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UID:2218@ub.edu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20261014T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20261014T170000
DTSTAMP:20261001T093601Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/epistemic-continuum/
SUMMARY:The Epistemic Continuum
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: How are epistemic goods like knowledge\, justificatio
 n\, and certainty connected? I argue that these epistemic goods can be und
 erstood in terms of one notion: the possibility of error. One knows a true
  proposition p iff given the way in which one believes that p the possibil
 ity of believing falsely is sufficiently slim. One’s belief is justified
  iff given the way in which one believes the possibility that one ends up 
 knowing is sufficiently high. The degree to which one’s belief is justif
 ied is a function of how possible it is that one’s way of believing yiel
 ds knowledge. Finally\, one is epistemically certain that p iff there is n
 o possibility that one ends up ignorant given the way in which one is psyc
 hologically certain that p is the case.\n\nThis framework places knowledge
 \, justification\, and certainty on a continuum and vindicates several ind
 ependently plausible connections between them\, while also giving rise to 
 new interesting results. For instance\, the view entails that epistemic ce
 rtainty entails both knowledge and a maximal degree of justification. It p
 redicts that knowledge doesn’t entail justification\, thus supporting th
 e existence of unreasonable knowledge (Lasonen 2010\; Williamson 2014). Th
 e view entails that the KK-principle is invalid for knowledge\, but that a
  suitably formulated positive introspection principle is valid for certain
 ty. This provides a rationale for an error-theory regarding arguments for 
 the KK-principle\; some of those who argue for the KK-principle have mixed
  up knowledge and certainty. I demonstrate how Dorst’s (2019) argument f
 or the KK-principle can be dismantled by the proposed framework.\n\nAfter 
 laying out some of the extensional and structural properties of knowledge\
 , justification\, and certainty I turn to examine the normative roles of t
 hese epistemic goods. I argue that each of these goods can be identified w
 ith a central normative notion. Knowledge provides the evaluative standard
  of success in the epistemic domain. Thus beliefs which fail to amount to 
 knowledge are bad\, but we cannot necessarily criticize those who end up i
 gnorant. Justification is the central epistemic norm of belief. By violati
 ng a norm one merits personal criticism unless one is excused or exempted 
 from complying with the norm. In the case of violating an epistemic norm t
 his criticism will manifest as a distinctly epistemic response (Kauppinen 
 2018). Finally\, epistemic certainty is the epistemic ideal. Epistemic cer
 tainty is epistemic perfection attainable by creatures such as us with res
 pect to particular propositions. While it is interesting in its own right 
 to figure out what the epistemic ideal is because some of us might hope to
  achieve it in certain domains\, an account of the epistemic ideal will al
 so shed light on normative questions regarding ordinary thinkers. How clos
 e to the ideal can we reasonably expect others to get informs when beliefs
  are justified (Pasnau 2013). Our tolerance to the possibility of ignoranc
 e depends on our expectations of how close we can get to the ideal.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor)
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 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor):ge
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TZID:Europe/Madrid
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DTSTART:20260329T030000
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