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UID:263@ub.edu
DTSTART:20180918T130000Z
DTEND:20180918T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T094639Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/self-control-framing-and-ratio
 nality/
SUMMARY:Self-control\, framing\, and rationality
DESCRIPTION:Being influenced by how outcomes are framed is widely held to b
 e a paradigm of irrationality. Yet\, experimental and theoretical discussi
 ons of framing have ignored the most interesting situations in which frami
 ng occurs. These are when an agent or decision-maker consciously and simul
 taneously considers a single outcome or scenario under two different frame
 s and evaluates it differently in each frame. From the perspective of stan
 dard theories of rational decision-making and rational choice\, such clash
 es of frames are not supposed to happen &ndash\; and if they do occur they
  are paradigms of irrationality. The standard view\, I claim\, gets things
  almost completely wrongThere is nothing intrinsically irrational about se
 eing the world in conflicting frames. In fact\, actively engaging competin
 g frames can be a powerful force for rationally engaging with problems tha
 t classical theories of rationality are unable to tackle. This paper appli
 es this basic idea to self-control. Clashes between temptation and self-co
 ntrol can be modeled as clashes of frames and\, I argue\, successful self-
 control can often be a matter of how one frames oneself and one&rsquo\;s g
 oals. Agents exercising self-control can behave perfectly rationally\, des
 pite (and in fact because) they are consciously and simultaneously conside
 ring a single outcome or scenario under two different frames and evaluatin
 g it differently in each frame.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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