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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:659@ub.edu
DTSTART:20250507T130000Z
DTEND:20250507T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T195342Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/is-lying-prima-facie-morally-w
 rong/
SUMMARY:Is lying prima facie morally wrong?
DESCRIPTION:Bernard Williams (2002) and Jennifer Saul (2012) have argued th
 at lying isn&rsquo\;t necessarily morally worse than misleading. Their arg
 uments focus primarily on general effects of utterances -- the effects of 
 misleading acts can be as bad\, or worse\, as the effects of lies. In cont
 rast\, Viebahn (2022\, MS) has argued that lying and misleading differ in 
 terms of the communicative commitments and responsibility of the speaker\,
  but that these commitments relate to essentially non-moral norms. Viebahn
  (MS) draws from Kauppinen&rsquo\;s (2018) discussion of kinds of normativ
 ity and applies it to constative speech acts to argue that the difference 
 in commitment between lying and misleading is a difference in non-moral re
 sponsibility. I will argue that lying is (or may be) prima facie morally w
 rong. Misleading acts are not\, whatever their effects and whatever other 
 communicative responsibilities one may have. I will give reasons for moral
  accountability not to be excluded from practices bound by epistemic norms
 \, such as constative speech acts like giving testimony\, telling\, or fla
 t out asserting.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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