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UID:230@ub.edu
DTSTART:20150513T130000Z
DTEND:20150513T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T094554Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/frege-on-abstraction/
SUMMARY:Frege on Abstraction
DESCRIPTION:One approach to explaining our knowledge of\, and our ability t
 o refer to abstract objects is to explain that knowledge and referential a
 bility as arising out of &nbsp\;our grasp of &ldquo\;abstraction principle
 s\,&rdquo\; principles which explain the identity conditions of those abst
 ract objects in terms of some conditions with which we are antecedently fa
 miliar. &nbsp\;This is the neo-logicist strategy for cardinal numbers\, ac
 cording to which we understand cardinal numbers by understanding identity-
 statements concerning them\, and we understand these in turn by understand
 ing their equivalence with statements about 1-1 mappings.&nbsp\;Frege seem
 s to have considered just such a strategy\, and to have rejected it. The g
 oal of this talk is to clarify Frege&rsquo\;s conception of abstract objec
 ts\, and to shed some light on its viability\, by examining that (apparent
 ) rejection. I will argue that Frege&rsquo\;s reasons for rejecting the no
 w-popular abstractionist strategy are not what they are standardly taken t
 o be\, and that the realism about numbers that emerges from Frege&rsquo\;s
  work is a more nuanced and plausible\, if somewhat more tangled\, view th
 an is the robustly Platonist one commonly attributed to him.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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