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UID:2145@ub.edu
DTSTART:20251204T100000Z
DTEND:20251204T120000Z
DTSTAMP:20251204T115720Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tba-10/
SUMMARY:Another Kind of Overflow: The Two Visual Streams Hypothesis\, Consc
 iousness\, and Qualitative Character
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Many people consider the dorsal visual stream to be 
 a 'zombie': 'merely computational' in nature\, something akin to a 'robot'
  system which the conscious mind or visual system assigns tasks (reaching\
 , grasping) to solve\, but which is utterly different in kind and content 
 to the conscious\, qualitative ventral steam - what we use to survey and d
 escribe a visual scene of colours\, shapes and identifiable objects. Recen
 tly Wayne Wu has argued that\, instead\, and for all the empirical story t
 ells us\, the dorsal stream may instead be a case of what Ned Block has de
 scribed as consciousness 'overflowing' cognitive access. On Wu's hypothesi
 s\, the dorsal stream is conscious\, and has phenomenal/qualitative charac
 ter all of its own\, only it is not introspectible\, and its contents cann
 ot be reported on - it is cognitively isolated. I suggest that a third hyp
 othesis may well make better sense\, since\, among other things\, it prese
 rves the link between consciousness and introspectability: the dorsal stre
 am is unconscious\, but has qualitative character. Hence it has unconsciou
 s qualitative character. This would be an example of qualitative character
  overflowing consciousness\, rather than consciousness overflowing cogniti
 ve access. I will suggest understanding some other alleged cases of Block-
 style overflow in the same way.
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor)
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 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia (UB\, Faculty of Philosophy\, 4th floor):ge
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