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UID:528@ub.edu
DTSTART:20170315T130000Z
DTEND:20170315T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T195200Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/disjunctivism-and-the-time-lag
 -problem/
SUMMARY:Disjunctivism and the Time Lag Problem
DESCRIPTION:                 Direct realism is the thesis that in veridical
  cases we directly experience external material objects\, without the medi
 ation of either sense-data or adverbial contents. A well-known argument ag
 ainst direct realism\, originally developed by Bertrand Russell\, is the t
 ime lag argument\, i.e. the argument stressing that light travels at a fin
 ite speed and a time separation exists between the act of perceiving and t
 he object of perception. As Russell expressed himself\, the argument &ldqu
 o\;affords a fresh illustration of the necessity of distinguishing between
  sense-data and physical objects&rdquo\;. Direct realists\, however\, have
  traditionally rejected the time lag argument simply by replying that we c
 an directly visually perceive into the past.  I show that such reply origi
 nates a serious threat to direct realism as well as to the disjunctive the
 ory of perception &ndash\; a philosophical position which is commonly take
 n as a vindication of direct realism. As a consequence of their conceding 
 that we can directly visually perceive into the past\, direct realists see
 m forced to accept the untenable claim that there are some events counting
  as both perceptions and hallucinations.  One of the most reasonable react
 ions available to direct realists is trying to offer a definition of hallu
 cination capable to preempt this conclusion. I examine some promising atte
 mpts and explain why they are all doomed to failure.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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