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UID:1994@ub.edu
DTSTART:20170509T130000Z
DTEND:20170509T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250928T161836Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/sense/
SUMMARY:Sense
DESCRIPTION:Robert May  (University of California\, Davis)&nbsp\;Sponsored 
 by: Project &ldquo\;Foundations and Methods of Natural Language Semantics&
 rdquo\;(Excelencia programme\, FFI2016-80636-P\, AEI/FEDER\, UE)What is se
 nse? Frege&rsquo\;s answer is this: Sense is what makes a reference thinka
 ble such that in virtue of thinking this way an agent has grounds for maki
 ng a judgement. In this talk\, I explore this conception\, which places se
 nse at the crux of Frege&rsquo\;s account of judgement. The central claim 
 is that sense is a composite notion\, split between what makes a reference
  thinkable (mode of determination) and how we think of references (mode of
  presentation). These are related via grasp: an agent who grasps a mode of
  determination of a reference has a mode of presentation of that reference
 \, and accordingly has grounds for making a judgement. This is crucial to 
 understanding how Frege responded to the threat to logicism posed by the i
 dentity puzzle\, viz. that a = b requires a special act of recognition in 
 judgement. But it does\, perhaps surprisingly\, leave open the analysis a 
 = a.
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
LOCATION:Seminar room of the old department of Logic\, History and Philosop
 hy of Science
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 phy of Science:geo:0,0
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