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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:258@ub.edu
DTSTART:20180221T130000Z
DTEND:20180221T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T094557Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/perspectives-models-and-modal-
 knowledge/
SUMMARY:Perspectives\, models\, and modal knowledge
DESCRIPTION:Debates on whether conceivability acts as a guide to possibilit
 y have been prominent in the literature on the epistemology of modality. M
 uch less attention has been paid to the role that an epistemic notion of c
 onceivability might play in scientific modelling. In this paper\, I attend
  to two tasks. First\, I introduce an epistemic notion of conceivability t
 hat proves congenial to an ubiquitous class of scientific models\, i.e. pe
 rspectival models qua seemingly inconsistent models for the same target sy
 stem. Second\, I argue that this epistemic notion of conceivability at wor
 k in perspectival models delivers relevant modal knowledge in science (mod
 al knowledge that is not derivative of any prior knowledge of essential pr
 operties). The outcome of this strategy is not just to explore how model-b
 ased natural sciences might inform debates about the epistemology of modal
 ity. But\, also\, to re-assess some thorny issues in philosophy of science
  concerning the role of scientific models &mdash\;known to involve idealiz
 ations and falsehoods &mdash\; in delivering nonetheless important modal k
 nowledge. Perspectival models provide an exemplary case in point given rec
 ent debates on scientific pluralism\, perspectivism\, and the so-called pr
 oblem of inconsistent models.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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