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UID:219@ub.edu
DTSTART:20140704T130000Z
DTEND:20140704T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20250915T094552Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/strong-alethic-pluralism/
SUMMARY:Strong alethic pluralism
DESCRIPTION:extra sessionAccording to strong alethic pluralism\, there is n
 o     single truth property possessed by all truths. Instead there are    
  several ways of being true\, and none of them can account for truth     a
 cross all truth-apt discourse. Truth for discourse about     medium-sized 
 dry goods might reduce to correspondence while truth     for mathematical 
 discourse might reduce to coherence with the axioms     of arithmetic. A n
 umber of seemingly devastating objections     confronts so-called strong a
 lethic pluralism. Perhaps for this     reason it is not a widely held view
 . This paper has two aims. The     first aim is to defuse the main objecti
 ons leveled against strong     alethic pluralism. The second is to offer t
 wo arguments in favour of     the view. We start by stating the main objec
 tions to strong     pluralism and then proceed to respond to them. Having 
 done so\, we     present two versions of what we call the &ldquo\;No Resem
 blance Argument&rdquo\;.     The first version aims to show that there is 
 no truth property that     applies across all truth-apt domains. The secon
 d version aims to     establish a more modest conclusion: if there is a tr
 uth property     that applies across all truth-apt domains\, it is less   
   fundamental&mdash\;and\, we want to say\, less real&mdash\;than properti
 es like     correspondence\, coherence\, and superassertibility. Considera
 tions on     naturalness and fundamentality lie at the heart of both versi
 ons of     the argument. We label our second argument the &ldquo\;Dispensa
 bility     Argument&rdquo\;. This argument aims to show that the generic t
 ruth     property endorsed by moderate pluralists is explanatorily     dis
 pensable. The explanatory work that truth needs to do can be done     with
 out appealing to a generic truth property. To the extent that     indispen
 sability is a necessary condition for existence\, this gives     us a reas
 on to think that pluralists should not buy into the     existence of a gen
 eric truth property.
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
LOCATION:Seminari del Departament de Lògica\, Història i Filosofia de la 
 Ciència
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari del Departament de Lògica\, Història i Filosofia de la
  Ciència:geo:0,0
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