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UID:216@ub.edu
DTSTART:20140428T130000Z
DTEND:20140428T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T094552Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/belief-is-weak/
SUMMARY:Belief is Weak
DESCRIPTION:extra session (with John Hawthorne and Daniel Rothschild) &nbsp
 \;The paper argues against two views about belief: a. entitlement  equalit
 y&mdash\;standards for assertion are the same as those for belief. b. a be
 lief  knowledge norm&mdash\;one ought to believe that p only if one knows 
 that p. Three  arguments are offered showing that our ordinary notion of b
 elief is too weak\,  perhaps much too weak\, to serve as a standard for as
 sertion and too weak for  being governed by a knowledge norm. What emerges
  from these arguments is a  notion of belief that is rational even when do
 ubted\, closer to a Bayesian view  about belief than might have been expec
 ted\, and shares properties that are  standardly associated with partial (
 or graded) belief. An account outline of  belief that originates from the 
 arguments will be sketched: Believing that p is  similar to thinking p lik
 ely.  &nbsp\;
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Room 411
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Room 411:geo:0,0
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