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UID:2045@ub.edu
DTSTART:20210525T130000Z
DTEND:20210525T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250928T161912Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/normative-reference-as-a-norma
 tive-question/
SUMMARY:Normative reference as a normative question
DESCRIPTION:Camil Golub (U. Leeds) Normative naturalism holds that normativ
 e properties are identical with\, or reducible to\, natural properties. Va
 rious challenges to naturalism focus on whether it can make good on the id
 ea that normative concepts can be used in systematically different ways an
 d yet have the same reference in all contexts of use (see\, e.g.\, Horgan 
 &amp\; Timmons 1991\; Eklund 2017). In response to such challenges\, some 
 naturalists (e.g.\, Sayre-McCord 1997\, Copp 2000\, Brink 2001) have propo
 sed that questions about the reference of normative terms should be unders
 tood\, at least in part\, as normative questions that can be settled throu
 gh normative inquiry. In this paper I have two goals. First\, I argue that
  these naturalist proposals do not yet allow for radical disagreement on n
 ormative matters\, or at least do not explain how such disagreement is pos
 sible. Secondly\, I argue that\, in order to account for radical disagreem
 ent\, naturalists should not only treat normative reference as a normative
  issue but also adopt a non-representationalist account of normative conce
 pts\, on which such concepts are individuated through their practical role
 . I illustrate this point by showing how a view that combines naturalism a
 nd expressivism about normative discourse can vindicate the elasticity of 
 normative concepts\, their referential stability\, and the objectivity of 
 normative truths.
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
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