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UID:286@ub.edu
DTSTART:20201014T130000Z
DTEND:20201014T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T094641Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/excusable-moral-doubt/
SUMMARY:Excusable moral doubt
DESCRIPTION:Agents are often uncertain about the moral status of their acti
 ons. Can such moral uncertainty excuse an agent for failing to choose the 
 option that is morally best among the alternatives available? A possible v
 iew is that moral uncertainty never exculpates because it always reveals a
  lack of concern for morally significant considerations (Harman 2011\, 201
 5\; &Aacute\;lvarez and Littlejohn 2016\; also Weatherson 2019). Against t
 his view\, I will argue that\, even if we grant that moral facts are knowa
 ble a priori\, there are situations of moral uncertainty where a competent
 \, fully informed agent may fail to do what is morally best in a way that 
 does not manifest disregard for what is morally valuable. More specificall
 y\, I will consider situations of misleading moral self-doubt\, in which t
 he agent has (higher-order) evidence making her reasonably doubt whether s
 he is being properly sensitive to a relevant moral concern. My claim is th
 at this type of misleading self-doubt may undermine the agent&rsquo\;s acc
 ess to otherwise available reasons (I call this *dispossessing defeat*). F
 ailing to respond to such inaccessible reasons does not manifest a lack of
  regard for morally relevant considerations.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Online
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 ;X-TITLE=Online:geo:0,0
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