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UID:581@ub.edu
DTSTART:20200122T130000Z
DTEND:20200122T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T195300Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/imperative-transparency/
SUMMARY:Imperative Transparency
DESCRIPTION:Imperativism (Klein 2007\, 2015\; Mart&iacute\;nez 2011\, 2015)
  is the view that pain and other affective phenomenology depends on the *i
 mperative content* of certain brain vehicles. Imperative content offers ni
 ce solutions to a few pressing problems for intentionalism about pain. Bes
 t of all\, imperative content comes for free with all of our best metasema
 ntic theories. I\, in particular\, defend a version of *first-order impera
 tivism [FOI]*\, where the imperative contents relevant to fixing the painf
 ulness of a state have the subject&#39\;s body as their main subject matte
 r\, perhaps along the lines of *See to it that bodily disturbance D does n
 ot exist!*.&nbsp\; &nbsp\;In this paper I respond to one of the main worri
 es recently presented by (Barlassina &amp\; Hayward 2019) about FOI: that 
 it cannot account for the &quot\;intrinsic reflexive motivational force&qu
 ot\; (*op. cit*\, p. 5) of pain. I am going to agree with them: indeed FOI
  cannot account for this. But this is because pain does not have intrinsic
  reflexive motivational force. Or so I will argue. More precisely I will d
 efend two claims:&nbsp\; &nbsp\;1.&nbsp\; Pain has intrinsic motivational 
 force\, but it is body-directed. 2.&nbsp\; Pain also has reflexive motivat
 ional force\, but this one is extrinsic.&nbsp\; &nbsp\;Finally\, I argue t
 hat\, if I am right about the above\, it&#39\;s good that I am\, since the
  &quot\;reflexive imperativism&quot\; defended by Barlassina and Hayward h
 as a complicated relationship with its naturalistic ambitions: it is uncle
 ar how a naturalistic metasemantics for reflexive contents is supposed to 
 work.&nbsp\; &nbsp\;References&nbsp\; &nbsp\;Barlassina\, L &amp\; Hayward
 \, MK  2019\, &#39\;More of me! Less  of me!: Reflexive imperativism about
  affective  phenomenal character&#39\;\,  *Mind*.&nbsp\; Klein\, C 2007\, 
 &#39\;An Imperative Theory of Pain&#39\;\, *The Journal of  Philosophy*\, 
 vol. 104\, pp. 517--532.&nbsp\; Klein\, C 2015\, *What the body  commands:
  The imperative theory of pain*\, MIT Press.&nbsp\; Mart&iacute\;nez\,  M 
 2011\,  &#39\;Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain&#39\;\,  *Phe
 nomenology and the  Cognitive Sciences*\, vol. 10\, no. 1\, pp.  67--90.&n
 bsp\; Mart&iacute\;nez\, M 2015\,  &#39\;Pains as reasons&#39\;\, *Philoso
 phical Studies*\, vol. 172\, no. 9\, pp.  2261--2274.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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