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UID:661@ub.edu
DTSTART:20241127T130000Z
DTEND:20241127T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T195342Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/objective-disagreement-and-per
 spectival-differences/
SUMMARY:Objective disagreement and perspectival differences
DESCRIPTION:Could rationality require you and I to disagree about something
  objective like the outcome of a coin toss even if\, knowing we're equally
  rational\, we have transmitted all of our relevant evidence to each other
  via communication (reaching a point where we have common knowledge that t
 here&rsquo\;s nothing informative left for any of us to say)? It would be 
 surprising if it could\, for that would entail a particularly revisionary 
 form of perspectivalism according to which some peers ought to agree to di
 sagree in their worldly credences just because\, as they would put it\, &l
 dquo\;I am I\, you are you&rdquo\;. Though most would be inclined to repud
 iate that type of perspectivalism\, I&rsquo\;ll develop an argument inspir
 ed by Robert Stalnaker's discussion of the Sleeping Beauty problem to argu
 e that one cannot both repudiate it and side with authors such as David Le
 wis who subscribe to the Halfer position on that case. By itself\, this am
 ounts to an exceptional\, and so far unaddressed\, challenge to a reputabl
 e philosophical view. But the implications of the argument extend beyond t
 his particular case. In particular\, it suggests that there's nothing esse
 ntially private or incommunicable about the epistemic import of the &lsquo
 \;I&rsquo\; and &lsquo\;now&rsquo\;.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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