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VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:278@ub.edu
DTSTART:20191204T130000Z
DTEND:20191204T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T094640Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/singular-thoughts-names-and-fi
 les/
SUMMARY:Singular Thoughts\, Names\, and Files
DESCRIPTION:There is an important cognitive difference between a thought th
 at is directed towards a particular object and a thought that is not so di
 rected but is instead about a certain kind of objects. For example\, there
  is a difference between my thoughts about my brother and my thoughts abou
 t brothers more generally. The former is an example of a singular thought 
 while the latter exemplifies general thoughts. Similarly\, when I come upo
 n a particularly grizzly murder then there is an important cognitive diffe
 rence between my thought that Smith&rsquo\;s murderer is insane when I kno
 w who the murderer is and when I do not have such knowledge. In the former
  case my thought is about a particular person while in the latter case it 
 is not about a particular person but rather about the murderer whoever it 
 might be. Again\, the former exemplifies singular thoughts and the latter 
 general thoughts. While there is a general agreement about there being sin
 gular thoughts and general thoughts there is little agreement on what exac
 tly constitutes a singular thought. Similarly\, there is not much agreemen
 t on the conditions for one acquiring singular thoughts. In particular\, t
 he disagreement about the latter focuses on the one hand on the epistemic 
 requirement of acquaintance and on the other hand on the metaphysical requ
 irement of existence. Even those who insists on an acquaintance requiremen
 t for singular thoughts do not agree on the strength of the acquaintance r
 elation. Most direct reference theorists adhere to what I will call the or
 thodox view when it comes to acquaintance\, namely the view that one can b
 e sufficiently acquainted with an object and so obtain a singular thought 
 about it in virtue of being at the receiving end of a use of a name of the
  object that stretches back to an initial baptism of it. I will argue that
  we have good reasons to doubt the truth of the orthodox view. But even if
  the orthodox view is not right\, one nevertheless has to acknowledge that
  names do play a large role when we exchange information and I will provid
 e an account of mental files that accounts for such a role. My take on men
 tal files will be significantly different from\, and will carry fewer comm
 itments than the influential accounts of Robin Jeshion and Francois Recana
 ti.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia UB
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=C. Montalegre\, 6-8\, Barce
 lona\, 08001\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia UB:g
 eo:0,0
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