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UID:499@ub.edu
DTSTART:20150617T130000Z
DTEND:20150617T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T195157Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/lying-and-asserting/
SUMMARY:Lying and asserting
DESCRIPTION:A number of philosophers have tried to define lying. According 
 to the &lsquo\;traditional definition&rsquo\;\, the speaker must state wha
 t he believes to be false\, with the intention to deceive the hearer. Rece
 ntly\, a growing number of authors have disputed this definition\, claimin
 g that it is sufficient that the speaker assert what he believes to be fal
 se. This paper endorses this alternative view\, and adopts a speech-act th
 eoretic account of assertion to define lying.The first part of the paper p
 resents the &lsquo\;traditional definition&rsquo\;\, and summarises the mo
 st compelling objections addressed to the &lsquo\;intention to deceive con
 dition&rsquo\; of this definition. The second part introduces the alternat
 ive &lsquo\;assertion-based&rsquo\; definitions of lying. These definition
 s require that the speaker genuinely assert the proposition. For these acc
 ounts\, the main challenge is to offer a satisfying characterisation of wh
 at counts as an assertion\; I will argue that the main proposals on the ma
 rket fail to fulfil this purpose. In the third part of the paper\, I adopt
  a speech-act theoretic account of assertion\; after considering some furt
 her problematic cases\, I conclude that it offers a more promising theoret
 ical background for analysing the concept of lying.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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