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UID:888@ub.edu
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240523
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240525
DTSTAMP:20250922T112839Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/scientific-objectivity-2/
SUMMARY:Scientific Objectivity
DESCRIPTION:Download poster HEREThursday 2315:00 - 16:30 &mdash\; Tomasz Pl
 acek "On testimony in scenarios with Wigner and Friend&rdquo\;16:45 - 18:1
 5 &mdash\; &nbsp\;Mathias Frisch "Representing and communicating deep unce
 rtainty: The treatment of equilibrium climate sensitivity in AR6&rdquo\;&n
 bsp\;\nFriday 2409:30 - 11:00 &mdash\; Mauro Dorato "The desirability of s
 cientific objectivity"&nbsp\;11:30 - 13:00 &mdash\; Aida Roig&eacute\; "St
 ructural causes of research misconduct in contemporary science"15:00 - 16:
 30 &mdash\; Alfonso Garc&iacute\;a &ldquo\;Modal Modelling&rdquo\;16:45 - 
 18:15 &mdash\; Roman Frigg "Models\, Understanding\, and Trust"\nAbstracts
 :M. Dorato "The desirability of scientific objectivity"In this paper\, I d
 iscuss three different senses of objectivity\, namely&nbsp\;(i) mind-indep
 endent (referred to non-directly observable entities like quarks and Higgs
  boson)(ii) intersubjectively valid (referred to scientific hypotheses)(ii
 i) independent of non-epistemic values (like religious\, political\, econo
 mic values...)\,&nbsp\;Finally\, I defend the desirability of the value of
  scientific objectivity ('objective' is itself a normative term) by reject
 ing arguments against the validity of the fact-value distinction based on 
 cases of inductive risks.R. Frigg "Models\, Understanding\, and Trust"&nbs
 p\;Models play an important role in many scientific contexts. Typically\, 
 models represent their respective target systems and are crucial in derivi
 ng predictions about the target. But models are often taken to be of more 
 than instrumental value in that they are also seen as providing scientists
  with an understanding of the target. Understanding is epistemically cruci
 al not only because it satisfies scientists&rsquo\; curiosity\, but also b
 ecause it increases trust in the model. In what way do models do this and 
 what sort of understanding do models provide? This is the question that th
 e paper explores. &nbsp\;M. Frisch "Representing and communicating deep un
 certainty: The treatment of equilibrium climate sensitivity in AR6&rdquo\;
 In this talk I argue that the so-called &ldquo\;storyline approach&rdquo\;
  provides an important tool for properly taking into account tail-risks in
  climate policy decisions. First\, probability distributions are not an ap
 propriate framework for representing uncertainties in climate projections.
  Second\, in the case of qualitatively improbable yet catastrophic risks i
 t is for pragmatic reasons important to supplement any such framework with
  an explicit representation of high impact scenarios. Third\, process-unde
 rstanding\, which is an integral part of storyline approaches\, can go som
 e way towards addressing the challenge of delineating which possibilities 
 are serious enough to be considered in policy decisions.A. Garc&iacute\;a 
 &ldquo\;Modal Modelling&rdquo\;Several recent accounts of modeling have fo
 cused on a presumably modal dimension of scien&shy\;tific inquiry. The gen
 eral account rests on three claims: (1) there are two kinds of models\, re
 presentational models and models that lack world-linking conditions or rel
 ations of similarity to a target (MM)\; (2) MM provide knowledge about the
  world and this knowledge is modal\, about possibilities\; (3) there is a 
 distinction between objective and epistemic possibility\, and MM mainly pr
 ovide knowledge about objective possibilities. In this talk I critically a
 ssess these claims and defend that if MM provide modal knowledge\, they do
  so by virtue of being "externally coherent".T. Placek "On testimony in sc
 enarios with Wigner and Friend"It is hard to imagine science without a wel
 l-functioning system of transmission of justified beliefs: scientists do r
 ely on results\, experimental or theoretical\, &nbsp\;reported by other sc
 ientists. A recently rekindled interest in Wigner's Friend scenarios (Frau
 chiger and Renner\, 2018\, Nature Communications\, 9(1):3711 and &nbsp\;Br
 ukner\, 2018\, Entropy\, 20) points to a problematic consequence of quantu
 m mechanics: allegedly its inability to secure the transmission of beliefs
  (testimony) about measurement results. We argue that testimony is not lic
 ensed by quantum mechanical formalism\; we discuss some recent attempts to
  save the cogency of testimony in the context of quantum measurements.A. R
 oig&eacute\; "Structural causes of research misconduct in contemporary sci
 ence&rdquo\;Research misconduct stands in the way of scientific objectivit
 y\, and its prevalence has apparently increased: for instance\, retraction
 s have risen sharply in the last two decades at a pace that far outpaces t
 he increase in volume of papers being published\, and surveys to scientist
 s indicate that a significant portion of them know some colleague engaging
  in scientific misconduct. Is this perceived increase in scientific miscon
 duct a product of structural changes in science\, and if so\, how? In this
  talk I will introduce and examine a few how-plausibly mechanisms relating
  systematic factors in scientific organization with questionable research 
 practices\, including misconduct.\n
CATEGORIES:Conferences
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Barcelona)
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 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Barcelona):geo:0,0
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