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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:584@ub.edu
DTSTART:20200513T130000Z
DTEND:20200513T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T195300Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/meaning-and-commitments/
SUMMARY:Meaning and Commitment(s)
DESCRIPTION:You ask: &ldquo\;Will you come to the cinema tonight?&rdquo\; I
  answer &quot\;I have to grade 50 exams&rdquo\; My answer (let&rsquo\;s ca
 ll it [1]) has the implicature that I will not come to the cinema tonight.
  In so implying\, I am committing myself to it being the case that I will 
 not come to the cinema tonight. If rather than [1]\, I had answered [2] &q
 uot\;No\, I will not come to the cinema tonight&quot\;\, I would also have
  committed myself to it being the case that I will not come to the cinema 
 tonight. Is my commitment to it being the case that I will not come to the
  cinema tonight stronger if I utter [2] than if I utter [1]? More generall
 y\, is one more committed to the truth of p\, if one asserts that p than i
 f one conversationally implicates that p? One might think that if the answ
 er to this question is &quot\;yes&quot\; one would have a basis for explai
 ning the (alleged) intuition that\, in general\, lying is worse than false
 ly implicating.&nbsp\; In this talk I will examine one argument (by Mazzar
 ela et al. 2018)\, based on empirical studies\, for the &ldquo\;yes&rdquo\
 ; answer to the question above\, and I will argue that it does not succeed
 . I will furthermore provide some reasons for thinking that we should rath
 er answer &ldquo\;no&rdquo\;. The alleged general moral distinction betwee
 n lying and falsely implicating should lie elsewhere.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Online
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Online:geo:0,0
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