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UID:514@ub.edu
DTSTART:20160504T130000Z
DTEND:20160504T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T195159Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/expressivism-and-stipulation/
SUMMARY:Expressivism and Stipulation
DESCRIPTION:               Expressivism about some fragment of language (de
 ontic sentences\, epistemic modal sentences\, etc.) is standardly characte
 rized as the thesis that the semantic properties of the target sentences a
 nd the relations among them (like truth\, inconsistency\, validity\, etc.)
  are to be explained in terms of properties of the mental attitudes that a
 re conventionally expressed by uses of these sentences\, rather than in te
 rms of their contents or truth-conditions (Schroeder 2008\; Silk 2014). It
  is often claimed that by so doing\, i.e. by reversing the classical order
  of explanation\, expressivists face explanatory challenges that are inste
 ad avoided by cognitivists\, and that are only met by stipulating that the
  relevant attitudes (e.g. the ones associated with accepting the sentences
  &#39\;&#39\;gambling is wrong&#39\;&#39\; and &#39\;&#39\;gambling is not
  wrong&#39\;&#39\;) have the properties that the semantic formalism repres
 ents them as having (e.g. by assigning two disjoint sets of &#39\;&#39\;hy
 perplans&#39\;&#39\; to the two sentences). In this talk\, I examine vario
 us&nbsp\;specifications of what it means\, in general\, to &#39\;&#39\;exp
 lain the inconsistency of S and not-S&#39\;&#39\;. I argue that these spec
 ifications are either question-begging against the expressivist\, or are s
 uch that\, presumably\, standard cognitivist explanations are no less stip
 ulative than expressivist ones.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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