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UID:1165@ub.edu
DTSTART:20211111T130000Z
DTEND:20211111T150000Z
DTSTAMP:20251116T175445Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/the-phenomenal-concept-strateg
 y-cannot-explain-problem-intuitions/
SUMMARY:The Phenomenal Concept Strategy Cannot Explain Problem Intuitions.
DESCRIPTION:The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining 
 why we think there is a hard problem of consciousness. The meta-problem pr
 omises to help us solve the hard problem. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
 promises to solve both problems at once while allowing for a metaphysics o
 f mind that avoids dualism\, which is hard to defend\, and illusionism whi
 ch is hard to accept. I argue that the strategy fails to fulfil this promi
 se. Standard accounts of the PCS cannot provide an adequate response to th
 e meta-problem because the cognitive isolation of phenomenal concepts is n
 ot the basis of our problem intuitions.
CATEGORIES:Graduate Research Seminar (GRSem)
LOCATION:Zoom
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 ;X-TITLE=Zoom:geo:0,0
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