BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//wp-events-plugin.com//7.2.3.1//EN
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2140@ub.edu
DTSTART:20251217T140000Z
DTEND:20251217T160000Z
DTSTAMP:20251209T081416Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/tba-8/
SUMMARY:On The Argument from Heuristics
DESCRIPTION:Abstract. The Argument from Heuristics moves from the premise 
 that many data points prompting the revision of philosophical theories are
  the product of fallible heuristics to the conclusion that these same data
  points ultimately warrant no such revision. Earlier criticisms of epistem
 ic contextualism have relied on a similar argument  (cf. Vogel 1990\; Haw
 thorne 2004\, Nagel 2010)\, but the most developed and recent version is d
 ue to Williamson (2024).\nIn this talk\, we outline a principled strategy 
 to coherently reject the conclusion of Williamson’s version of this argu
 ment while at the same time accepting the conclusion of different heuristi
 cs-based arguments. We take stock of the discussion by articulating a gene
 ral methodological upshot: to properly evaluate these arguments\, more att
 ention must be paid to some crucial features of the heuristics at issue.\n
 (Joint work with Sabina Domínguez-Parrado)
CATEGORIES:Seminar
LOCATION:Seminari de Filosofia\, Faculty of Philosophy (4th floor)\, Univer
 sity of Barcelona
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari de Filosofia\, Faculty of Philosophy (4th floor)\, Unive
 rsity of Barcelona:geo:0,0
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR