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UID:323@ub.edu
DTSTART:20221019T130000Z
DTEND:20221019T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T094738Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/grounding-physicalism-and-the-
 knowledge-argument/
SUMMARY:Grounding physicalism and the knowledge argument
DESCRIPTION:The knowledge argument is one of several major arguments agains
 t physicalism - construed here as the thesis that all facts are physical f
 acts. It turns on two main premises: (1) that in her black and white room\
 , Mary could know all of the physical facts\, but that (2) upon seeing red
  for the first time\, Mary would learn a new fact. Together\, the claims i
 mply that Mary learns a new non-physical fact and hence that physicalism i
 s false. While there is much disagreement in the literature about the Mary
  argument\, commentators tend to agree that physicalists must accept (1) a
 nd push back by denying (2). This paper\, however\, explores the options f
 or denying (2) within a physicalist framework. In particular\, the paper e
 xplores this option within the framework of a form of physicalism cast in 
 terms of metaphysical grounding.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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