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UID:2036@ub.edu
DTSTART:20190507T100000Z
DTEND:20190507T120000Z
DTSTAMP:20250928T161911Z
URL:https://www.ub.edu/grc_logos/activities/the-understanding-hypothesis/
SUMMARY:The Understanding Hypothesis
DESCRIPTION:Benedicte Veillet (University of Michigan-Flint) It&rsquo\;s ha
 rd to shake the intuition that something epistemologically significant hap
 pens to Mary the omniscient neuroscientist when she first sees color. Yet 
 it has proved difficult for physicalists to satisfactorily describe Mary&r
 squo\;s epistemological progress. There are\, of course\, prominent physic
 alist stories of what happens to her&mdash\;e.g. she acquires know-how\, o
 r tokens new demonstrative thoughts&mdash\;but objections to these stories
  repeatedly stress the fact that in Mary&rsquo\;s context the relevant eve
 nts simply wouldn&#39\;t be epistemically significant enough. &nbsp\;Here 
 I propose a (somewhat) novel physicalist account of what might make Mary&r
 squo\;s first experience of color epistemologically significant. The idea 
 is that over and above the acquisition of know-how and of demonstrative th
 oughts\, Mary will also gain understanding of color and color experiences 
 when she first sees color. Drawing on a recent\, independently motivated a
 ccount of understanding (Wilkenfeld\, forthcoming)\, and a range of cases 
 involving visualization in the philosophy of science\, I will argue that o
 ne can gain understanding of a phenomenon without thereby coming to know a
  new fact about it--and that such a gain can indeed be epistemologically s
 ignificant.
CATEGORIES:Extra talks
LOCATION:Seminari Ramon Llull (UB\, Barcelona)
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=\, Spain;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100
 ;X-TITLE=Seminari Ramon Llull (UB\, Barcelona):geo:0,0
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