism seems to provide benefits in terms of the efficiency of storing\, processing\, learning or updating representations. Here I canvas several routes to formally capturing these intuitive benefits. I suggest ways in which computational complexity and a lgorithmic complexity can and cannot be used to demonstrate the benefits o f structure\, and I argue that the relationship between structural represe ntation and analog computation is less direct than has been supposed.\n CATEGORIES:Conferences LOCATION:UB (Barcelona) X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100 ;X-TITLE=UB (Barcelona):geo:0,0 END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR