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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:531@ub.edu
DTSTART:20170426T130000Z
DTEND:20170426T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T195200Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/self-expression-self-knowledge
 -and-authenticity/
SUMMARY:Self-Expression\, Self-Knowledge\, and Authenticity
DESCRIPTION:               Dorit Bar-On (2004\, 2011\, 2012\, Bar-On &amp\;
  Long 2001) advocates neo-expressivism about self-knowledge as an explanat
 ion of moderate first-person authority of avowals. In this talk\, I will g
 ive a brief overview of Bar-On&rsquo\;s theory and some central criticisms
  of its main assumptions. I then proceed to argue that even if these centr
 al criticisms are assumed solvable\, neo-expressivism still fails to expla
 in first-person authority in a relevant class of avowals: Those that invol
 ve ambiguity between committing oneself to an attitude and expressing a pr
 e-existing attitude. I argue that in cases where this ambiguity exists\, a
 ppealing to the expressive character of avowals does not settle why (or if
 ) these avowals exhibit first-person authority. I conclude that Bar-On&rsq
 uo\;s neo-expressivist theory needs to be augmented by some account of wha
 t &ldquo\;expressive success&rdquo\; consists in\, and suggest that the co
 ncept of authenticity should play a role in it.
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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