Abstract: Recently, Loev (2022) presented a new account of the nature of philosophical intuitions as an alternative to doxasticism and perceptualism, two long-standing opposing views which have led to a stalemate in the debate on the nature of intuitions: affectivism. According to affectivism, intuitions are emotional experiences. Although it might initially look like a viable middle ground between doxasticism and perceptualism, this account raises significant concerns. Firstly, it crucially relies on the concept of valence, which remains an obscure notion in the literature, diminishing its supposed explanatory power. Secondly, given the gradeability feature of intuitions and assuming that valence has a bipolar dimensionality, as Loev seems to do, we are led to an undesirable consequence: predicting the potential existence of intuitions which assert indifference towards their content. Finally, while Loev’s affectivism implies that so-called positive intuitions and their counterparts feel different, we can easily find cases in which the purported phenomenological distinction between them is not present.
Activities > Seminar > On the nature of philosophical intuitions
