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UID:1807@ub.edu
DTSTART:20220304T100000Z
DTEND:20220304T120000Z
DTSTAMP:20250928T160320Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/seventh-session/
SUMMARY:Seventh session
DESCRIPTION:Peter Kivy claims that expressivists in aesthetics cannot expla
 in why we argue about art. The situation would be different in the case of
  morals. Moral attitudes lead to action\, and since actions affect people\
 , we have a strong incentive to change people&rsquo\;s moral attitudes. Th
 is can explain why we argue about morals\, even if moral language is expre
 ssive of our feelings. However\, judgements about what is beautiful and el
 egant need not significantly affect our lives. So why be concerned with ot
 her people&rsquo\;s feelings about art? Kivy thinks the best explanation o
 f our tendency to argue about art is that we implicitly believe in objecti
 ve facts about aesthetics. This would count against expressivism. I argue 
 two things: that there is no good reason to think that we don&rsquo\;t car
 e about preferences and emotions unless they have significant practical co
 nsequences and that the truth of expressivism about aesthetic language is 
 compatible with beliefs about objective aesthetic facts.&nbsp\;Evers\, Daa
 n (2018)\, "Expressivism and arguing about art". British Journal of Aesthe
 tics\, 58 (2):181-191.
LOCATION:via zoom
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