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UID:1886@ub.edu
DTSTART:20240223T110000Z
DTEND:20240223T130000Z
DTSTAMP:20250928T160328Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/session-6-ayars-deciding-for-o
 thers/
SUMMARY:Session 6: Ayars\, "Deciding for others":
DESCRIPTION:Session 7: Beddor\, B. (2023). "Noncognitivism without expressi
 vism". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research\, 107(3)\, 762&ndash\;788.
 This session took place on 8th March\, 2024\, at 13:00This paper develops 
 a new form of metaethical expressivism according to which the normative ju
 dgment that X should &Phi\; consists in a decision that X &Phi\;. When the
  judgment is first-personal&mdash\;e.g.\, my judgment that I should &Phi\;
 &mdash\;the view is similar to Gibbard&rsquo\;s plan expressivism\, though
  the state I call &ldquo\;decision&rdquo\; differs somewhat from a Gibbard
 -style plan. The deep difference between the views shows in the account of
  third-personal judgments. Gibbard construes the judgment that Mary should
  &Phi\; as a de se plan on the thinker&rsquo\;s part to &Phi\; if she turn
 s out to be Mary (the Subtle View). I construe the judgment as a decision 
 for Mary that Mary &Phi\; (the Simple View). The main argument for Simple 
 Plan Expressivism is that it solves problems for Gibbard&rsquo\;s approach
 \, resonates with a new and interesting moral psychology\, and better make
 s sense of certain independently plausible constraints on normative judgme
 nt. In the end I argue that this account of normative judgment has implica
 tions for first-order ethics\, implying in particular that rational egoism
  as standardly formulated is incoherent.Ayars\, A. (2021)." Deciding for o
 thers: An expressivist theory of normative judgment". Philosophy and Pheno
 menological Research\, 105(1)\, 42&ndash\;61.
LOCATION:via zoom
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