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UID:247@ub.edu
DTSTART:20170201T130000Z
DTEND:20170201T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T094556Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/grasping-concepts-incompletely
 /
SUMMARY:Grasping Concepts Incompletely
DESCRIPTION:               Content externalism is committed to the claim th
 at concept-possession is a matter of degree. This means it is possible for
  a subject to grasp a concept incompletely\,&nbsp\;and possible for one su
 bject to grasp a given concept more fully than another subject grasps that
  concept. This in turn implies a distinction between a subject&#39\;s thou
 ghts\, on the one hand\, and her states of mind\, on the other. In this ta
 lk\, I will use the fact that concepts can be grasped incompletely to grou
 nd a model of self-knowledge. On the model I provide\, conscious thought p
 rovides reasons for self-ascriptions\, but those reasons are defeasible pr
 ecisely because of the disinction between thoughts and states of mind. The
  model&nbsp\;does justice to the authority and knowledgeable status of sel
 f-ascriptions while also acknowledging their potential defeat by evidence 
 from others.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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