BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//wp-events-plugin.com//7.2.3.1//EN BEGIN:VEVENT UID:918@ub.edu DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20250612 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20250613 DTSTAMP:20250922T112842Z URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/mini-workshop-on-implicit-atti tudes/ SUMMARY:Mini-workshop on Implicit Attitudes DESCRIPTION:Eric Mandelbaum (CUNY)Jules Holroyed (University of Sheffield)T ime: 15:00 - 17:00 hPlace: Barcelona\, UB\, Seminar Marí\;a Zambrano Jules Holroyd (University of Sheffield)Responsibly Navigating Social Pract icesIn a recent exciting contribution\, Cheshire Calhoun has developed an expanded picture of the morally responsible person. This picture focuses n ot only on the capacities needed to be accountable for violations of moral norms - as has been the focus of much  \;of the literature on moral r esponsibility. Rather\, Calhoun argues\, we ought to consider also what ca pacities are needed to be fluent operators in social practices\, in a way that enables others to form predictive expectations (what Calhoun calls &l squo\;compliance responsibility&rsquo\;). This picture helps us to see wha t is valuable about being a responsible person\; why it is a status that m atters to us.Our intervention focuses on Calhoun&rsquo\;s notion of compli ance responsibility\, and the questions of what capacities are involved in the navigation of social practices. Our contention is that what capacitie s are salient depends on the model of social practices we articulate\, and the features of those practices brought into view. We will survey three m odels of social practices and argue that each one brings different capacit ies into view. We argue that\, at least sometimes\, a model which brings a richer and more complex notion of practices\, and the corresponding set o f capacities into view\, is desirable. Our argument is intended as a const ructive supplement\, rather than a rival\, to Calhoun's picture. \;Eri c Mandelbaum (CUNY)The underintellectualization of everyday lifeMaximally simple models of the mind have dominated both empiricist and rationalist t heorizing. From behaviorism to associationism to Chomskian Minimalism to r esource rational Bayesianism\, simplicity assumptions have reigned. As a c onsequence\, philosophers and cognitive scientists have used simplicity as a guide to mental ontology\, especially those regarding mental structure and animal cognition. I offer a different perspective\, in which the impor tance of a task is linked to the multiplicity of ways of accomplishing tha t task: the more important the problem\, the more types of solutions evolu tion has created to solve it. Sometimes this is due to multiple mental mec hanisms aimed at similar contents\, and at others it's through redundant r epresentations of the same contents. This type of importance/redundancy vi ew leads to a much different picture of the mind\, one that casts light on the underintellectualization of everyday life. From low-level perception to insect cognition\, we should be inverting Morgan's canon\, and the defa ult assumption should be that even seemingly rote or foolish behavior is b acked by interesting complex computational/intentional machinery.\n CATEGORIES:Conferences LOCATION:Seminari María Zambrano (Faculty of Philosophy\, UB) X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100 ;X-TITLE=Seminari María Zambrano (Faculty of Philosophy\, UB):geo:0,0 END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR