BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//wp-events-plugin.com//7.4.0.1//EN BEGIN:VEVENT UID:820@ub.edu DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20180903 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20180905 DTSTAMP:20250922T112704Z URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/language-and-reality-themes-fr om-michael-devitt/ SUMMARY:Language and Reality. Themes from Michael Devitt DESCRIPTION:Barcelona 3-4 September 2018Seminari de Filosofia 4th floor Mon talegre 6\, BarcelonaProgramSeptember 3rd 10-11.15 \; \; \;&nb sp\; \; \; \; \; Stathis Psillos \; (U. of Athens\, Gr eece): Against Verificationist Realism11.45-13 \; \; \; \;  \; \; \; \; Ana Maria Creț\;u (U. of  \;Edinburgh ): Can Multiple Grounding Fix Psillos&rsquo\; Causal Descriptivism?15.15-1 6.30 \; \; \; Ví\;ctor Verdejo (U. of Barcelona): Ways o f Thinking and Reference Determination16.45-18 \; \; \; \;  \; \; \; \; Edouard Machery (U. of Pittsburgh): Experimen tal Semantics at 15Conference dinnerSeptember 4th10-11.15 \; \;&nb sp\; \; \; \; \; \; Asa Wikforss: &ldquo\;Why the Qua- problem is a Serious Problem&rdquo\; 11.45-13 \; \; \; \;& nbsp\; \; \; \; Carl Hoefer (ICREA/UB) &\; Genoveva Mart&ia cute\; (ICREA/UB): Selective Scientific Realism  \; \; \;  \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;&n bsp\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; and Reference to Th eoretical Unobservables 15.15-16.30 \; \; \; Andrea Bianchi (U. of Parma): Reference and Causal Chains16.45-18 \; \; \;&n bsp\; \; \; \; \; Michael Devitt (CUNY): No Place for Inte ntions in Speaker MeaningOrganizers: Genoveva Martí\;\, José\; Martí\;nez-Ferná\;ndez and Iñ\;igo ValeroSponsors: MINE CO (FFI2015-70707-P)\, Logos\, Departament de Filosofia (UB) Facultat de F ilosofia (UB).Attendance is free\, but please send a message to gmarti@ub. edu if you plan to attend. AbstractsAndrea Bianchi: &ldquo\;Reference and Causal Chains&rdquo\;Around 1970\, both Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke pr oduced powerful arguments against description theories of proper names. Th ey also offered sketches of positive accounts of proper name reference\, h ighlighting the crucial role played by worldly historical facts that may b e unknown to the speaker. Building on these sketches\, in the following ye ars Michael Devitt elaborated his well-known causal theory of reference. A s I have argued elsewhere\, however\, contrary to what is commonly assumed Donnellan&rsquo\;s and Kripke&rsquo\;s sketches point in two rather diffe rent directions\, by appealing to historical or causal facts of different sorts. In this paper\, I shall discuss and criticize Devitt&rsquo\;s causa l theory\, which messes up things\, I&rsquo\;ll argue\, by mixing\, so to speak\, Donnellan&rsquo\;s and Kripke&rsquo\;s sketches.Ana Maria Creț \;u: &ldquo\;Can Multiple Grounding Fix Psillos&rsquo\; Causal Descriptivi sm?&rdquo\;Psillos (1999\, 2012) puts forward a theory of reference that c an provide grounds for the realist&rsquo\;s claim that there is stability and continuity of reference of natural kind terms through theory change. P sillos&rsquo\; causal descriptivism combines causal and descriptive elemen ts to ensure successful mechanisms of both reference fixing and reference transmission. Drawing on an historical case study of particle identificati on\, in particular the identification of the positron\, I argue that Psill os&rsquo\; theory fails to account for at least some cases of reference-fi xing in science. I will then investigate the extent to which causal descri ptivism might benefit from Devittian multiple grounding to overcome the ch allenges posed by the aforementioned historical case study. \;Ví \;ctor Verdejo: "Ways of Thinking and Reference Determination" Reflectio n on the use of indexicals and other terms reveals that\, in some cases\, different ways of thinking of a reference need not involve a difference in thought. This point tells against Fregean views that assume a one-to-one correspondence between way of thinking and thought. One should not rush to conclude\, however\, that thought is individuated in purely causal or ref erential terms. I suggest rather that\, in order to deal with such cases\, we enrich the Fregean picture with the postulation of complex senses whic h comprise a number of ways of thinking that inform but do not determine a reference.Michael Devitt: &ldquo\;No Place for Intentions in Speaker Mean ing&rdquo\;The paper rejects two popular appeals to intentions in theorizi ng about speaker meaning. (A) In virtue of what does a speaker using a nam e or demonstrative refer to x? A popular answer is: because he intends to refer to x. I have four objections. (1) This answer\, unlike another popul ar one &ndash\; because he has x in mind &ndash\; is too intellectualized to be even a good starting point. (2) It is theoretically incomplete: In v irtue of what did the speaker intend to refer to x? (3) Once completed it is redundant. (4) It is misleading. (B) What explains the speaker meaning of a sentential utterance? A central idea of Gricean &ldquo\;intention-bas ed semantics&rdquo\; is that this meaning is constituted by the speaker&rs quo\;s intention to communicate a certain content to an audience. I follow Chomsky\, in thinking that &ldquo\;under innumerable quite normal circums tances&hellip\;people mean what they say or write\, but there is no intent to bring the audience&hellip\;to have certain beliefs or to undertake cer tain actions.&rdquo\; The basic act of speaker meaning is one of expressin g a thought. There is no theoretical motivation for the stronger requireme nt that the speaker be intending to communicate that thought to an audienc e. Carl Hoefer &\; Genoveva Martí\;: &ldquo\;Selective Scientific Realism and Reference to Theoretical Unobservables&rdquo\;Although a real ist stance toward fundamental physics is not yet warranted in general\, re alism about some of the entities and kinds postulated by current quantum p hysics is \;already justified. In many cases\, these are entities &mda sh\; such as protons and electrons &mdash\; that have remained in the onto logy of physics across one or more revolutionary overhaul of the theoretic al picture of the micro-world\, with clear referential continuity.  \; We will discuss what grounds belief in these entities that we consider are &ldquo\;here to stay&rdquo\;\, and how reference to these kinds works\; t hen we will discuss whether the conditions for such referential stability are already met for more recent theoretical entities\, such as black holes \, the Higgs boson\, and [various sorts of] &ldquo\;dark matter&rdquo\;.Ed ouard Machery: &ldquo\;Experimental Semantics at 15&rdquo\;In this talk I will discuss the 15 years long debate about the promises and limits of exp erimental semantics as well as Michael Devitt&rsquo\;s central role in it.  \;Stathis Psillos: &ldquo\;Against Verificationist Realism&rdquo\;&nb sp\;Michael Devitt has argued that scientific realism is a metaphysical th esis asserting the mind-independence of the world\, without the concept of truth appearing at all (nor being implicated) in it. More specifically\, he has claimed that qua metaphyiscal thesis\, scientific realism states th at tokens of most commonsense\, and scientific\, physical types objectivel y exist independently of the mental. Though I do not disagree with either the existence or the independence dimensions of realism\, I doubt that the latter can be adequately captured without commitment to a non-epistemic c onception of truth. In this talk\, I will argue that verificationist versi ons of realism might well allow for the existence dimension though they co mpromise the independence dimension. To block verificationist realism\, a broader conception of mind-independence is required\, and in particular on e that allows for a divergence between what exists in the world and what i s licenced as existing by (even an ideal) verificationist procedures and m ethods.Asa Wikforss: &ldquo\;Why the Qua-problem is a Serious Problem&rdqu o\;Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny have posed a challenge to the Kripkean idea that natural kind terms have their meaning fixed through a type of os tensive definition\, along the lines of proper names. The challenge derive s from the difference between individuals and kinds. An individual object instantiates any number of kinds\, including any number of natural kinds. How\, then\, can pointing to the samples serve to fix the term to the rele vant kind? This familiar problem is often called the qua problem (Devitt & amp\; Sterelny 1987). In response\, Devitt and Sterelny appeal to the psyc hological element in reference-fixing. They suggest that something about t he mental state of the speaker helps determine what is the relevant nature of the sample. In the talk I will have a closer look at the problem\, as well as some suggested solutions to it\, including Devitt and Sterelny&rsq uo\;s own. I shall argue that the qua problem poses a more serious challen ge than has generally been recognized\, both to the Kripkean account of na tural kind terms\, and to the standard idea that this account extends to m ental content.\n CATEGORIES:Conferences LOCATION:Barcelona X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100 ;X-TITLE=Barcelona:geo:0,0 END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR