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UID:640@ub.edu
DTSTART:20240619T130000Z
DTEND:20240619T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T195340Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/commitment-deniability-and-ind
 irectness/
SUMMARY:Commitment\, deniability\, and indirectness
DESCRIPTION:In recent years\, there has been an explosion of interest incom
 municative deniability. According to a common characterisation\, deniabili
 ty pertains to indirect speech. On this view\, you only undertake commitme
 nts to the propositions that you explicitly communicate. Indirect communic
 ation\, by contrast\, is non-committal: content that is communicated indir
 ectly does not go on the public scoreboard\, allowing communicators to ret
 ain plausible deniability.I&rsquo\;ll argue that\, albeit elegant\, this v
 iew is incorrect. The reason is that indirectness is neither sufficient no
 r necessary for achieving deniability: some indirect statements are not de
 niable\, and direct statements are often deniable. Additionally\, there&rs
 quo\;s empirical evidence that speakers are often held accountable for wha
 t they indirectly communicate\, and philosophical work showing that some l
 iteral assertions are non-committal. After challenging the traditional vie
 w\, I will present an alternative picture of how commitment\, directness\,
  and deniability relate to each other. I&rsquo\;ll suggest that deniabilit
 y isgrounded in &ldquo\;ambiguity&rdquo\; (broadly conceived) instead of d
 irectness\, and that it is best modelled as a conversationalstrategy to mi
 nimise the risks of incurring the reputational costs associated with one&r
 squo\;s commitments\, rather than as a sign that those commitments are abs
 ent.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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