BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//wp-events-plugin.com//7.4.0.1//EN
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:557@ub.edu
DTSTART:20181017T130000Z
DTEND:20181017T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T195258Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/freges-criterion-in-context/
SUMMARY:Frege’s Criterion in Context
DESCRIPTION:In the recent literature on the first person\, it has been sugg
 ested that thoughts expressed in ordinary &lsquo\;I&rsquo\;/&lsquo\;you&rs
 quo\;-exchanges may be the same while holding on to Frege&rsquo\;s Criteri
 on for the distinctness of thought. In this brief piece\, I argue that thi
 s compatibility claim can only be sustained at the price of relativising t
 he result of Frege&rsquo\;s Criterion to contexts in ways that render it u
 nprincipled or idle for the discrimination of thought. This is so in spite
  of the fact that the application of Frege&rsquo\;s Criterion is uncontrov
 ersially relativised to subjects in a context or time. The result bears on
  any approach committed to interpersonal shareability of first person thou
 ght and on any account willing to contextualise the notion of &lsquo\;same
  thought&rsquo\; as delivered by Frege&rsquo\;s Criterion. It does not its
 elf\, however\, threaten the individuation of thought expressible with ind
 exicals at the level of cognitive significance.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR