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UID:1804@ub.edu
DTSTART:20220124T130000Z
DTEND:20220124T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250928T160320Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/fourth-session/
SUMMARY:Fourth Session
DESCRIPTION:The authors join us for a brief presentation of the paper and d
 iscussionWe develop a novel solution to the negation version of the Frege-
 Geach problem by taking up recent insights from the bilateral programme in
  logic. Bilateralists derive the meaning of negation from a primitive *B-t
 ype* inconsistency involving the attitudes of assent and dissent. Some may
  demand an explanation of this inconsistency in simpler terms\, but we arg
 ue that bilateralism&rsquo\;s assumptions are no less explanatory than tho
 se of *A-type* semantics that only require a single primitive attitude\, b
 ut must stipulate inconsistency elsewhere. Based on these insights\, we de
 velop a version of B-type expressivism called *inferential expressivism*. 
 This is a novel semantic framework that characterises meanings by inferent
 ial roles that define which *attitudes* one can *infer* from the use of te
 rms. We apply this framework to normative vocabulary\, thereby solving the
  Frege-Geach problem generally and comprehensively. Our account moreover i
 ncludes a semantics for epistemic modals\, thereby also explaining normati
 ve terms under epistemic modals.Luca Incurvati &amp\; Julian J. Schl&ouml\
 ;der\, &ldquo\;Inferential expressivism and the negation problem&rdquo\;\,
  Oxford Studies in Metaethics 16
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