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UID:241@ub.edu
DTSTART:20160608T130000Z
DTEND:20160608T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T094556Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/knowledge-less-metaphysical-mo
 re-forensic/
SUMMARY:Knowledge: Less Metaphysical\, More Forensic
DESCRIPTION:               Abstract: Relevant Alternatives Theory is a natu
 ral account of knowledge\, but it faces the problem of saying what makes a
 n alternative relevant in any particular case. One promising idea is that 
 a reasonable person standard (RPS) supplies the needed specification of re
 levance. But just what standard is invoked by the RPS exactly? Examination
  of the use of the RPS in the law allows us to reflect on the conceptual r
 ole and features of a RPS. Importantly\, in the law\, use of the RPS raise
 s a dilemma: Is RPS a substantive standard\, incorporating specific ideas 
 about justification\, or an &ldquo\;open&rdquo\; standard? If more open\, 
 then the standard creates uncertainty for disputants\; if more substantive
 \, then the standard proves less responsive to novel situations. A similar
  dilemma faces us in applying the RP as a standard of relevance. I argue t
 hat the best characterization of RPS in epistemic setting is an open stand
 ard. So the dilemma forces us to confront hermeneutical issues raised by i
 nvoking a RPS. Several upshots concerning disagreement are discussed.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Room 410
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