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UID:566@ub.edu
DTSTART:20190313T130000Z
DTEND:20190313T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T195258Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/introspective-knowledge-by-acq
 uaintance/
SUMMARY:Introspective knowledge by acquaintance
DESCRIPTION:Introspective knowledge by acquaintance is (roughly) knowledge 
 we acquire just in virtue of being directly aware of our experiences. Diff
 erently from most contemporary acquaintance theorists\, and similarly to B
 ertrand Russell\, I think that knowledge by acquaintance is a sui generis 
 kind of knowledge: it cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge. In thi
 s talk I argue that\, although not propositional\, knowledge by acquaintan
 ce is nonetheless epistemically significant. My argument consists in isola
 ting a mark of epistemic significance\, namely information acquisition\, a
 nd showing that introspective knowledge by acquaintance displays it&mdash\
 ;it involves acquisition of information about the phenomenology of the int
 rospected experience. Along the way I also argue that knowledge by introsp
 ective acquaintance has a special epistemic property\, what I call complet
 e and perfect grasp&mdash\;an epistemic property that\, in a sense\, is an
 alogous to an epistemic property that has traditionally been attributed to
  some introspective propositional knowledge\, namely\, infallibility. I co
 nclude that there are good reasons for thinking that knowledge by acquaint
 ance is epistemically significant.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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