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UID:546@ub.edu
DTSTART:20180110T130000Z
DTEND:20180110T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T195256Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/invalidities/
SUMMARY:Invalidities
DESCRIPTION:There are many ways of understanding what it is for an argument
  to be valid. Although we usually identify the concept of validity with (c
 lassical first-order) logical validity and\, in turn\, we typically take t
 his to capture the notion of necessary preservation of truth in virtue of 
 logical form (or\, at least\, something very close to that)\, this is just
  one way in which validity can be explained. There are situations where th
 is notion is too restrictive and\, so\, not very useful. One particularly 
 broad understanding of the notion of validity that has received quite a bi
 t of attention recently is based on the idea that a sentence A implies a s
 entence B if\, and only if\, accepting A is incoherent with rejecting B. T
 hat is\, the argument from A to B is said to be valid only if any agent th
 at accepts A and rejects B is doing something wrong. The main claim of the
  paper will be that\, under this understanding of the notion of validity\,
  all the usual reasons to privilege a treatment of validities over a treat
 ment of invalidities vanish. So\, one interesting consequence of understan
 ding validity in this way that has been\, to the best of my knowledge\, ov
 erlooked in the literature is that validity and invalidity are on a par\, 
 which means that there is no reason to treat validities primitively and to
  define invalidities in terms of them.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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